tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33696073926502993112024-03-08T06:40:39.279-08:00Post-Soviet politicsRasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.comBlogger32125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-49229583378078168792014-09-14T15:53:00.001-07:002014-09-14T15:53:08.919-07:00Response to Dr Ian Klinke's comments<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background: #FAFBFB; color: #4e5665; font-family: "Helvetica","sans-serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Thank you for your
detailed (and still very lucid :)) response. I follow your argument - with a
few exceptions:</span><span style="color: #4e5665; font-family: "Helvetica","sans-serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$5:0" />
<br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$7:0" />
<span style="background: #FAFBFB;"><span data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$8:0">Russia's annexation of Crimea is not comparable to Kosovo's split from
Serbia. Kosovo became a sovereign state (if only recognised by some existing
states), as did Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although Kosovo, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia remain largely dependent on their patrons, the patrons' willingness to
afford them sovereignty does count. Norms, as you know, tend to get a life of
their own. We have already seen Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia act in ways
contrary to their patrons (i.e. the USA and NATO, and Russia, respectively).
Crimea, conversely, is formally a part of the Moscow vertikal - with no
sovereign room. This also creates a dangerous precedent for regions contested
by actors outside the post-Soviet space.</span></span><br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$9:0" />
<br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$11:0" />
<span style="background: #FAFBFB;"><span data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$12:0">The West, as a whole, has had a long-term involvement in Ukraine and
Georgia. Yet the West did not support the breakup of the USSR (with the
exception of the Baltics), NATO clearly rebuffed Ukraine and Georgia in 2008,
and NATO has shown no interest in military involvement in Ukraine - Russia's
annexation of Crimea was met with words only; little else has happened in
eastern Ukraine. I fail to see how this is NATO's proxy war - NATO would like
the problem to go away, thank you very much, so it can concentrate on Isis (and
maybe China and North Korea for the US). NATO is strengthening its position in
Eastern Europe, but at the request (i.e. demands) of the Baltics and Poland, in
particular. I doubt if more weapons in Eastern Europe will promote peace (and
no, NATO has no plan for what to do with Russia or itself in the coming years),
but Russia has no right to decide Polish or Baltic defence policy (and, indeed,
vice versa).</span></span><br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$13:0" />
<br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$15:0" />
<span style="background: #FAFBFB;"><span data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$16:0">No, I do not expect much on the "war crimes tribunal" front.
Kosovars and Bosniaks have perhaps also been treated too lightly, yet we can
add plenty of examples from Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel etc. My hope is slightly
(or very...) quixotic, but helping Ukraine to address any war crimes their
forces may have committed would send a stronger sign to the Kremlin than any
guns could.</span></span><br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$17:0" />
<br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$19:0" />
<span style="background: #FAFBFB;"><span data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$20:0">As per your wish I will refrain here from prolonging the debate on
"fascist Russia." I just want to point out that by
"fascist" I don't mean "bad" - I mean "fascist,"
as an ideology such as "liberal,""conservative," etc. The
US has plenty of wars and some chauvinism on its record, and for me its
democracy leaves much to be desired. Yet corporatism is mainly absent, there is
plenty of room for expressing opposition to the state (e.g. shown in popular
culture), no president in recent memory has succeeded in becoming a Leader /
Strongman, diversity is officially (if not always effectively) promoted.
Whether this makes the US a "better" state than Russia is moot - I
think so, but that debate would lead us into a long discussion of ethics. My
points here simply are: (a) if your remove the epithet "fascist," the
Russian elite today (and much of the country) would sign up to fascism's
attributes as I outlined them. The (mostly) liberal West would not. That lack
of mutual comprehension risks increasing the distance between Russia and the
West - a distance which I would like to see minimised as soon as possible; (b)
liberalism has plenty of flaws - as seen for instance in the financial crisis
and social hardship in the West since 2008. Yet liberalism allows for the
existence of minorities and minority opinions. True, such opinions are often
suppressed economically, politically, socially and - sometimes - militarily by
the West, but the principle of tolerance remains, unlike in fascism. Much worse
- and this is really my fear now - much of the West now seems ready to say
"sod Russia - that weird country" which leaves adrift not only a
glorious country but also those Russians who might not have high opinions of
the state. I fear for those Russians, if the Kremlin and the West both abandon
them.</span></span><br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$21:0" />
<br data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$23:0" />
<span style="background: #FAFBFB;"><span data-reactid=".1k.1:3:1:$comment10152275718350952_10152278554735952:0.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1:$comment-body.0.$end:0:$24:0">The early 1990s certainly witnessed many lost opportunities, including in
relation to NATO. Most fundamentally, perhaps, it was a great loss that most
countries in Central and Eastern Europe still felt they needed protection from
Russia. That is certainly not just Russia's fault; NATO - and the West as a
whole - should actively have presented and promoted ideas of a common European
security space, instead of simply floundering. Now, we need to start those
discussions, even if an inclusion of Russia in such a space would probably have
to wait at least 5-10 years (or, I fear, much more...).<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span></span><o:p></o:p></div>
Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-32746966985832807092014-09-13T03:53:00.003-07:002014-09-13T03:53:28.316-07:00Response to Dr Ian Klinke's article "NATO: the alliance that should have been dissolved"<div class="MsoNormal">
Dear Ian.<o:p></o:p></div>
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On your article, I find it interesting on a number of
points. I think you are absolutely right to note that Russia is not the only
cause of instability in eastern Ukraine. Recently, some observers - notably Ben
Judah in the New York Times - called for military assistance, and troops, from
the West to Ukraine. Among others I was not
convinced how such a step would enhance Ukrainian or indeed regional
security. Similarly, I cannot help but see your point that NATO has been
anything but a passive bystander in relation to Ukraine. As with the EU this
problem began years ago. Ukraine was de facto refused entry to NATO while at
the same time the country was expected by NATO to come closer to
"our" side, leaving Ukraine in a dangerous limbo. In retrospect, it
is perhaps not surprising that some members of the Russian elite perceived a
battle - bloody or otherwise - was taking place with the West on the future of
Ukraine.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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You suggest that NATO has an identity crisis. Few observers,
I believe, would fully disagree with you here. Following the end of the Cold
War during the 1990s NATO was, for most intents and purposes, simply another
Western "club" which former socialist states could join.
Subsequently, events in Kosovo and Central Asia have given NATO concrete jobs
to do, yet it probably remains most correct to say that these were American
projects with a NATO sheen - "coalitions of the willing," indeed,
which, certainly, was never the point of NATO where members of course are
expected to help each other when they otherwise might be most unwilling to do
so. Now, the fear might remain that Ukraine, and Central and Eastern Europe
more generally, is the latest American project into which the rest of NATO is
being dragged. Clearly, you have a good point in stressing that the Ukrainian
military has been responsible for civilian deaths in eastern Ukraine – and that
some of this responsibility might constitute war crimes. Arguably not the best
partner for NATO to arm.<o:p></o:p></div>
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With all this said, however, I still do take issue with some
points in your article. You mention that the fighting in Ukraine is NATO’s “proxy
war,” just as you suggest NATO is “beating the war drum.” Now, in order for
this to hold up, I think, one of two conditions would have to be fulfilled.
Either, NATO would have to have actively helped to start and expand the war in
Ukraine; or the mere existence of NATO would have provoked the war in the first
place. I am afraid I do not see either of these conditions in place here. That
NATO should actively have started and/or expanded the war in Ukraine does not
seem to be the message from your article. And, certainly, all signs during the
toppling of Viktor Ianukovych showed that NATO (and Russia) were taken aback. I
appreciate that some Western politicians, such as John McCain, actively and vociferously
campaigned in Kyiv for the removal of a democratically elected president. Yet
McCain, for all his follies, does not represent NATO. The organisation, in
fact, kept very much in the background until Crimea had been annexed by Russia.
The second explanation, that the existence of NATO has provoked this war does
ring true for me, but only in the limited sense, I hinted at above. The fact
that NATO for many years has been unwilling to state clearly whether Ukraine
belongs inside or outside the organisation (or even the “sphere of interests”
of NATO) is a contributing factor to the war. Yet, from this point, I cannot
conclude that Ukraine and Europe would be better off if NATO disappeared. On
the contrary, I believe that NATO now needs to assert itself and its mission in
a much clearer fashion than before.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Ian, I do not believe in a Europe, or a world, that is
divided into “spheres of interest,” belonging to a range of great powers. Now,
I do not claim that your article is advocating this – yet the elite of Russia
is, and so are many observers in the West for whom the actions of Russia today
are understandable and must be taken into account. Right now, this almost seems
to be the dominant tone of the debate in my Denmark. Still, if we are not to
have “spheres of interest” as the founding norm of international relations, of
what should such a norm consist? Well, I fear that the least bad option here
for me remains the norm of state sovereignty. This point comes with a number of
caveats, the largest one of which is that I remain a strong believer in
humanitarian intervention when required. Humanitarian intervention has been somewhat
discredited following the debacle in Iraq (and elsewhere), yet its necessity in
rare circumstances remains. Hence, it could be argued that the elites of
Russia, having witnessed the violent deposition of Ianukovych, honestly feared
that Ukrainian nationalists would assault Russians throughout Ukraine,
including in areas with an overwhelming Russian population, such as Crimea and
eastern Ukraine.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Reports from the UN soon pointed out, that Russians in
Ukraine were not threatened by Ukrainian nationalists. The interim government
did suggest a law to remove Russian as official language – a suggestion, which
a sensible interim president immediately discarded. Ukrainian nationalist candidates
had no chance in the subsequent presidential election. Thus, I cannot agree
with your assertion that Ukraine has done little to diffuse nationalist
tension. Certainly, though, the subsequent war has increased the presence of
intolerance in Ukraine, and there is no doubt that very worrying nationalist,
racist and other forces now fight as paramilitaries for the separatist and
government sides alike. Having said this, however, I fail to see that NATO
support for Ukraine equals Russian support for the separatists. All accounts I
have seen indicate that conditions in the separatist-held areas have remained
dangerously lawless, even when Ukrainian troops were not near. With the
deplorable exception of Odessa, this has not been the case in Ukrainian-held
territory. Certainly, Ukrainian shelling of civilian areas has been a
substantial part of the reason for the lawlessness in eastern Ukraine. Yet the
difference remains that Ukrainian military personnel can (and absolutely
should) be held responsible for all war crimes committed. The West must insist
on this; and while I am not overly optimistic about this happening, at least in
the state of Ukraine there is someone to hold to account. Whom do we hold
responsible on the nebulous side of the separatists?<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
But leaving all this to a side for the moment, let us assume
– for the sake of the argument – that Russia had somewhat humanitarian reasons
to enter Ukraine. Let us agree that the war has cost immense suffering for the
civilian population of eastern Ukraine. If, under these circumstances, Putin’s
Russian military now entered eastern Ukraine, and Crimea, just to stop the
fighting and to hold the Ukrainian regime to account, then the intervention
might be justified. Forget for the moment that Russian military assistance has
inflamed the fighting for months; forget, likewise, that Russian soldiers and
equipment have been part of the fighting for a long time, too. If the Russian
regime wants to ensure peace and tolerance for all in Ukraine then Russia, as a
neighbouring state, might do well in ending the fighting now – and NATO, by
extension, might do well to stay away. In fact, if Russia can begin to play the
role of guarantor of stability and civilian safety in the post-Soviet region –
if Russia can help to guarantee that the populations of Ukraine and other
post-Soviet states can enjoy the sovereignty of their increasingly
well-governed states – then NATO should perhaps be drawn back, slowly
dismantled, to be gradually replaced with negotiations for pan-European
security stretching this time really from the Atlantic to Vladivostok. Certainly,
the USA would probably be happy to turn his full attention to China and what
promises to be some tense years in East Asia.<o:p></o:p></div>
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And yet, Ian, this is not the Russia of which we today can
speak. Russia did not insert troops on Crimea in order to force Ukraine to
treat the inhabitants of the peninsula better. Instead, Russia promoted a
Crimean political party with 4% support from the previous local election to the
role of governing force capable of developing an unfree, unfair referendum that
justified the first land-grab in Europe since the Second World War. This is not
Kosovo – it is not even Abkhazia and South Ossetia for here, at least, the
contested areas are recognised as sovereign by Russia. A small difference you
may think, yet states whose sovereignty is recognised have a tendency to gain
more and more autonomy for themselves; something arguably visible with the two
republics in the Caucasus. Yet not with Crimea, which has now become the symbol
of the simple premise that “might makes right.” And a world built on such a
premise, the Soviet Union and Russia until quite recently clearly understood,
is a dangerous world in which states with justification can look anxiously for the
possibilities and dangers of conquest.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Now, you and I of course both know that many other factors
besides sovereignty guard international stability. Some international
institutions, for instance, have shown an ability to solve international
disputes with a minimum of tension. Arguably, NATO does not have a good record
here; not least due to the exclusive, militarised nature of this institution.
Thus, it might seem sensible to dismantle NATO and replace it instead with a
body of understandings and treaties that could foster a pan-European security
framework, including Russia. Yet, for me it is today difficult to see how such
a framework could be created. The elite of Russia today has substantial
resentment for the West. In Moscow, there is a clear feeling that the West has
treated Russia poorly since the end of the Cold War, and that the West seeks to
keep Russia down whenever possible. The merits or otherwise of this impression
are moot, yet there is little doubt for me that Russia’s elite saw the
deposition of Ianukovych in precisely this vein. Clearly, the activities of
NATO during the last decades have contributed to this Russian wish for
revanchism, yet removing NATO now would not convince elites in Russia of the
beneficence of the West. Unfortunately, for the time being, the resentment will
stay in place. It will also be accompanied by a search for justice for Russia;
a belief in Russia that there is a just place for Russia in the international
system and that Russia should seek this place with whatever means possible.
Now, unfortunately, beyond the idea that Russia should be a great power with a
regional sphere of interests what would constitute a just world in Russian
optics remains rather vague. Consequently, while Russian diplomatic and
military manoeuvres in and around Ukraine have often been tactically sound, on
a strategic level they have been haphazard. Yet even if a clear Russian
strategy for a just world order could be conjured, this does not imply that
neighbouring states and their populations should acquiesce. Populations of
regions such as Crimea and the Donbass might wish for independence – and this
might conceivably be accommodated through democratic means such as is happening
shortly in Scotland – yet Russia, just as other actors outside Ukraine, has no
right to force this through. And right does matter if we are not to start
doubting the entire post-World War II web of (admittedly very constructed)
borders – or perhaps have a look at the North Caucasus?<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Even though the elite of Russia today is revanchist in
relation to the West, and seeks to create a just (as opposed to an ordered)
world – and even if we assume these are developments to be resisted by the West
– it does not automatically follow that NATO is the instrument with which to check
the Russian state. In many ways NATO is a poor instrument for the task. Being
blatantly unwilling to send troops and serious military equipment to Ukraine, NATO
is reduced to strengthen its presence in its existing member states such as the
Baltics and Poland. I am not quite convinced that an increased NATO-presence in
Central and Eastern Europe will sufficiently comfort local regimes, who may
still fear Russian attacks through non-traditional means, such as by the recent
kidnapping of the Estonian security official. Yet NATO remains the least bad
option here; at least for the time being. If NATO were disbanded now, a
belligerent yet floundering Russia would be opposed by a range of European
states, which in many ways are equally floundering and could quickly become
equally belligerent, squaring up to Russia. A pan-European security agreement
would be ideal, yet I for one see no reason why the current Russian state
should be trusted to adhere to such agreements or to respect for sovereignty,
for that matter. Unfortunately, in the foreseeable future this lack of trust
might well grow.<o:p></o:p></div>
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This is because, I believe, the nature of the Russian state
and its development. Russia today is increasingly becoming a fascist state.
Mind you – not a Nazi state, although these two terms are often confused,
especially in Russia. By a fascist Russia I mean a Russia that has the state (and
the leader) as the highest ideal, that favours corporatism and a modicum of
expansion in the surrounding region, that is increasingly militarised, and that
shows signs of chauvinism. Conversely, racialism and worldwide expansion are
irrelevant here. (My apologies for spelling out such basics to you, but I have
come into the habit of closely defining fascism, before people accuse me of
comparing Putin and Hitler; Putin and Franco might be a better bet). This is relevant
here, because such a Russia will increasingly be distanced from the European
community of values (and yes, I do believe such a community exists). Possibly,
Russia might drag Belarus away, too (although I doubt it), but an iron wall of incompatibility
and perhaps incomprehension is being constructed between Russia and the rest of
Europe. The existence of NATO certainly does not prevent this development, yet –
I believe – the absence of NATO would today not prevent it, either. Instead,
unfortunately, the West is forced to retain NATO for the simple reason that
lack of trust and mutual understanding between Putin’s Russia and the West will
remain for the foreseeable future and, at least, as long as Russian state
ideology remains fascist. This is not a shout for all the glories of “democracy,”
(however ill defined) but simply my conviction that some basics of Western
political ideology – including a respect for individuals and a non-militarised
solution to problems in the areas surrounding “us” – are going to, and should,
remain. And if I take this normative position I cannot possibly accept any
international imposition of a Russian fascist state ideology. This does not
mean that the West by force should seek to change Russian ideology – an
impossible and in many ways pointless task – but it does mean that we should
recognise our fundamental differences with the Russian state of today, and take
the necessary precautions against Russia, such as by ensuring the Baltics,
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania that their right to sovereignty will be ensured by
the EU and, yes, by NATO.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On a concluding note, however, this leads me to a final
concern. Leaving Ukraine to a side, it remains unlikely that Russia would
openly intervene in NATO member-states. Low-level provocations will remain yet,
frankly, Russia can ill afford a long-lasting dispute. Already, Western
sanctions are hurting a stuttering Russian economy much more than Russian sanctions
are able to hurt the West (a Russian halt to energy transfers to the rest of
Europe would be similarly catastrophic for the Russian economy in the medium
term). So some sort of modus vivendi will probably be found as the shooting
dies down in Ukraine (Donbass as the next Transnistria remains quite possible).
Nevertheless, in such a modus vivendi the Russians will remain “others.” Not
such a big problem for the many talented Russians living and working in the
West, who should easily be able to carve out a position for themselves, and not
such a problem for those people living in Russia who agree to support the glory
of the Russian state with their existence. Yet what to do for those people in
Russia who do not support the state above all else; who do not see Putin as the
ultimate leader; who seek to be politically, economically, culturally, gender-based
different? Well these Russians, on whose behalf the West for so many years has
been willing to shout, will now be left on their own. Lumped together, by the
West, with other people in Russia in the category of “others” / “outsiders” / “barbarians.”
These people in Russia may well be forgotten in the coming years. And that would
become yet another tragedy in this sad tale.</div>
Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-41980345215285601882014-09-02T04:49:00.002-07:002014-09-02T04:49:16.973-07:00Endgame approachingAutumn is approaching - for nature and for Europe. Or at least for the Europe we have known since 1991. At best, we are heading back to a continent with two opposed military parties. At worst...well, let's not go there, quite yet.<br />
<br />
What does Russia want? Just a "common-sense peace" if the government is to be believed. For Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, war is outmoded - and sanctions are, too. (<a href="http://ria.ru/politics/20140901/1022260960.html">Putin o sanktsiiakh</a>) Yet the armed forces of Ukraine shoot at civilians. So of course civilians must be defended by armed fighters in eastern Ukraine (<a href="http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/9/1/703274.html">V Evrope predpochitaiut ne samechat' rasstrel ukrainskimi voennymi zhilykh kvartalov</a>) - and perhaps by Russia, too? The Ukrainian government only wants war and try to undermine all attempts at peace, says Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. (<a href="http://itar-tass.com/politika/1414975">Vashington, Briussel i NATO podstegivaiut partiiu voiny v Kieve</a>) So the Ukrainian military must move out of - or be removed from - eastern Ukraine and agree to an immediate ceasefire. (<a href="http://russian.rt.com/article/47925">V Minske budet obsuzhdat'sia prekrashchenie ognia</a>) When that has been achieved Russia and Ukraine can again each agreements on natural gas deliveries, to the benefit of all of Europe. (<a href="http://itar-tass.com/ekonomika/1413158">Rossiia i Ukraina gotovy provesti trekhstoronniuiu vstrechu po gazu 6 sentiabria</a>)<br />
<br />
There is a kernel of truth to these Russian claims. In eastern Ukraine fighting has taken place in residential areas. And as the state with <i>de jure</i> sovereignty over this area, Ukraine has a responsibility to ensure a minimum of civilian casualties, also to the detriment of military aims. Whether Ukraine has shown such duty of care is not clear now, but the rest of the world must insist - now and later - on complete transparency of the actions committed by the military forces of Ukraine. If necessary, the West must insist on sanctions against any Ukrainian forces found to have committed crimes against the civilian population, through intent or neglect.<br />
<br />
Similarly, as much as Ukraine and the West today want to distance themselves from Russia, the issue of energy deliveries remains. The European Union, and perhaps even Ukraine, could scrape through the coming winter without Russian oil and natural gas, yet this will cause economic pain for Europe in a way, which the continent only now seems to understand. In the longer run energy from the USA and elsewhere might help Europe to escape from Russian energy, but that will only enforce the division now strengthening just east of Riga, of Warsaw and of Kyiv.<br />
<br />
And the division is there to stay. Russia keeps on seeing NATO as a threat, especially if the military infrastructure of the organisation is seen to threaten Russian territory. That is a sinister message, considering that Russia today sees Crimea as its territory. (<a href="http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/09/02/rossiya-rascenit-agressiyu-protiv-kryma-kak-agressiyu-protiv-vsey-strany.html">Novaia voennaia doktrina</a>). There is little sign so far that Putin will back away from the peninsula and the new, Russian map of Europe (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-28961152">Canada and Russia in Twitter fight over map</a>) - or indeed back away from its "defence of peace and civilians" in eastern Ukraine. (<a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-s-talk-of-statehood-for-east-ukraine-puts-pressure-on-kiev-/506246.html">Putin's talk of statehood for East Ukraine puts pressure on Kiev</a>) And now it looks as if Ukraine and the West have finally taken up the challenge.<br />
<br />
Have Russian troops invaded Ukraine? In effect, this seems likely. However, what really matters is that everyone now acts as if this has happened. Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine, now speaks of a direct Russian attack (<a href="http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/26561127.html">Priama agresiia Rosiii proty Ukraiiny dokorinno zminiue sytuatsiiu u zoni boiiv</a>) - and his government has called for the entry of Ukraine into NATO. Ukraine in NATO - if that is not a red line for Putin's Russia, then nothing is. Crucially, not only is the idea of Ukrainian membership not rejected by NATO's General Secretary, Anders Rasmussen, but he has presented plans for a NATO "rapid response force" that is openly directed against Russia. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/nato-high-readiness-spearhead-force-counter-russian-threat">NATO to create high-readiness force to counter Russian threat</a>).<br />
<br />
Now, in itself such a force makes good sense for NATO. Rapid reaction forces are increasingly needed by the international actors of the world to handle modern warfare. Russian military reform has itself been moving in this direction. Similarly, Rasmussen and others in Europe can say with justification in the preservation of peace that the involvement of Russia in Ukraine is unacceptable, and that Russia must be prevented from further aggression, in Ukraine and elsewhere.<br />
<br />
The problem is, though, that there currently is no sign that anybody is willing to back down. If Putin is (allegedly) heard saying that he "could take Kyiv in two weeks," (<a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-comment-on-taking-kiev-in-2-weeks-misinterpreted-aide-says/506271.html">Putin comment on "taking Kiev in two weeks" twisted, aide says</a>), Ukrainian Minister of Defence Valerii Heletei writes that Ukraine must be prepared for a war in which tens of thousands may die. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/politics/2014/09/140902_russian_mid_geletey_reaction_sa.shtml">MES Rosiii nesadovolene zaiavamy Heleteia</a>). Dalia Grybauskaite, President of Lithuania, says that Russia is at war with Europe. (<a href="http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/658653/grybauskaite-rusija-praktiskai-pradejo-kara-su-europa#.VAWnA_ldVO8">Rusija "praktishkai pradejo kara su Europa"</a>). From the US, Mike Rogers, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, says that the US must arm Ukraine now before another Syria is created. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/01/uk-ukraine-crisis-usa-lawmakers-idUKKBN0GV0JX20140901">U.S. lawmakers call for arming Ukraine government</a>). For Heavens sake, even the EU - war-averse little EU - is about to have a foreign policy chief, who sees the "strategic partnership" between the Union and Russia as dead, even if she at least wants to stick to diplomacy. (<a href="http://www.corriere.it/esteri/14_settembre_01/mogherini-putin-non-rispetta-patti-ma-diplomazia-resta-l-unica-strada-90968ad6-3197-11e4-a94c-7f68b8e9ffdd.shtml">Putin non rispetta i patti</a>) But not everyone seems to agree with Federica Mogherini, as would largely have been the case just a month ago.<br />
<br />
Now, probably the situation is less dire than it seems. Putin's people have been quick to downplay any threat against Ukrainian statehood. Poroshenko and Heletya have not argued for war against Russia, but for Russia to get out of Ukraine. NATO gives no indication that military action against Russia is forthcoming. And the exhortations of Rogers et al seem to have little impact on President Barack Obama, who has plenty to do in Syria. Yet especially the calamity of the Middle East - and other incoming political crises such as Britain's fight to retain Scotland - still prevents Ukraine from getting the undivided attention of the West. The Baltics, and other NATO states, would not suffer from such neglect and Putin's Russia, consequently, will almost certainly not cross that line. Yet if Russia has now invaded Ukraine then two of the largest states in Europe are at war. And the West, still, seems to have no plan for ending this - apart from sanctions that came too late and, at the very least, will need more time to work. Worse, the West seems to have no plan for what to do with Ukraine - or with Russia - in the longer run.<br />
<br />
Maybe a solution starts with Europe itself. What sort of Europe do we want? Can it include armed aggression - at a price - or should international law and sovereignty always outweigh economic considerations? If aggression can be acceptable, then Russia is effectively welcome to take over eastern Ukraine (and to keep invaded Crimea). To take whatever else Putin can get his hands on. And Russia and Ukraine alike are welcome to ignore civilian casualties. In return - once a stalemate has been reached - "negotiations for peace" can commence.<br />
<br />
Yet if aggression is never acceptable then the West must make that clear now. If it is claimed by the West that Russia directly violates peace in Europe then no collaboration with the Russian state can be possible until Russian forces are completely and unequivocally out of eastern Ukraine, and out of Crimea. No ifs and no buts! With this solution - probably now the least bad of many truly terrible options - the West and Russia are in a state of bloodless war. The consequences of which will be felt for years and maybe decades to come.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-30741791938252959942014-07-20T13:19:00.001-07:002014-07-20T13:19:30.433-07:00Business as usual?Has the world really changed with the crash of MH17? In fact, what does it take to change a world, a region, a conflict? The shooting down of a civilian airplane? Not at Moneron Island in 1983, it didn't; nor in the Persian Gulf five years later. Moscow delayed, then accused the plane of spying. Washington just stuck to the story of how the crisis was Iran's fault, anyway.<br />
<br />
Does it matter that so many of the dead this time are European? No, it shouldn't, but does it? For how much the world / the West gets involved? OK, many Americans died in 1983, but that was the Soviet Union, for crying out loud, the "Empire of Evil" - the Soviets were supposed to do this sort of stuff! (how the deuce Rust ever made it...did he not watch Firefox?) Does the West have the same expectations of Russia now? Should it have? Oh, in what a difficult dilemma does Volodia find himself...<br />
<br />
What to do, what to do, if you sit behind the walls of the Kremlin? The Russian leadership mostly seems intent on downplaying the crash. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that Russia and the US have agreed an independent inquiry and adherence to the Geneva Principles for peace in Ukraine. Like a great power Russia yearns to be important, to be indispensable in international affairs. But, see, this is what Volodia and his chums have a problem understanding: Being indispensable does not a great power make. It does not even a medium power make. A great power actually tries to solve something; to develop situations, to help somehow. And that, alas, seems very far from the capabilities of today's Russian regime.<br />
<br />
Did Volodia and Dima sit at the controls, playing Space Invaders with holiday-goers? You know, I don't think they did. And I don't think many observers, apart perhaps from some members of the Ukrainian leadership, would suspect the Russian elite of having declared war on the world. Yet the crime of which many observers are accusing the Russian leadership is the crime of neglect; neglect in the Pandoran sense where the jack-in-the-box is replaced with warheads. To show that Russia is indispensable, yes. But perhaps irresponsible, too.<br />
<br />
Russian political analyst Iulia Latynina very interestingly stated that Russia has now "been caught up with" Gaddafi and bin Laden. No, Latynina is not saying anything as simple as "Russia is a terror-state." Instead, I think, her point is that Volodia is well on his way to making his state (sorry, the state of all Russians over which Volodia has claimed ownership) improper - dare we say "uncivilised" - in international affairs. This is not because Volodia is a "bad man," but because he seems caught between several illusions of what actually makes a civilised state in/of international affairs.<br />
<br />
There is an old story, told to me more than a decade ago, about the Soviet embassy in West Berlin. Now, this was of course one of the most important centres of espionage activity for the Soviet Union (and everyone else) during the Cold War. At the embassy was a spy-master, an analyst capable of putting together highly detailed analyses of Western affairs based on information from the myriad of Soviet agents in the field sending him any and all possible pieces of information of which they could get hold. Then, one day the spy-master had to go back to Moscow suddenly, family matters I believe, and his replacement was not quickly found. Yet while his post remained empty, all the little agents milling about kept sending the embassy all sorts of information, in a wonderful confusion of absolutely no order of priority at all, for these little agents could not themselves conduct analysis. It was not their job. Sometimes, it does matter that Volodia is a former field agent in the Soviet foreign intelligence service...<br />
<br />
Yet I digress. A friend of mine, a very competent analyst, pointed out shortly after the crash that there was an outside risk Ukraine might have shot down the plane. While I agree with the possibility that Ukraine might have mistaken the plane for a Russian spy plane I would assume that the Ukrainian military would have the technology and training to recognise civilian versus military aircraft, especially considering the frequency with which civilian aircraft overflew the area of the crash. Similarly, all thoughts of the plane crashing "by itself," so to speak, seem to have been debunked. So the quite strong suspicion remains that the plane was shot down by separatists based in eastern Ukraine; separatists over which Russia admits to have influence; and over which Russia has control according to the West.<br />
<br />
And here we are back at Volodia's illusions. Hands up, who remembers the Sochi Winter Olympics? Come on - they even had Sugarpova at the opening ceremony... I joke, but the tragedy - and for Volodia this is a tragedy - is that the Sochi Olympics actually went quite well. Good organisation, welcoming to spectators (well, not the Circassians, but you know...), great venues, and engaged spectators. Even quite a few Russian medals. So hunky-dory all! Yet (and now for the tragic part) Volodia meant for the Winter Olympics to change the image of Russia and his regime abroad. The guy really wants to be loved. And, in terms of international perceptions of Russia (or domestic perceptions, for that matter), the Winter Olympics did diddly-squat.<br />
<br />
You see, Volodia, you've got to make up your mind now! If you really want to be a scary leader of a scary country, you can be that - well, you can try anyway. Yet you better make damn sure to get better at it real quickly, because - right now - you're not that scary, at all. And if you really want to be lovable, then you can be that, too - maybe, sort of - but you've clearly got some work to do there, too.<br />
<br />
Don't get me wrong: the brutal incineration of almost 300 innocent souls, the subsequent mistreatment of their bodies and the (alleged) disappearance of some of their effects is horrifying and has left the world reeling in shock. But the overall picture, emerging more and more clearly, is one of idiotic incompetence - more Clouseau in a Dumb State than Cushing in a Death Star...<br />
<br />
No, Volodia, you (probably) did not order that drunk militia-man to fire warning shots at the OSCE. No, Volodia, you (probably) did not order the separatist administrations to move pieces of the wreckage back and forth so many times that separatist leaders now seem uncertain of whether they have the black boxes or not. But, Volodia, nobody in the West gives a damn! You have made so certain to create and consolidate a "power vertikal" not just in Russia but in much of the other successor states, too, that you can now be blamed for pretty much anything bad happening there. You are, in Philip Hammond's slightly hyperbolic words, leading Russia towards the status of a "pariah state." And, in the Daily Mail's phrase, for such a state "THERE'LL BE HELL TO PAY!" (on a side note, could somebody please take the nice people at the Daily Mail into a warm, comfortable room, hold their hands and explain to them, with compassion, that it would be best for everyone if they could now be quiet and let the grown-ups do the talking. Maybe Daily Mail could concentrate on gardening and nature...or maybe not, they'll probably just get their badgers in a twist again...)<br />
<br />
Yet if Volodia's Russia can be blamed for all things wicked, and at the same time look oh so befuddled, then it is "business as usual," and then Volodia is in the worst of all worlds. If he didn't care about the West, Volodia's problem would be less. As a state Russia remains easily strong enough to ward off direct threats to its sovereignty; threats to Volodia's sovereignty will come from inside his regime, if at all. Sanctions can hurt Russia, yet now China offers a way out (well, a redirection to a slightly slower-cooking soup, but anyway...). Yet Volodia's Russia is not a great power, and won't become a great power, for "with great power comes great responsibility." Right now, I'm afraid, Russia is showing neither.<br />
<br />
There is a story that then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, in 1993 responded to public panicking over chaotic monetary reforms with the words:<br />
<i><br /></i>
<i>"</i><span style="background-color: white; color: #252525; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 22.399999618530273px;"><i>Хотели как лучше, а получилось как всегда." </i></span><br />
<br />
No, Volodia is not a nice fellow, but neither is he a tough decisive leader (Nicholas I would find the comparison rather insulting) and the above sentence is very much in danger of becoming Volodia's epitaph.<br />
<br />
Especially is he continues with his "business as usual."Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-7466437773563447332014-07-17T14:07:00.001-07:002014-07-17T14:07:53.125-07:00Into the maelstromThis is what we know so far:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>At 4.41 pm BST today Reuters.uk reported that a Malaysian airplane had crashed on the ground in eastern Ukraine.</li>
<li>The flight was MH17 from Malaysian Airlines flying at 10 kilometre altitude from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.</li>
<li>An official from the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior stated the plane had been shot down by a BUK surface-to-air missile, and that all 295 passengers and crew had died. The Ukrainian government stated it was not involved, and suggested the plane may have been shot down, comparing it to recent attacks by separatists on Ukrainian military planes.</li>
<li>Aleksandr Borodai, prominent in the separatist forces, claimed the plane had been shot down by the Ukrainian Air Force.</li>
<li>A range of commercial airlines have declared they now will not fly over eastern Ukraine.</li>
</ul>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
It is now certain that the plane did crash, leading to the death of almost 300 people. Which are the possible explanations for this horrific event?</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<ol>
<li>Could the airplane have crashed by itself? This is highly unlikely. There are no reasons to suspect that the plane should have malfunctioned to the point of crashing; air traffic controllers claim all messages from the plane were normal until it disappeared from their screens.</li>
<li>Could the airplane have been hit by a bomb; either in the hold or a suicide bomber? There is little reason to suspect that a bomb should have been slipped through the safety checks at Schiphol Airport; and it would be a remarkable coincidence if a bomb in the airplane would detonate precisely over an active combat zone where military planes were shot down just days ago.</li>
<li>Could the airplane have been shot down by the Ukrainian military? These troops would have the ability to shoot down the airplane, but it is difficult to see why they should do so. There is little reason why the Ukrainian military should have mistaken the airplane for a separatist plane, consider the separatists have not flown any airplanes so far. </li>
<li>Could the airplane have been shot down by the separatists in Ukraine? It is possible that the separatists have acquired the BUK missile systems that allegedly was used to shoot down the plane, but it is difficult to see why they should have done so, or why they should have mistaken the airplane for a military airplane, especially given the height at which it was flying. An analyst on BBC has speculated, however, that the separatists, unlike governments, might not be able to distinguish electronically civilian versus military aircraft.</li>
</ol>
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
<div>
If, and this remains a big if, the airplane was shot down deliberately there remains the question of motive. </div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Why would the Ukrainian military shoot down the airplane? Ukraine is winning the military battle in the region and has little reason to escalate the conflict.</li>
<li>Why would the separatists shoot down the airplane? They are losing the battle but shooting down a civilian airplane would not help their cause.</li>
<li>Why would any Russian-led forces shoot down the airplane? Elements in the Russian state may have an interest in keeping the trouble in eastern Ukraine going to some extent, but scaring international airlines from using the airspace makes little political, military or commercial sense.</li>
</ul>
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
<div>
There remains one, very remote, possibility that some party wants to use this catastrophe to escalate the current crisis beyond the area to which it has so far been contained. If this is the case - and I have currently seen no strong indications that it is the case - then the reasonably calm reactions from all sides so far is a sign that such a plan might fail.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
This does not mean that a possible shooting down of the aircraft should not have consequences for the parties responsible; even if this was a mistake. But the next days must be focused on fact-finding before such steps are taken.</div>
Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-37201531650333913672014-05-08T15:19:00.000-07:002014-05-08T15:35:04.016-07:00Democracy Blues in UkraineIt's a funny thing; this business of democracy.<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
These days in Ukraine, everybody claims to be democratic. Everybody claims
to represent the people. The acting government in Kiev can point to the fact
that 77% of people in Ukraine have told pollsters from Pew Research that they
want the borders of Ukraine to remain unchanged. Pro-Russian secessionists can
point to the fact that 54% of Crimeans want regions to be able to secede from
Ukraine; and that - in eastern Ukraine - the 27% of Russian-speakers who feel
the same cannot simply be ignored. (<a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-ukrainians-want-to-remain-one-country/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-ukrainians-want-to-remain-one-country/</span></a>)
Pro-Russian secessionists can, of course, also point to the fact that Pew
Research is based in Washington, DC (although, by that standard, what are we to
think about Russia Today...)<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
...and a vast majority of people in Ukraine can point to the fact that they
would like peace now, please, and could all those nice pollsters please go
away.<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
Anyway, so much for the <em>hoi polloi</em>. All the statespeople want to be
democratic, too, yes they do. That is why Petro Poroshenko and the West want
that Ukrainian presidential election to take place on May 25 across the country
- apart from in the nasty terrorist towns, of course (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKKBN0DL11J20140507"><span style="color: blue;">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKKBN0DL11J20140507</span></a>)
And that is why Vladimir Putin was for the east Ukrainian secessionist
referendum - until he was against it, of course. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/ukraine-crisis-putin-referendum-autonomy-postponed"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/ukraine-crisis-putin-referendum-autonomy-postponed</span></a>)
How fortunate for democracy that eastern Ukraine, as represented by those most
illustriously non-elected militias, have decided to ignore Uncle Volodya and
press ahead with their voting, nonetheless. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27320806"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27320806</span></a>).<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
Why is it, by the way, that Maria Lipman, Vladimir Solovyov and so many
others seem to think Putin planned this snub of him from the start? (<a href="http://www.firstpost.com/world/putin-keeps-russians-west-guessing-with-ukraine-shift-1515085.html"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.firstpost.com/world/putin-keeps-russians-west-guessing-with-ukraine-shift-1515085.html</span></a>)
OK - I get why Solovyov thinks so; as a Putinista he would have to do so. But
hasn't it occurred to anybody that Putin has been a politician for a good
fourteen years now. As all other politicians in the world, Putin has long since
learned to make mistakes - and now he just looks like someone who can't control
his troops. <o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
Anyway, I digress from my digressions. Democracy, it's about DEMOCRACY (the
word around which all statespeople of the world must unite!)!!! Democracy - <em>C'est
la lutte finale / Groupons-nous et demain... </em><o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
Look, I get it that democracy is a lovely thing in many ways; least evil and
all that... (<a href="http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill(090503).html"><span style="color: blue;">http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill(090503).html</span></a>)
I'm all for the power of the demos. But can we please all start agreeing on a
simple starting point:<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
Democracy is based on fiction!<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
This doesn't mean we should get rid of democracy, far from it. And it
doesn't mean there is not qualitative difference between the lumpy porridge
served in much of the West and the rancid meat of the Russian political system
- because, my God, there is such a difference! (<a href="http://en.novayagazeta.ru/politics/8740.html"><span style="color: blue;">http://en.novayagazeta.ru/politics/8740.html</span></a>)
But it does mean that all this search after a "truly democratic"
election that will "save" Ukraine, or "save" Russians in
Ukraine, is futile.<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
If the referendum on secession in (parts of) eastern Ukraine takes place
this Sunday it will in itself provide no legitimacy to a region uncontrollable
from Kiev (and from Moscow?). Just as the referendum, so-called, in Crimea
provided no legitimacy, either, carried out as it was under the barrels of
automatic weapons. And without legitimacy, on Crimea and in the rest of
Ukraine, the status of the peninsula will remain uncertain. Similarly in
eastern Ukraine - how can people vote in a free and fair manner with all sorts
of armed bugbears running around? (and yes, there are bugbears on both sides of
the divide).<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
Now as for that Ukrainian presidential election of May 25... William Hague,
who has otherwise been sensible recently, states that the failure to hold this
election would be very serious, because "Once postponed, who knows when
they would be held." (<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"><a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-hague-idUKKBN0DN0XJ20140507"><span style="color: blue;">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-hague-idUKKBN0DN0XJ20140507</span></a>).
Very true - and once held, who knows when the new president will be accepted
throughout Ukraine? Of course Poroshenko wants this election to take place -
he's bloody in the lead! (outside Slavyansk, anyway) (<a href="http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/23/ukraine-polls-suggest-poroshenko-may-win-presidential-election/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/23/ukraine-polls-suggest-poroshenko-may-win-presidential-election/</span></a>)
</span><o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Neither the referendum, nor the presidential election will solve anything as such. Certainly, neither shall the "will of the people(s)." What will work? Well, to start with - there must be an agreed demos, a people on which all the goodies of democracy can centre (how the deuce do we do this? Well, might a "Truth and Reconciliation" committe be an idea - possibly supported by a Ukrainian government in which each minister represented a region in Ukraine?). That demos must be everyone resident within and holding the citizenship of Ukraine; a citizenship which should be straightforward to get. Yes - the demos includes people from Western Ukraine ("fascists" and all). It includes Crimeans. And yes - it includes, too, Mr Poroshenko's "terrorists" in Slavyansk. We can punish by law all wrongdoers, for sure, but until we know who "we" are, we can't do a thing - at least that must be the reality for everyone in Ukraine.</span><br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"></span><br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Yet, if we agree that crimes have been committed by those on both sides of the fighting in Ukraine (and I certainly agree - as much as I sympathise with the Ukrainian position, I watched the live, savage beating of a pro-Russian militaman in Odessa and almost vomited...) then why are the borders of Ukraine such a non-negotiable? Why can't regions of Ukraine become independent or join Russia if their populations so wish?</span><br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"></span><br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Well, because democracy and its purported legitimacy may be fictitious - but they are based in a more fundamental fiction, and that is called sovereignty and the international stability that this confers. If Crimea can secede based on the fact that a majority of Crimeans want to secede (assuming this referendum had been free and fair, which it most certainly wasn't) then why couldn't Chechnya become independent (Dzhokhar Dudayev arguably had a republican, if not nation-wide, majority for that)? Why can't the Basque Country and Catalonia become independent? And why does Kharkiv necessarily have to follow Slavyansk into Russia? What is "eastern Ukraine" anyway?</span><br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"></span><br />
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">...oh, that's right, "eastern Ukraine" is a fiction, just like "western Ukraine," just like "Ukraine." But "Ukraine" is a fiction with twenty-two years history, at least, and that beats twenty-two days. History, in its crooked way, can slowly confer some sort of legitimacy and normality - that normality back to which all people in Ukraine must now seek. For their sake, for the sake of the Russian Federation (with its own twenty-two years of history), for the sake of us all.</span>Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-86191698664956951452014-05-06T14:56:00.000-07:002014-05-06T14:56:17.533-07:00Why the Russian economy mattersIn Ukraine, fighting spread from the east to Odessa. Each day witnesses new battles and deaths, most recently in southern Mariupol although the now familiar battleground of Slavyansk continues to burn. Now, in a callow (or callous?) move, pro-Russian militias let civilians man the barricades in the east. Certainly, this may slow down the advance of Ukrainian troops, but it does nothing to protect ordinary people, Russians or Ukrainians, of eastern Ukraine. The nationwide elections of May 25th do seem hopeless, now, but so does the referendum planned in eastern Ukraine for May 11th. Russian troops may yet officially invade Ukraine.<br />
<br />
On this dark background it seems perhaps misguided to focus, for a moment, on the state of the Russian economy. Yet we cannot avoid looking at this economy if we are to properly guess at the longer-term involvement of the Russian state in Ukraine - and in Russia itself.<br />
<br />
Three questions are particularly pertinent. <br />
<ul>
<li>Is the economy of Russia in trouble?</li>
<li>Is the state of the economy of Russia connected to Western sanctions?</li>
<li>Do Russian elites care about the state of the Russian economy? </li>
</ul>
<br />
On the first question: Yes, the economy of Russia is in trouble, in the short term but, much more importantly, over the medium to long term, too. In Q1 for 2014, Russian GDP contracted by 0.5% according to the Russian Ministry for the Economy, which also states that growth may not exceed 0.5% for the year. Now, Maksim Oreshkin of the Russian Ministry of Finance has confirmed that Russian GDP is set to contract again in Q2, meaning that Russia is technically in a recession.<br />
<br />
This is not, or not primarily, due to Western sanctions, however. Russian economic growth has been sluggish for a while. Last year, for instance, the IMF measured Russian GDP as 1.3%. Admittedly, this growth has now been downgraded to a projected 0.2% (the OECD project a 0.5% growth rate for 2014), but even if growth for 2014 were to equal that of 2013, it would hardly be impressive. Remember, this is a BRIC we are talking about - one of the four great developing economies (together with Brazil, India, and China - and South Africa for BRICS) immortalised for a decade by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs. You cannot really blame O'Neill for the comparison; it made fine sense in 2001 and the years thereafter. <br />
<br />
But now... In 2013, admittedly, according to the IMF Russia remained the eighth-largest economy of the world, with China second, Brazil seventh, India ninth (and South Africa thirty-third...). The Russian economy still matters - but look at growth rates. According to the IMF DataMapper for April 2014 (which even has Russian growth rates at 2.5%), India is at 6.8%, China is at 6.5%, and even Brazil has a projected year-on-year growth of 3.5%. (<a href="http://www.imf.org/external/Datamapper/index.php">http://www.imf.org/external/Datamapper/index.php</a>). Also, tellingly, with the exception of Ukraine (for which no secure data can be obtained presently by the IMF), all other post-Soviet states have a higher economic growth than Russia. For sure, the Russian economy is so much larger than that of its neighbours that its relative sluggishness still conceals assets much larger than those of the neighbouring states. Yet, clearly, the Russian regime is in no position to promote their state as the powerhouse that shall drag surrounding states into a glorious economic future. So much for that Customs Union, perhaps? Much more importantly, so much for Russian aspirations to show their country as an economic powerhouse of the world.<br />
<br />
Western sanctions against Russia do have an impact; as does the uncertainty fostered among Russian and international investors by the persistent unrest next to, and partly fomented by, Russia. Apart from sharply curtailed GDP growth, inflation in Russia is rising with the Central Bank recently rasing the base rate by 50 basis points to 7.5%. Yet if this was the Russian economy of the early noughties it could probably ride out the storm. Now, sanctions may not force the Russian regime to be constructive in Ukraine. Russian elites do (mostly) care about the state of their country and its economy, but the fight for Ukraine and the incendiary anger against the West is taking precedence. So far, so understandable. <br />
<br />
But what comes next? As mentioned above, Russia can no longer show itself internationally as a quickly growing economy. For better or for worse, the Russian economy has "matured" - and this thanks mainly to great world market oil prices over the last decade. And how has Russia and Russians benefitted from this? Especially outside Moscow and St Petersburg? Not very much, it seems. For 2013, the Economist Intelligence Unit compared living standards in 80 countries (that is, "where is it best to be born?"). Russia was not last. Oh no, only number 72 - and it beat Syria! (while losing to Indonesia, but there we are...). (<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/21566430-where-be-born-2013-lottery-life">http://www.economist.com/news/21566430-where-be-born-2013-lottery-life</a>). Surveys of political and civil freedoms, and on corruption levels, do not make for more cheerful reading for Russia. <br />
<br />
Maybe these measurements are misguided, run by Western, subversive agencies? Well, if so - why, in June 2013, did almost half of all Russian students dream of emigrating? Why did 38% of businesspeople want to leave. This according to Russian pollsters, from the respected Levada Centre. (<a href="http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130606/181540254/Almost-Half-of-Russian-Students-Dream-of-Emigrating---Poll.html">http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130606/181540254/Almost-Half-of-Russian-Students-Dream-of-Emigrating---Poll.html</a>).<br />
<br />
The real problem is not that the Russian economy is getting sluggish. The real problem is that Russians (and everyone else) are ever less convinced in the Russian economy, and in the ability of their regime to better ordinary people's living standards. Russians and Westerners alike know of the American Dream; it stayed alive and well even when the American economy was in the doldrums. There must be a Russian Dream, too. It should be brave and optimistic. Instead, it seems just unrest and death. And that, it seems, is all that President Vladimir Putin and his staff is able to leave behind.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-34106876348653427132014-04-29T16:00:00.001-07:002014-04-29T16:00:08.635-07:00Russia and the context of the hi-tech sanctionsThus a new round of sanctions have appeared against Russia and Russians, on behalf of the USA and of the EU. <em>Plus <span style="font-family: "Georgia","serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">ç</span>a change</em>, it is tempting to say. While it is inherently difficult to conduct counter-factual history, it seems reasonable to say that Western sanctions so far have had little impact on Russian policy in relation to Ukraine. And as Western military intervention in Ukraine would be both very difficult and probably counterproductive it may be feared that the USA and the EU are running out of options to keep Russia from threatening the integrity of the Ukrainian state.<br />
<br />
Yet there is a fine balance to be trod here, between raising the cost for the Russian regime while ensuring that ordinary Russians are faced with a minimum of difficulties. This is why personalised sanctions have been directed against Russians and Ukrainians deeply involved in the Ukraine crisis, in Vladimir Putin's regime, or both. And it is why the EU, in particular, and to some extent the USA is careful imposing sanctions that may further disrupt the Russian economy. Certainly, the latest round of sanctions may have been inadequate: the Moscow stock market rose 1% on the news that more serious and wide-ranging sanctions were not imposed. Yet the Rouble continues to perform very poorly, and Russia is judged by some analysts to have witnessed $60bn capital flight already in 2014, equivalent to the total for all of 2013. Hence the amount of personalised sanctions can also be seen as a Western indication that no collective economic punishment of Russians or Russia is sought. <br />
<br />
The personalised sanctions are only one side of the story, though. Although some American politicians, in particular, continue to clamour in vain for widespread sanctions on Russian financial institutions and energy companies, other industry sectors are being severely hit by the USA, in particular. Previously, the White House had banned NASA from having any contact with the Russian government, apart from issues concerning the International Space Station (which is currently only accessible with Russian rockets). Now, the USA is denying export licences to Russia for any high-technology items that may contribute to Russian military capabilities. Existing licences of this kind are being revoked. This is unlikely to hamper Russia's military ability in the short run. Russia remains a globally significant arms exporter in its own right, does currently have some sophisticated military hardware, and can probably buy more from China if required. What these sanctions will do, however, is to prevent Russians from learning from their cooperation with American colleagues in a range of spheres, including space technology where the two countries have previously cooperated extensively on the development and deployment of sattelites. <br />
<br />
More fundamentally, by sanctioning high-tech cooperation with Russia the USA is putting Russian development on the spot. Under the previous Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev (currently Russian Prime Minister) technological development officially became a high priority for the state, most obviously exemplified in the Skolkovo innovation centre. The fetichising of technological development as a symbol of success, and perhaps even a symbol of civilisation, has deep roots in Russian and Soviet history. And always a Western connection appears. Peter the Great drags Russia definitively into the European system of states by copying techniques of shipbuilding and administration assessed during his extensive stay and even work in the Dutch Republic and in England. Emperors following in his wake were mostly only too keen to obtain and implement for their own uses Western technologies that could improve Russian infrastructure, industrial production and, indeed, arms. Even the Bolshevik leadership, so ready straightaway to announce its departure from everything to do with the "bourgeois" system of states, happily invited American engineers, architects and other technological developers to teach and develop the first generation of Soviet technical experts. And the Russian Federation has similarly taken advantage of technological cooperation with the West.<br />
<br />
All this does not mean that Russia and Russians had no technological developments of their own. As the space race showed, when the Soviet state put its mind to something results did follow. Today, Russian technical experts, not least in the computer industry, remain sought for all over the world. What Russia does lack, however, is a sustainable infrastructure helping to support, maintain and develop its high-tech industries. It is all very well that President Vladimir Putin now obliquely threatens the West with possible future energy disruptions; or that Finance Minister Anton Siluanov foresees no immediate danger for Russian companies from the sanctions. If the repercussions from the current crisis drag into the far future, and they most likely will, then the Russian regime has to adjust its policies and mentality to technological autarky, as well as autarky in a number of other spheres. Russia may have the resources to do this, for a while anyway. Whether its regime has the will to do so is a different matter.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-8869601034720858402014-04-28T16:37:00.003-07:002014-04-28T16:37:57.500-07:00What place for the OSCE in Ukraine?And thus international organisations once more fall foul of Russia and of the pro-Russian militias in Ukraine. First, a UN observer was chased out of Crimea when Russian troops and their allied were busy securing Russian control of the peninsula. Then OSCE observers were kept away from Crimea with armed road blocks and warning shots to help ensure a minimum of international scrutiny of the referendum preceding Crimean accession to Russia. Russia was sanctioned by the Council of Europe, while the UN produced a report stating in clear terms that Crimea and eastern Ukraine have not witnessed any systematic attacks on Russians. And now OSCE observers have been captured by militias in Slavyansk in eastern Ukraine; the fate of all but one of them precarious.<br />
<br />
We have repeatedly heard how unpopular NATO is in Russia (and with many people in Ukraine, too). The EU, as well, has received widespread censure in Russia for the public support shown to the Maidan rebellion and to the acting government in Kiev. Yet this is nothing new. In Moscow, NATO has been seen as the enemy ever since 1949. The EU has come under increasing criticism during the last decade following disputes over energy and trade policies, human rights, and the (somewhat haphazard) competition between Russia and the EU for influence in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. So far, so predictable. However, the UN and the OSCE have repeatedly been mentioned by the Russian regime as the two international organisations within which Russia and the West could do business; around which a new European security structure could be built. Well so much for that pipedream, it would seem.<br />
<br />
The OSCE did have its main mission to Ukraine approved by Russia. The observers now prisoners in Slavyansk were part of a secondary mission by the OSCE, which did not require Russian approval. Still, it might have been expected that Russia would seek to protect OSCE staff in Ukraine, to highlight that this organisation (in which Russia would hold a veto and a commanding voice) should be the future institutional solution (or cul-de-sac) within which to manage Ukraine. Instead, after the observers were captured by militias accusing them of spying for the West the Russian regime has mostly kept quiet. Russian ambassador to the OSCE, Andrey Kelin, has assured the world that Russia is taking "some steps" to help secure the release of the observers. (<a href="http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0428/612131-ukraine/">http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0428/612131-ukraine/</a>) It remains to be seen, however, what if anything Russia is actually doing to defuse the situation. Kelin also pointed out that the OSCE were highly irresponsible to send in the monitors in the first place. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUKKBN0DE1MM20140428">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUKKBN0DE1MM20140428</a>) The OSCE observers have been mentioned as prisoners of war and as spies by the pro-Russian militias in Slavyansk and, indeed, it is possible that these militias captured the observers by mistake in an increasingly tense situation. Yet if Russia did not want OSCE observers present, and since Russia has previously ruled out UN peacekeepers in eastern Ukraine, it appears that Russia does not want any international observers, at all, in the region. Ukrainians must be left to decide their own fate; just a rickety regime in Kiev, well-armed and seemingly violent militias in eastern Ukraine, and thousands of Russian troops waiting at the border... <br />
<u><strong></strong></u><br />
While Russia continues to insist that it has nothing to do with the militias holding numerous towns in eastern Ukraine, the USA is not convinced. Maybe because the behaviour and look of the pro-Russian militias appears strikingly similar to that of Crimean militias, who eventually turned out to contain many members of the Russian armed forces. From the OSCE, Gary Robbins as US Deputy Head of Mission has deplored Russian unwillingness to condemn the capture of the observers, (<a href="http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_28/OSCE-was-irresponsible-to-send-monitors-to-East-Ukraine-Russia-5043/">http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_28/OSCE-was-irresponsible-to-send-monitors-to-East-Ukraine-Russia-5043/</a>) a capture including mistreatment of the observers and of Ukrainian prisoners in eastern Ukraine, according to the US State Department. (<a href="http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2374598&language=en">http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2374598&language=en</a>) <br />
<br />
From the EU such direct accusations take longer in appearing. Yet what is remarkable now is the willingness with which Germany not only appears as the semi-official interlocutor for the EU with Russia, but also as a vocal critic of Russian unwillingness (and inability) to implement the recent Geneva peace deal. On the OSCE observers, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been in contact with the OSCE as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Without much success so far, apart from the release of one observer on medical grounds, Mr Steinmeier's diplomacy has not shown much result. And he is clear that Germany holds Russia fully responsible for the release of the observers, and for ensuring that it is up to Russia to prevent humiliating treatment of the observers by the militias. (<a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140427/russia-must-press-ukraine-separatists-free-osce-team-0">http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140427/russia-must-press-ukraine-separatists-free-osce-team-0</a>) The office of Chancellor Angela Merkel is similarly putting the onus on Russia to solve the situation. (<a href="http://www.dw.de/ban-demands-that-separatists-in-ukraine-release-osce-observers/a-17599660">http://www.dw.de/ban-demands-that-separatists-in-ukraine-release-osce-observers/a-17599660</a>)<br />
<br />
Now, it is possible that the OSCE observers were captured without the knowledge of Moscow. Further, it is possible that the Russian regime is working clandestinely to pressurise the militias in Slavyansk into releasing the remaining observes. Apparently, the militias were not prepared to let an observers risk serious health problems, and thus let him go. Similarly, the leader of the captive observers has stated that they are being well treated by their captors, even though they have received no indication of release. Yet watching this leader mechanically read through this statement, it is clear that the observers have, at least, been subjected to substantial psychological pressure by their captors (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laBj3-QUizY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laBj3-QUizY</a>) and, as mentioned above, their mistreatment is repeatedly mentioned by Western governments. Possibly, this is all against the wishes of Russian President Vladimir Putin; or, at least, against the wishes of some of his aides. Nevertheless, no one from the Russian regime seems keen now to point to the positive role the OSCE might have in defusing the Ukrainian crisis. And, until the opposite is demonstrated, Russia appears not to be prepared to help protect the staff of the OSCE in Ukraine. Thus, the Russian state appears, once and for all, to have abandoned the pretence that international organisations are the way forward to ensure Ukrainian, and European, security. What may ensure such security remains to be seen.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-33859851906814189162014-04-22T16:24:00.001-07:002014-04-22T16:44:29.538-07:00Requiem for a peace?Once more, fires flare in eastern Ukraine. Violent deaths are now becoming an everyday occurrence. The Geneva deal is fading. And across Europe governments call to defence against the Russian threat. Could all-out war ensue between Russian and Ukrainian troops? Or is there a way back to stability and peace in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere?<br />
<br />
When Ukrainian tanks last week rolled into Slavyansk, only to be mobbed and stopped by civilians and (Russian?) militiamen it did not represent the finest hour for the Ukrainian army. However, in their seeming incompetence the Ukrainian armed forces did manage to hold their fire. Ukraine lost equipment, but no soldiers, or civilians, lost their lives. In its own muddled way, the "battle for Slavyansk" indicated that Russians and Ukrainians might be able to resolve the situation gradually, with threats but no deaths.<br />
<br />
Now, blood is seeping through. Recently, pro-Russian militiamen were shot and killed in a murky firefight and now has been found the tortured body of what appears to be a pro-Ukrainian politician, from the Prime Minister's party, no less. It remains unclear precisely what happened to Volodymyr Rybak outside Slavyansk, but his fate may spur events on. (<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/22/ukraine-politician-found-dead_n_5192477.html">http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/22/ukraine-politician-found-dead_n_5192477.html</a>)<br />
<br />
It is possible that militias killed Mr Rybak to provoke open fighting with Ukrainian troops. It is also possible, if unproven, that the militias were spurred to the act by figures in the Russian regime. For now, Russia is not commenting on this murder and, indeed, is keeping fairly quiet in what could be anticipation or confusion. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has, once more, stressed that Russia can overcome any Western sanctions; that business and ordinary citizens should be kept free from political shenanigans. (<a href="http://rt.com/business/154012-sanctions-russia-stronger-medvedev/">http://rt.com/business/154012-sanctions-russia-stronger-medvedev/</a>) UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, meanwhile, seems unsurprised that tensions will take a while to die down - and, following the recent UN report dismissing the claim of systematic threats to Russians in Ukraine, Churkin now wants UN far removed from eastern Ukraine. Apparently, the OSCE is now expected to stop any unrest that may appear, together with the Ukrainian conscience or some such. (<a href="http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_22/Prospect-of-UN-peacekeeping-operation-in-Ukraine-unreal-Russian-diplomat-9486/">http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_22/Prospect-of-UN-peacekeeping-operation-in-Ukraine-unreal-Russian-diplomat-9486/</a>)<br />
<br />
On the bright side, this is hardly belligerent talk from Medvedev and Churkin. At worst, if the Russian administration is connected to the militias currently occupying parts of eastern Ukraine - and if recent casualties on both sides have been at least partly provoked by Russian intents to keep Ukraine unstable - at least the tens of thousands of Russian troops lined up along the border with Ukraine do not seem to be on their way in. Certainly, their continued presence is ominous - unless Moscow fears a Ukrainian spearhead attack towards the Ural mountains there is no credible domestic reason why Russian tanks in these numbers need to be facing the border. Undoubtedly, Russia would consider an attack if actions by the Ukrainian state resulted (even indirectly) in civilian casualties, but so far this has mostly been avoided.<br />
<br />
Having said this, though, developments in eastern Ukraine have left the acting government in Kiev in a difficult dilemma. One month remains before the presidential election to decide the successor to the exiled Viktor Yanukovych. Such an election seems impossible under current circumstances, with the most populous (and richest, bar Kiev) part of the country subject to unelected, masked rule. Even if the militias (or some of them) in eastern Ukraine are genuinely concerned with locals' welfare (unlikely given the readiness with which militias let unarmed civilians face down armed Ukrainian soldiers and tanks) they have not been elected by any significant part of the local population in any of the cities they occupy. Everything you need to know about the official Russian view of democracy is encapsulated in its willingness to let politics be decided through the barrel of a gun - that was the case on Crimea and it is the case in eastern Ukraine. Let us say, for the sake of the argument, that a majority of Crimeans wanted to join Russia. Let us say that most people in eastern Ukraine feel the same way. Well, why could observers from the OSCE and the UN not be admitted to Crimea before or during the referendum? Why does Churkin want to keep the UN away now? And, if regions in Ukraine can vote to join Russia (an idea for which arguments may be found), why could Chechnya not vote to secede from Russia? Should Russia even be in the North Caucasus anymore? Maybe Russia is welcome there - but Moscow will never allow a local referendum to decide the matter. Thousands have died in the North Caucasus during recent decades - many Russians among them - but apparently Dagestan is lower priority than Donetsk. Or maybe it is simply easier for Russia to deal with unrest in Ukraine, where the Kiev government can still be blamed for any trouble? Or maybe Ukraine, like the North Caucasus, remains subject to Russian "off the cuff" politics, in Tor Bukkvoll's wonderful phrase; resulting in reactive Russian responses to whatever may be happening on a given day. <br />
<br />
It seems increasingly clear to me, anyway, that the crime of Vladimir Putin's Russia right now is less the imperial gluttony suggested by <em>The Economist</em> (<a href="http://www.economist.com/printedition/2014-04-19">http://www.economist.com/printedition/2014-04-19</a>) and more a bumbling necessity to prove Russia as the great power of which Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeatedly reminds us. (<a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/us-releases-photos-of-russian-troops-russia-us-trade-jabs-over-troubled-ukraine-deal/story-fni0xs63-1226892038216">http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/us-releases-photos-of-russian-troops-russia-us-trade-jabs-over-troubled-ukraine-deal/story-fni0xs63-1226892038216</a>)<br />
<br />
Dear Mr Lavrov - your Russia still has one of the highest income inequalities in Europe, if not much of the world (<a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/</a>); significant proportions of your male population suffers from substance abuse, losing years of their lives in the process (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/russian-men-losing-years-to-vodka">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/russian-men-losing-years-to-vodka</a>); your country appears to be more corrupt than Mali, than Nicaragua, than Pakistan... (<a href="http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/">http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/</a>) It is all fine and well that your government wants to protect Russians living in Ukraine; please remember to protect Russians living in Russia, too!<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, Lavrov and his colleagues may not have much time in the coming days and weeks to focus on domestic challenges. Following recent events, acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and acting President Oleksandr Turchynov both directly blame Russia for the violent surge. And, in worrying tones, the militias occupying cities in eastern Ukraine are now uniformly referred to as "terrorists," to be treated as criminals, one would suspect, and not military representatives of a foreign state. I cannot but agree with Turchynov's (and the West's) call for Russia to withdraw its troops from Crimea (leaving the Black Sea Fleet, one would assume) and to unequivocally condemn any violence in eastern Ukraine. Yet Turchynov does not stop here - he is also calling for Ukrainian security forces to re-launch in the east. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3D0C420140422">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3D0C420140422</a>). Last time the Ukrainian offensive here ended in farce; let us hope we will not soon see farce turn into widespread tragedy.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-60299462174840808692014-04-13T03:41:00.002-07:002014-04-13T03:44:46.082-07:00Eastern Ukraine - a summary So, this is how things currently stand - or at least seem to stand - in eastern Ukraine.<br />
<br />
<strong><u>Recent events in eastern Ukraine</u></strong><br />
<br />
Since last weekend, som government building in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk have been occupied by groups demanding referendums on secession from Ukraine and incorporation in Russia. This weekend, events there have been somewhat static, although the regional police station in Donetsk has been taken over by militias. (<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-13/ukraine-tension-mounts-as-police-face-gunfire-in-east.html">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-13/ukraine-tension-mounts-as-police-face-gunfire-in-east.html</a>) Donetsk and Luhansk are the 5th and 11th largest cities in Ukraine, with populations of over a million and half a million, respectively, so their fate is crucial for what happens to Ukraine as a whole. Yet, for now, the standoff between the acting Ukrainian government and pro-Russian state protesters continues here.<br />
<br />
Events have been much more dynamic lately in the smaller cities of Kramatorsk (population: 181,000) and Slaviansk (population: 125,000). The size of these cities make them less central for eastern Ukraine, yet they are cities within 10 kilometres from each other, making it easier for the militias to coordinate their actions, and they straddle the major highway running from the border with Russia near Rostov-on-Don via Donetsk and Luhansk in the far south-east of Ukraine to Kharkiv further north-west. So Kramatorsk and Slaviansk are useuful places to control for anyone seeking to move military equipment through the heartland of eastern Ukraine. (<a href="https://maps.google.co.uk/maps?q=slavyansk&hl=en&ll=48.857487,37.606201&spn=5.118148,13.392334&sll=51.48931,-0.08819&sspn=0.605411,1.674042&hnear=Slov'yans'k,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine&t=m&z=7">https://maps.google.co.uk/maps?q=slavyansk&hl=en&ll=48.857487,37.606201&spn=5.118148,13.392334&sll=51.48931,-0.08819&sspn=0.605411,1.674042&hnear=Slov'yans'k,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine&t=m&z=7</a>)<br />
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In Kramatorsk and Slaviansk militias have taken over local police stations, and they have stolen allegedly hundreds of weapons belonging to the security forces of Ukraine. Roadblocks have been placed around Slaviansk, where it seems a potential battle between local militias and the security forces of Ukraine would be most likely to appear. Civilian protesters in their hundreds have gathered to protect the militias' hold on the government buildings in Slaviansk. (see stills and listen to brief audio here: <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/video/2014/04/12/armed-men-take-over-police-station-in-uk?videoId=308172540&videoChannel=117759">http://uk.reuters.com/video/2014/04/12/armed-men-take-over-police-station-in-uk?videoId=308172540&videoChannel=117759</a>)<br />
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As was the case on Crimea, and has been the case so far in eastern Ukraine, it is clear that the majority of local residents in Kramatorsk and Slaviansk (let alone Donetsk and Luhansk) do not actively support the pro-Russian state militias. The degree of any tacit support is, of course, difficult to measure, but what protests we have previously witnessed in eastern Ukraine have generally shown a clear majority in favour of remaining part of Ukraine. Some miners have now come out to protest "for Donbass" in Donetsk, but their protests seem very much directed in favour of their region's autonomy and not for unification with Russia. (In the picture in the link attached here from a recent Donetsk protest notice the almost complete absence of Russian flags - as well as the Soviet flag in front: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/12/east-ukraine-protesters-miners-donetsk-russia">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/12/east-ukraine-protesters-miners-donetsk-russia</a>). Mining in Ukraine remains a dangerous, low-paid profession - seven miners died just days ago near Donetsk (<a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/seven-people-died-in-donetsk-coal-mine-accident-343019.html">http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/seven-people-died-in-donetsk-coal-mine-accident-343019.html</a>) - and it is perhaps to be expected that miners in this region wish to ensure more funds for them, their profession and area in a future Ukraine. This, however, is not the same as wishing to join Russia, where miners' conditions are poor, too.<br />
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<strong><u>Russia</u></strong><br />
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The Russian regime has kept noticeably quiet over the last few days. Previously, President Vladimir Putin has mentioned how Russia would use "political, diplomatic and legal means" to defend Russian-speakers abroad. (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protect-the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html">http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protect-the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html</a>) Apparently, such "non-military" means included the armed occupation and annexation of Crimea with the assistance of local militias. So the fact that Russia is again calling for calm and non-violent measures is perhaps not to be taken at face value; not least since a build-up of tens of thousands of Russian troops and military equipment remains along the border with Ukraine. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/satellite-images-russian-military-ukraine-border">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/satellite-images-russian-military-ukraine-border</a>)<br />
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The militias now occupying Kramatorsk, Slaviansk and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine are very similar to those that occupied Crimea; and they are almost certainly again controlled from Moscow (although it should not necessarily be assumed that they would follow all of Putin's orders, especially if they were ordered to withdraw). Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is using their presence to state that Ukraine is "demonstrating its inability to take responsibility for the fate of the country," and Lavrov warns that Ukrainian use of force against Russian-speakers "could undermine the potential for co-operation...including the holding of planned 4-party talks in Geneva" on April 17 between Russia, Ukraine, the USA, and the EU. (<a href="http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_13/Kerry-calls-Lavrov-to-come-up-with-solution-of-de-escalation-of-Ukraines-crisis-3723/">http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_13/Kerry-calls-Lavrov-to-come-up-with-solution-of-de-escalation-of-Ukraines-crisis-3723/</a>) The planned Geneva talks are possibly key here - not only to understand Lavrov's statement, but to understand the militias' presence in eastern Ukraine. As has been suggested by Serhyi Leshchenko from Ukrainskaya Pravda, Russian wishes for federalisation and effectively fragmentation of a future Ukraine are much more likely to be heeded by the West if Russia on Thursday can appear in Geneva with <em>de facto</em> control of eastern Ukraine. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3709O20140412">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3709O20140412</a>) For similar reasons, Russian parliamentarians, such as Duma Speaker Sergey Naryshkin, are calling for peace and accusing the West of fomenting "Russophobia [and] anti-Russian campaigns." (<a href="http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_12/Naryshkin-calls-for-Russia-France-partnership-to-continue-5472/">http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_12/Naryshkin-calls-for-Russia-France-partnership-to-continue-5472/</a>)<br />
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And as for those sanctions, so vaunted by the West - they may well be hurting those placed under sanctions, but for now complaints are not forthcoming from the Russian elites. Gennady Timchenko, prominent energy trader and seemingly close to the Russian regime, now talks of how being sanctioned by the USA is an honour for him. Timchenko says that Russian elites, knowing such sanctions could come, withdrew many funds to Russia - and that Russia itself, given increasing European hostility - will start selling more natural gas to China. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-timchenko-idUKBREA3B05X20140412">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-timchenko-idUKBREA3B05X20140412</a>) The latter statement, in particular, is dubious given the horror with which Russian elites have for decades viewed control by an increasingly powerful China (and if Russia started to export most of its energy to China it would be wholly beholden to a Beijing leadership that can be very commercially aggressive). Similarly, Timchenko did make sure to officially divest himself of shares in the oil trader Gunvor immediately after he was sanctioned (<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72ac6954-b06a-11e3-8efc-00144feab7de.html#axzz2yl7STzfI">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72ac6954-b06a-11e3-8efc-00144feab7de.html#axzz2yl7STzfI</a>) so the Western actions had some effect. Just as Russian state giant Gazprom's entry on the Crimean energy market has been complicated by US sanctioning of the Chernomorneftegaz company, in a clear warning to Gazprom not to get involved here (since Gazprom cooperating with or taking over a sanctioned company would be subject itself to US sanctions) (<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukrainerussia-crisis-us-sanctions-crimean-separatists-and-chernomorneftegaz-gas-firm-9256282.html">http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukrainerussia-crisis-us-sanctions-crimean-separatists-and-chernomorneftegaz-gas-firm-9256282.html</a>). Nevertheless, sanctions are not showing quick results in amending Russian policy.<br />
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<strong><u>Ukraine</u></strong><br />
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From Ukraine, it is just now being reported that fighting with casualties has taken place in Slaviansk. Ukrainian acting Interior Minister Arsen Avakov has stated that one Ukrainian security officer has died, as have, possibly, a number of fighters on the separatist side. It is unclear whether there are civilian casualties. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/13/uk-ukraine-crisis-casualties-idUKBREA3C06P20140413">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/13/uk-ukraine-crisis-casualties-idUKBREA3C06P20140413</a>)<br />
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It seems clear that the acting Ukrainian government is not ready to let eastern Ukraine go without a fight, as was (almost) the case on Crimea. Avakov has openly accused Russia of fomenting the armed separatism in eastern Ukraine and (unlike the Russian regime and the pro-Russian state militias) Avakov has openly called for civilians to leave the centre of Slaviansk to avoid being caught in fighting. Avakov is talking about Ukraine fighting against "terrorists" and while he keeps saying that the Ukrainian regime is open to dialogue it appears as if the decision has been taken to remove militias by force. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-response-idUKBREA3B0F320140412">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-response-idUKBREA3B0F320140412</a> ; <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/13/uk-ukraine-crisis-slaviansk-avakov-idUKBREA3C04E20140413">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/13/uk-ukraine-crisis-slaviansk-avakov-idUKBREA3C04E20140413</a>). Currently, on his Facebook page, Avakov is decrying (unofficially and emotionally by his own description) provocations taking place across the largest cities of eastern Ukraine. (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/arsen.avakov.1?fref=ts">https://www.facebook.com/arsen.avakov.1?fref=ts</a>)<br />
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Acting Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Deshchytsia has been echoing Avakov's accusations against Russia, while Energy Minister Yuriy Prodan warns that Russia is close to turning off gas deliveries to (and through) Ukraine - a fear that has been stated by Ukraine for weeks now and that is shared by many in the West. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3709O20140412">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3709O20140412</a>)<br />
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<strong><u>The West</u></strong><br />
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And speaking of the West, plans for going forward seem very limited. US Vice President Joe Biden has announced his arrival in Kyiv to show support for the acting Ukrainian regime. A useful gesture - apart from the fact that it will take place in 9 days' time... So, Biden might arrive in Kyiv just in time to tell the Ukrainian government that he completely shares their misgivings about Russia now controlling all of eastern Ukraine. And that the Geneva talks (which by then will have taken place almost a week before) were really unfair! (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10763284/Ukraine-Joe-Biden-to-visit-Kiev-as-conflict-escalates.html">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10763284/Ukraine-Joe-Biden-to-visit-Kiev-as-conflict-escalates.html</a>) <br />
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Apart from Biden riding to the rescue on his snail, US Secretary of State John Kerry has threatened Russia with "additional consequences" if Russia does not immediately take steps to de-escalate the situation in eastern Ukraine! (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pro-russian-gunmen-take-over-eastern-ukrainian-citys-police-headquarters/2014/04/12/b3cfceed-c9a4-4599-938b-8c033bdb0405_story.html">http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pro-russian-gunmen-take-over-eastern-ukrainian-citys-police-headquarters/2014/04/12/b3cfceed-c9a4-4599-938b-8c033bdb0405_story.html</a>). The EU seems to say little, at all - allowing Marine Le Pen and other nationalist extremists talking for "Europe" about how Russia is really the victim of EU "Cold War thinking." (<a href="http://rt.com/news/marine-pen-russia-ukraine-128/">http://rt.com/news/marine-pen-russia-ukraine-128/</a>)<br />
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OK, I expect little else from Ms Le Pen, or from her fellow souls Heinz-Christian Strache and Geert Wilders, who all seem to see the devious hand of the EU behind the world's troubles. And, indeed, Kerry, Biden, Catherine Ashton et al might have offered much stronger warnings to the Russian regime behind closed doors than what we know of.<br />
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With this in mind, though, I am still thinking - has the West simply run out of plans? <br />
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Kerry, Biden, Ashton etc. have all clearly, correctly and repeatedly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine - in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine. Significant financial aid is forthcoming to Ukraine - unanimously supported by the West (and by China) to ensure a viable Ukrainian state. And yet, with military options ruled out, and sanctions taking a while to function, the West is taking one Hell of a gamble here. Ukrainian troops are right now fighting with pro-Russian state militias in eastern Ukraine. If those remain the only combatants the fighting will finish soon - the Ukrainian forces are much superior. <br />
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But if the Russian military decides to cross the border - then the two largest states in Europe are at war. And that could get really bloody.<br />
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Looking further ahead, Russia, as many have pointed out, will (probably) not touch NATO countries, as this would almost certainly provoke armed response from NATO (and, excluding nuclear weapons, that is a fight Russia would lose). <br />
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OK - well, these are European countries that border Russia yet are not protected by NATO:<br />
<ul>
<li>Azerbaijan</li>
<li>Belarus</li>
<li>Finland</li>
<li>Georgia</li>
<li>Kazakhstan</li>
<li>Moldova (through Ukraine)</li>
<li>Sweden is pretty close, too</li>
</ul>
Just saying...Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-14621141477507342262014-04-07T13:07:00.001-07:002014-04-07T13:07:15.472-07:00On states and quasi-statesStates are all equal, but some states are more equal than others - this is the message now projected by the Russian government. Today, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told his German counterpart that Ukraine will need "international assistance" to develop a new constitution, which takes into consideration the interests of all groups inside Ukraine. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-steinmeier-idUKBREA361DW20140407">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-steinmeier-idUKBREA361DW20140407</a>) That is, a constitution able to empower Russians in Ukraine.<br />
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At the same time, of course, separatist movements have now seized government buildings in eastern Ukraine, declaring their wish for a "Crimean solution" to the alleged persecution suffered by Russians in eastern Ukraine at the hands of the acting government in Kiev. While the Ukrainian leadership is left to fear that Russian military forces, poised and ready at the border, will enter Ukraine to support "the people's will" in a referendum on joining Russia, just as we recently saw in Crimea. (<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-officials-in-eastern-city-of-donetsk-proclaim-independence-from-kiev-and-set-date-for-referendum-on-joining-russia-9243750.html">http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-officials-in-eastern-city-of-donetsk-proclaim-independence-from-kiev-and-set-date-for-referendum-on-joining-russia-9243750.html</a>)<br />
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Will Russian troops cross the border? Most likely not, as things stand, for this time a battle with the Ukrainian military would be almost guaranteed - a fight that Russia could never win even if its troops were victorious on the battlefield. Still, nothing can right now be ruled out as reaction from a Russian leadership that in its actions has recently appeared incoherent, if not unhinged. It is telling that even Germany - so often the mediator between Russia and the West in recent weeks - is now very worried about possible escalation of the crisis. (<a href="http://www.itv.com/news/update/2014-04-07/germany-very-worried-after-ukraine-buildings-seized/">http://www.itv.com/news/update/2014-04-07/germany-very-worried-after-ukraine-buildings-seized/</a>)<br />
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For now, though, thoughts on Russian invasion of Ukraine remain speculative at best. Much more likely remains a Russian wish to keep eastern Ukraine unstable, possibly with the use of inserted provocateurs in the region, to ensure that Kiev (and the West) acquiesce in a future Ukraine <em>a la Russe</em>. And this is where we come to the distinction between states and quasi-states. <br />
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The distinction between states and quasi-states is not the same as the distinction between great powers and weaker states. The latter distinction revolves around the concept of external sovereignty - the ability to project power, or influence broadly understood, beyond state borders. Thus, Russia is - regionally at least - a great power, just as the USA (and increasingly China) is a global great power. Ukraine is not a great power by any standard.<br />
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The former distinction, however, between states and quasi-states has to do with internal sovereignty. That is, with the ability of a state to control events within its borders and, among other things, exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence/coercion. Again, Ukraine clearly is having problems on this front - what with armed groups taking control in Donetsk and elsewhere. Yet whereas Ukraine as a great power would benefit few (and certainly would not benefit Ukraine itself), a Ukraine with strong internal sovereignty - a Ukraine that is a state and not a quasi-state would benefit all in Ukraine and in neighbouring states, too. This seems to self-evident that even Lavrov repeatedly calls for stability and calm in Ukraine. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/07/sergei-lavrov-russia-stabilise-ukraine-west">http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/07/sergei-lavrov-russia-stabilise-ukraine-west</a>)<br />
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And yet, and yet, the only problem with Lavrov's calming words is, as sometimes happens with the Russian leadership these days, the facts on the ground. Scores of people did die in Kiev when the democratically elected president, Viktor Yanukovych, was toppled. The new, acting government did try to enact a law removing official status from the Russian language in some regions of Ukraine. And some people on Crimea did fear that Ukrainian "fascists" (however defined) were ready to attack Russians on the peninsula.<br />
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Yet it is not Kiev that sees violence these days, but Crimea - where a Ukrainian soldier was today killed by a Russian soldier (<a href="http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/07/russian-soldier-kills-ukraine-navy-officer-in-crimea/">http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/07/russian-soldier-kills-ukraine-navy-officer-in-crimea/</a>). And where recent weeks have witnessed a large number of well-documented assaults on journalists and those opposed to Crimean secession from Ukraine. And during the battles in Kiev both Russians and Ukrainians died in opposition to Yanukovych - although the Kremlin only remembers the former casualties. The language law suggested by the Ukrainian government was unhelpful, but it was immediately vetoed by Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov. And those violent groups of Ukrainian "fascists" never materialised in Crimea, or in eastern Ukraine for that matter. They have at times appeared in Kiev, though, so maybe we shall expect Russian "peacekeepers" there next?<br />
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As a state, Ukraine needs economic and political help to establish its internal sovereignty, its statehood. In this, Lavrov is right. Only problem is that Russian troops right now occupy parts of Ukraine, and remained poised to invade elsewhere. No regret is voiced by the Russian leadership that the invasion of Crimea was required; just a call for Ukraine and the West to accept a <em>fait accompli: </em><br />
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"What can one advise our US colleagues to do? Spend more time in the open, practice yoga, stick to food-combining diets, maybe watch some comedy sketch shows on TV. This would be better than winding oneself up and winding up others, knowing that the ship has already sailed...Tantrums, weeping and hysteria won't help." (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-diplomat-idUSBREA3217B20140403">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-diplomat-idUSBREA3217B20140403</a>)<br />
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Thus the words of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov on the annexation of Crimea. These are not the words of a government interested in strenghtening the internal sovereignty of Ukraine. These are words of a regime seeking to create in Ukraine, and elsewhere, quasi-states constantly on the verge of collapse and dependent on Russian goodwill to survive. This is, with a vengeance, a new version of the decades-old idea of a "near abroad" surrounding Russia, in which Moscow has special interests. And it is a warning that Vladimir Putin's regime will not stop its aggression, in Ukraine and elsewhere, before the West and the rest of the world gives a clear signal that Russia will not be allowed to create quasi-states at its leasure. The sooner that signal comes, the better - for Ukraine, for the West, and for a Russia, which is now heading down a cul-de-sac like never before.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-90210487904848423812014-03-27T17:12:00.002-07:002014-03-27T17:12:38.245-07:00Money and international recognitionThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) has today announced that it has reached a staff-level agreement with the acting government of Ukraine. The agreement concerns an economic reform programme for Ukraine, which can be supported by a two-year Stand-By Agreement with the IMF. The Fund expects that it will assist Ukraine with an amount ranging from $14bn to $18bn, with an additional $9bn to $13bn expected to be offered by other, so far unidentified international donors. (<a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14131.htm">http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14131.htm</a>)<br />
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In practice, this offer of financial support has been spearheaded by the USA. In the complicated system of voting rights within the IMF each of the 188 member states has a percentage of the votes, to some extent depending on the financial contributions of each state to the Fund. Currently, the USA holds 16.75% of all votes; almost three times the votes of Japan, which holds the next most number of votes. (<a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx">http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx</a>) Thus, it appears that the USA, once more, spearheads international support for the acting government in Kiev. At the same time, though, it is equally clear that this offer of aid to Ukraine only could have appeared on a background of broad international support for Ukraine - and of opposition to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. <br />
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Such opposition also appeared in the UN General Assembly, which today voted on a resolution "calling upon states not to recognise changes in status of Crimea region." 100 member states voted in favour of this resolution, while only 11 voted against it, with 58 states abstaining. Not quite unanimous support for Ukrainian territorial integrity, but quite a strong signal from international society, nonetheless. (<a href="http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/ga11493.doc.htm">http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/ga11493.doc.htm</a>) And it is noteworthy that, among the few countries supporting the Russian position in this vote, we mainly find states with a chequered international reputation - such as Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Syria and Zimbabwe. Finally, and worth keeping an eye on for the future, note that Russia received support here from just one other post-Soviet state (Belarus) - a fact that says a great deal about Vladimir Putin's dreams of Eurasian union. (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/us-ukraine-crisis-un-idUSBREA2Q1GA20140327">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/us-ukraine-crisis-un-idUSBREA2Q1GA20140327</a>)<br />
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Returning to the question of aid from the IMF, it remains to be seen, though, whether Ukraine can live up to the standards of reform required by the Fund. The IMF has stated publically that there is currently no need for a restructuring of Ukrainian state debt. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/uk-ukraine-crisis-imf-debtrenegotiation-idUKBREA2Q18W20140327">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/uk-ukraine-crisis-imf-debtrenegotiation-idUKBREA2Q18W20140327</a>) However, it must be remembered that Ukraine has a recent history of reneging on promises to reform its economy. For sure, such lack of economic rigour took place under former president Viktor Yanukovych (<a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/why-is-the-west-playing-hardball-with-yanukovych-332467.html">http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/why-is-the-west-playing-hardball-with-yanukovych-332467.html</a>) and it is likely that the acting Ukrainian government wants to make as much distance to his policies as possible. Indeed, acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has vigorously advocated Ukraine as a country with which the IMF - and the Western world more generally - can do business. (<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-13/ukraine-s-yatsenyuk-sees-commitment-to-change-helping-imf-loan.html">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-13/ukraine-s-yatsenyuk-sees-commitment-to-change-helping-imf-loan.html</a>) <br />
<br />
Clearly, Yatsenyuk has managed to convince the IMF and thus the USA and its allies that Ukraine after Yanukovych is serious about reforming its economy once and for all. Yet, it is worth remembering that Yanukovych did not resist reforms of the Ukrainian economy simply to spite the US-dominated Fund. Well, a little spite might have been involved... Nevertheless, though, Ukraine of today, like Ukraine of the last couple of decades, remains a state with a seriously troubled economy. One problem remains Ukrainian dependence on Russian energy - and debt accrued by Ukraine in this regard. Partly, such debt has accumulated due to less-than-friendly dealings by Russia (<a href="http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/03/12/russia-ukraine-debt/">http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/03/12/russia-ukraine-debt/</a>), yet the Ukrainian economy also remains a mess due to many years of half-hearted reforms, corruption, and generally poor governance. (<a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/03/ukraine-and-russia">http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/03/ukraine-and-russia</a>). This problem did not disappear following the Orange Revolution. And, despite Yatsenyuk's seemingly honest pledges now, it remains to be seen whether the acting Ukrainian government retains the domestic political capital to satisfy the IMF in the longer run and, more importantly, to showcase a Ukraine that can get by without Russian subsidies.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-84050074028237264792014-03-22T02:31:00.003-07:002014-03-22T02:34:09.249-07:00War of the Ban<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_GoBack"></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">No, no - the bespectacled UN General Secretary has
not suddenly gone all belligerent on us... <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Instead,
we are witnessing a flurry of activity from Russia and the USA, as they raise
the stakes over the recent violent conquest of Crimea by Russia. In a stream of
announcements, the USA first banned several members of the Russian elite from
entering the USA and from accessing any funds they may have in American banks.
Shortly afterwards. a fuming Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs added
sanctions on American in return, promising that Russia "will respond
adequately to every hostile thrust." (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/20/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-usa-idUKBREA2J1K120140320"><span style="color: blue;">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/20/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-usa-idUKBREA2J1K120140320</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">This can
all seem a little bit hyped. Following the high drama surrounding Crimea in
recent days, banning a score of Russians from entering the USA is unlikely to
make Russian troops flee in fright from Sevastopol, just as John McCain
probably long ago understood that Moscow is not yet ready for another wily
foreigner to drop by the Patriarch's Ponds...<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Nevertheless,
we can learn a few things from this War of the Ban - about Russian (and
American) politics, and about the workings of international diplomacy now and possibly in the future.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Bring Out
the Banned!</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">So who
have actually been placed on the lists of the banned? Russia has banned a
predictable list of people: Three members of the White House administration
(Caroline Atkinson, Daniel Pfeiffer and Benjamin Rhodes), as well as six vocal
members of the US legislature (Harry Reed, John Boehner, Robert Menendez, Mary
Landrieu, Daniel Coats, and John McCain [whether McCain's cat has been banned
as well is currently unclear]). (<a href="http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/177739554DA10C8B44257CA100551FFE"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/177739554DA10C8B44257CA100551FFE</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Considering
that few if any of the above will have stocks in Gazprom or money saved in
Sberbank, it seems safe to say that Russia here simply felt a symbolic need to
retaliate in kind against usual suspects in the USA (a theme we shall return to
below). Those Russians banned by the USA, however, are a slightly more
interesting mix, even if their importance is not always obvious in media
debate. Let us begin with the seven Russians banned on March 17th:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<ul type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Sergey Glazyev (<a href="http://www.glazev.ru/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.glazev.ru/</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Andrey Klishas (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/295/"><span style="color: blue;">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/295/</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Valentina Matviyenko (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/257/"><span style="color: blue;">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/257/</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yelena Mizulina (<a href="http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131253/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131253/</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Dmitry Rogozin (<a href="http://government.ru/gov/persons/170/"><span style="color: blue;">http://government.ru/gov/persons/170/</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Leonid Slutsky (<a href="http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131318/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131318/</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; tab-stops: list 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Vladislav Surkov (<a href="http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/2"><span style="color: blue;">http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/2</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The US
White House did not provide detailed reasons for why these seven had been
singled out for sanctions. Instead sanctions were justified with the official
positions held by the individuals; Yelena Mizulina, for instance, "is
being sanctioned for her status as a State Duma Deputy." (<a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/fact-sheet-ukraine-related-sanctions"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/fact-sheet-ukraine-related-sanctions</span></a>)
By that logic, the USA could sanction all members of the Duma - a course
scornfully suggested by the Duma. (<a href="http://rt.com/politics/russian-duma-sanctions-crimea-594/"><span style="color: blue;">http://rt.com/politics/russian-duma-sanctions-crimea-594/</span></a>)
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Certainly,
these seven have all been prominent proponents of recent Russian actions in
Ukraine (for examples, see: </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;"><a href="http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-mania-ukraine's-euromaidan-9636"><span style="color: blue;">http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-mania-ukraine’s-euromaidan-9636</span></a>;
<a href="http://www.russia-today.ru/new.php?i=301&vip=6"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.russia-today.ru/new.php?i=301&vip=6</span></a>;
<a href="http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/721586"><span style="color: blue;">http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/721586</span></a>;
<a href="http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/23911811/mizulina-predlozhila-prostym-rossiyanam-prostym-rossiyanam"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/23911811/mizulina-predlozhila-prostym-rossiyanam-prostym-rossiyanam</span></a>;
<a href="http://rt.com/politics/rogozin-sanctions-boomerang-russian-582/"><span style="color: blue;">http://rt.com/politics/rogozin-sanctions-boomerang-russian-582/</span></a>;
<a href="http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/02/25/moscow_will_protect_compatriots_in_ukraine_says_russian_lawmaker.html"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/02/25/moscow_will_protect_compatriots_in_ukraine_says_russian_lawmaker.html</span></a>;
/ <a href="http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/despite-denials-moscow-works-behind-the-scenes-in-ukraine/moscow-vladimir-putin-kiev-violence-federalism-viktor-yanukovych/c1s15092/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/despite-denials-moscow-works-behind-the-scenes-in-ukraine/moscow-vladimir-putin-kiev-violence-federalism-viktor-yanukovych/c1s15092/</span></a>).
</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">At
the same time, as people with long-standing connections to Putin and the
regime, if not necessarily people placed at the very top of Russia's
leadership, these seven also provided the USA with targets that would be
noticed by the Kremlin without panicking the circles directly surrounding
Putin. It is also telling that several people on the list have a history of
prominent opposition to the West. Dmitry Rogozin, for instance, was renowned
for his belligerent views while Russian ambassador to NATO between 2008 and
2011 (see also the launch of his book: <i>The Hawks of Peace</i>, at <a href="http://gbr.rs.gov.ru/en/node/1816"><span style="color: blue;">http://gbr.rs.gov.ru/en/node/1816</span></a>).
Vladislav Surkov has been the bogeyman for domestic political opposition in
Russia over the last decade. (<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/richard-sakwa/surkov-dark-prince-of-kremlin"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/richard-sakwa/surkov-dark-prince-of-kremlin</span></a>)
And the above-mentioned Mizulina was the author of anti-gay laws, which
provided the background for the previous Russo-Western crisis. (<a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/author-of-anti-gay-law-is-putins-conservative-champion/484431.html"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/author-of-anti-gay-law-is-putins-conservative-champion/484431.html</span></a>)
</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Finally,
it is worth noting that the first seven to be hit by US sanctions came from
what is ostensibly a range of political backgrounds. Before becoming
presidential adviser, Sergey Glazyev and Dmitry Rogozin were among the
co-founders of the party Motherland, centred on nationalism and left-wing
economic policies. (<a href="http://rodina.ru/"><span style="color: blue;">http://rodina.ru/</span></a>).
Yelena Mizulina used to be a prominent member of the Communist Party and is now
a member of the party A Just Russia, known (just as Motherland) for its focus
on left-wing economic policies. (<a href="http://www.spravedlivo.ru/"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.spravedlivo.ru/</span></a>). Leonid Slutsky, for
his part, is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, known for
being neither liberal nor democratic but with a very - erm - noticeable leader
in Vladimir Zhirinovsky (<a href="http://ldpr.ru/"><span style="color: blue;">http://ldpr.ru/</span></a>;
also <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/people/article/vladimir-zhirinovsky/434232.html"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.themoscowtimes.com/people/article/vladimir-zhirinovsky/434232.html</span></a>).
The main point is, though, that the Communist Party, A Just Russia, and the
Liberal Democratic Party constitute the entire opposition in the Duma (lower
house) of the state parliament. So - either Putin's policy towards Ukraine
really has support throughout Russian society - or we have yet another example
of how political opposition no longer exists in Russia...</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Now, let
us have a look at the additional Russians sanctioned by the USA on March 20:</span></div>
<ul>
<li>Evgeny Bushmin (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/189/">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/189/</a>)</li>
<li>Vladimir Dzhabarov (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/272/">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/272/</a>)</li>
<li>Andrey Fursenko (<a href="http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/71">http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/71</a>)</li>
<li>Alexey Gromov (<a href="http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/4">http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/4</a>)</li>
<li>Sergey Ivanov (<a href="http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/81">http://state.kremlin.ru/persons/81</a>)</li>
<li>Viktor Ivanov (<a href="http://fskn.gov.ru/pages/main/info/leadership/4386/index.shtml">http://fskn.gov.ru/pages/main/info/leadership/4386/index.shtml</a>)</li>
<li>Yuriy Kovalchuk (<a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/yuri-kovalchuk/">http://www.forbes.com/profile/yuri-kovalchuk/</a>)</li>
<li>Vladimir Kozhin (<a href="http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/28/upravlenie.html">http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/28/upravlenie.html</a>)</li>
<li>Sergey Mironov (<a href="http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131254/">http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131254/</a>)</li>
<li>Sergey Naryshkin (<a href="http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131138/">http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131138/</a>)</li>
<li>Viktor Ozerov (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/49/">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/49/</a>)</li>
<li>Oleg Panteleev (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/47/">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/47/</a>)</li>
<li>Arkady Rotenberg (<a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/arkady-rotenberg/">http://www.forbes.com/profile/arkady-rotenberg/</a>)</li>
<li>Boris Rotenberg (<a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/boris-rotenberg/">http://www.forbes.com/profile/boris-rotenberg/</a>)</li>
<li>Nikolay Ryzhkov (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/316/">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/316/</a>)</li>
<li>Igor Sergun (<a href="http://www.fontanka.ru/2011/12/27/069/">http://www.fontanka.ru/2011/12/27/069/</a>)</li>
<li>Gennady Timchenko (<a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/gennady-timchenko/">http://www.forbes.com/profile/gennady-timchenko/</a>)</li>
<li>Aleksandr Totoonov (<a href="http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/322/">http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/322/</a>)</li>
<li>Vladimir Yakunin (<a href="http://rzd.ru/enterprise/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=5010&refererLayerId=5040&layer_id=5060&id=2168">http://rzd.ru/enterprise/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=5010&refererLayerId=5040&layer_id=5060&id=2168</a>)</li>
<li>Sergey Zheleznyak (<a href="http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131498/">http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/deputies/131498/</a>)</li>
</ul>
This is the list that is really getting interesting Apart from a new host of politicians from the two chambers of the Russian parliament - their inclusion looks mostly like a continuation of the previous round of sanctions - the USA also targets high-profile friends and close allies of Putin. More tellingly, the White House states this outright. (<a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx">http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx</a>)<br />
<br />
Much, for instance, have been made of the fact that Gennady Timchenko, co-owner of the oil trading company Gunvor until two days ago (<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72ac6954-b06a-11e3-8efc-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wcN48Oby">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72ac6954-b06a-11e3-8efc-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wcN48Oby</a>), is named as a close associate of Putin, whose personal financial interest in Gunvor has for the first time been publicly alleged by the USA. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/oligarch-timchenko-denies-putin-links-us-blacklist-sanctions">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/oligarch-timchenko-denies-putin-links-us-blacklist-sanctions</a>) <br />
<br />
Andrey Fursenko, Yuriy Kovalchuk and Vladimir Yakunin, are long-time friends of Putin - dating back, in fact, to the so-called Ochero Dacha Cooperative that they co-founded in the early 1990s and whose members have seen their fortunes rise together with those of Putin. (<a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-ukraine-crisis-putin-wealth-20140321,0,1236120.story">http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-ukraine-crisis-putin-wealth-20140321,0,1236120.story</a>). The Rotenberg brothers go even further back with Putin - as judo sparring partners for the President back in the Soviet Union. (<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-28/putin-s-judo-playing-friend-says-premier-didn-t-help-him-win-gazprom-deals.html">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-28/putin-s-judo-playing-friend-says-premier-didn-t-help-him-win-gazprom-deals.html</a>)<br />
<br />
And then there are of course the s<em>iloviki</em> - the people from the security services. Sergey Ivanov, now leading the Presidential Executive Office, was very close to becoming Russian president in 2008 following Putin's first terms - and he has remained a possible successor to Putin (<a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/21/did-obama-just-sanction-russia-s-next-president.html#url=/articles/2014/03/21/did-obama-just-sanction-russia-s-next-president.html">http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/21/did-obama-just-sanction-russia-s-next-president.html#url=/articles/2014/03/21/did-obama-just-sanction-russia-s-next-president.html</a>). Viktor Ivanov, director of the Federal Drug Control Service, has cooperated with the USA on curbing Afghan drug trade to the West (<a href="http://en.g8russia.ru/interview/20140226/983237489.html">http://en.g8russia.ru/interview/20140226/983237489.html</a>). Igor Sergun, a secretive figure, leads the military intelligence service (<a href="http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9711@egOrganization">http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9711@egOrganization</a>). These three are, arguably, the most influential s<em>iloviki</em> bar none in Russia.<br />
<br />
<strong><u>So what does this mean?</u></strong><br />
<br />
First and foremost, it means that US sanctions just got serious. Apart from Putin himself, and one or two other persons, the sanctions could not have targeted more senior figures in the Russian regime. The economic element of the sanctions is not the most important aspect. While a number of the above-mentioned people could well have funds now frozen in the West they hardly face penury - just as the one bank targeted, Bank Rossiya, is being assisted by the Russian Central Bank to weather the storm. Putin has, anyway, long publicly told his elites to bring their funds back to Russia - something they will now be very inclined to remember. <br />
<br />
What does matter, though, is the fact that the USA has gone personal against the Russian President and his regime. By targeting people around Putin (although, not yet, Putin himself) the guilt for the illegal annexation of Crimea has been placed squarely on the shoulders of the Russian regime and not Russia as such. The USA has accused the Russian administration of being run by business associates / friends / cronies with regard for themselves and not for Russia. And, despite previous hints at this from the USA, that development is new.<br />
<br />
Unless Putin and his allies continue to overplay their hand and actually invade the rest of Ukraine (or the Baltics) it is almost impossible to imagine use of military means by the West. Clearly, the Russian elites can ride out the immediate consequences of this storm, just as the sanctions may still be slackened after a while. Yet what will remain is that the Russian administration - just as it broke the fundamental norm of international society by annexing the territory of another sovereign state - has now <em>de facto</em> been placed outside the company of "civilised" administrations by the USA, which has attacked the Russian leadership as persons, not as representatives of their country. Under Putin's leadership, Russia could, just possibly, become a "quasi-state" recognised as a menace and not as a member. <br />
<br />
This is not the fault of ordinary Russians (however much they may or may not welcome the "return" of Crimea to Russia), but of a regime that has long since been used to acting without much thought for the consequences for their people. It would be very helpful, therefore, if the next Western step following these sanctions would be to ease the access of ordinary Russians into the EU and the USA, while making sure that top levels of the regime were kept out. Such a step would not make Putin cry in his sleep, just as Russia will continue to attract plenty of money to keep his rich friends happy (well, at least for a time...). But it would send a clear signal from the West that everyday Russians are welcome friends and members of international society - and that the Putinistas are not. Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-60132302147348224742014-03-19T17:37:00.001-07:002014-03-19T17:37:28.589-07:00Whither Ukraine's National Guard?Amidst the drama of Russia conquering Crimea, and thus breaking international law with seeming impunity, the future of the rest of Ukraine has been overlooked. Irrespective of Russian aggression, Ukraine witnessed significant violence in Kiev in February. Even, and especially, those who wish Ukraine well must query how Ukraine moves forward now - not just internationally, but in domestic affairs, too.<br />
<br />
A pointer to how Ukraine could develop under its new regime may perhaps be found in the new-fangled National Guard, which has been created to "capture the spirit of Maidan," so to speak. But where did this National Guard come from, of whom does it consist, and how can we expect it to develop?<br />
<br />
<strong><u>Origins</u></strong><br />
<br />
The creation of a Ukrainian National Guard was officially suggested on March 11 by the administration's National Security and Defence Council. Acting Minister of the Interior, Arsen Avakov, made clear that the Guard would be representative of civil society and would be engaged in military activities, such as guarding state borders, as well as civil ones. (<a href="http://www.unian.ua/politics/894960-avakov-hoche-vidnoviti-natsionalnu-gvardiyu.html">http://www.unian.ua/politics/894960-avakov-hoche-vidnoviti-natsionalnu-gvardiyu.html</a>) Possibly, Avakov was the right person to announce the creation of such an apparently unifying force, himself having begun as a politician in the eastern city of Kharkiv while supporting politicians identified with Western Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko and then Yulia Tymoshenko.<br />
<br />
With Avakov's backing, and the backing of the Council, the Guard was officially voted into existence by parliament the following day, with a projected size of 60,000. The vote was quite clear with 262 of 330 (or 79%) of parliamentarians present voting in favour. Note, though, that the parliament holds 450 seats; thus only 58% of all parliamentarians supported the creation of the Guard. Also, all members present from the Communist Party voted against the proposed law, as did all but one members present from the Party of Regions. (<a href="http://www.unian.ua/politics/896007-vr-vidnovila-natsionalnu-gvardiyu-ukrajini.html">http://www.unian.ua/politics/896007-vr-vidnovila-natsionalnu-gvardiyu-ukrajini.html</a>) This means that two parties, which received around 13% and 30% of the popular vote in the October 2012 parliamentary elections (<a href="http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel121.htm">http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel121.htm</a>), have come out united against the National Guard.<br />
<br />
<strong><u>Composition</u></strong><br />
<br />
So far, the Guard is not a fighting force. Its projected size has now been reduced by about half. The few thousand recruits, who have so far showed up for training, are not trained soldiers and would not be likely to inflict much damage on an invading Russian force despite plenty of patriotic speech from the new guards (<a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/video/?video_id=NTM1Njg2fHwxNDcxfHx8fHx8MTZ8fA==&video_tile=Thousands+sign+up+to+Ukraine%26%2339%3Bs+National+Guard">http://www.ibtimes.co.in/video/?video_id=NTM1Njg2fHwxNDcxfHx8fHx8MTZ8fA==&video_tile=Thousands+sign+up+to+Ukraine%26%2339%3Bs+National+Guard</a>) Also, it is noticeable that the idea of using the Guard to protect the borders of Ukraine has been quickly dropped, with that task now squarely on the Ukrainian military, which has sent the bulk of its 180,000 soldiers to face Russian troops alongside their shared border. The Guard, however, has been tasked with the potentially important defence of natural gas pipelines running across the country, which are vulnerable to sabotage (unless and until, of course, Gazprom turns off the gas). (<a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ukraine-increases-pipeline-security/496273.html">http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ukraine-increases-pipeline-security/496273.html</a>)<br />
<br />
Although the Guard does not consist of soldiers, per se, it is to some extent integrated with the military and other Ukrainian security forces and does include a number of recruits with fighting experience from the violence in Kiev. Indeed, the Guard especially seeks to continue and develop the so-called "Maidan spirit" that helped overthrow President Viktor Yanukovych. This is hope to assist both the development of the Guard and the prestige of the acting government in the face of a still uncertain country. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/uk-ukraine-crisis-guard-idUKBREA2I0S320140319">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/uk-ukraine-crisis-guard-idUKBREA2I0S320140319</a>)<br />
<br />
<strong><u>Development</u></strong><br />
<br />
Undoubtedly, Ukraine would benefit from a more effective national security programme. Similarly, in case of an emergency it would be very useful for everyone concerned with preserving the Ukrainian state to be coordinated in civil as well as military defence tasks that might keep vital infrastructure running during an attack from Russia.<br />
<br />
However, it is far from clear that the Guard will be ready to do so in the far future, let alone within the coming days and weeks. The problem is not just the blatant lack of combat prowess in the Guard, but the potential it has to deeply divide Ukraine.<br />
<br />
The stated purpose of the Guard includes 20 points. Of these, 6 refer to the territorial defence of Ukraine, which predictably is a high priority for the acting Ukrainian government. Beyond these 6 points, however, the rest of the tasks set for the Guard are also military in nature, including helping to preserve conditions of martial law when necessary, stopping "violent riots" (the nature of which are left undefined), and helping to restore the constitutional order. (<a href="http://nguarmy.com.ua/">http://nguarmy.com.ua/</a>)<br />
<br />
As such, these of course seem like sensible priorities for an administration, which may yet face internal collapse. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the Guard has been created following the disbanding of the riot police (the Berkut) and the sacking of highly placed officers elsewhere in the security services. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26350088">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26350088</a>; also <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26265808">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26265808</a>). <br />
<br />
OK - so now we have, on the one hand, a Ukrainian National Guard with wide remit to enforce the new order and consisting of people who, one must assume, are strong supporters of the acting government and thus were opponents of Yanukovych. On the other hand, we have a large number of sacked Ukrainian riot police, consisting of people who, if they have not already declared their undying loyalty to Yanukovych and Putin, might be tempted to do so considering that they and Berkut have been universally blamed by the acting Ukrainian goverment for the deaths that preceded Yanukovych's departure. (<a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-police-berkut-forces-crimea/25295633.html">http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-police-berkut-forces-crimea/25295633.html</a>) This is a recipe for confrontation between a Guard backed by western Ukraine and ex-Berkut members backed by eastern Ukraine. And with a military unable to prevent potential domestic conflict with Russian tanks parked nearby.<br />
<br />
It would have been much more helpful if the Ukrainian administration had constructed a National Guard specifically focused on civilian tasks and on including participants from all of Ukraine. Similarly, while the main blame for the deaths in Kiev does almost certainly lie with Yanukovych and (some parts of?) Berkut much uncertainty has appeared regarding exactly what happened on the Maidan and elsewhere in Kiev. An official inquiry should have been begun, as a priority and with participation from all of Ukraine and all political parties. Instead, a beleaguered Ukrainian administration reacts to a very real Russian danger by constructing symbolic forces displaying Ukrainian nationhood and defiance. <br />
<br />
Unfortunately, it is not yet clear whether the Ukrainian nationhood symbolised by the Guard can accommodate everyone in Ukraine.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-16371770534692014542014-03-18T17:32:00.000-07:002014-03-19T00:59:58.404-07:00The world of tomorrow<em>I appreciate that readers might disagree with my comments below; find them unrealistic or even distasteful. Be that as it may, I hope that my words will at least provoke a bit of contemplation of what we are currently witnessing in Eastern Europe.</em><br />
<br />
Today, Russia officially and forcibly annexed Crimea, previously part of the sovereign territory of Ukraine. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26630062">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26630062</a>)<br />
<br />
Today, we may have witnessed the most important watershed in international affairs since the Second World War. <br />
<br />
I state this based on my belief that post-World War international stability has, to a significant extent, been based on international law within international society; on the existence of the United Nations as the institutional embodiment of such law; and on the prohibition against wars of territorial conquest that is a centrepiece of the UN Charter.<br />
<br />
Against this argument, the vast majority of observers and analysts believe that this crisis, while serious, will soon dissipate. The West and Russia will suspend some cooperation for a time, some sanctions will appear on both sides, and after a few years - if not months - everything will be back to business as usual. Ukrainian territorial integrity will be sacrificed, but the great powers and international affairs will remain stable as in the last seventy years. Such reasoning rests on three assumptions:<br />
<br />
<strong><u>1) Rationality is stability</u></strong><br />
<br />
All actors act according to rationality. This statement is a mainstay of most international affairs theory, and also of lay understandings of relations between states. Indeed, history has witnessed few, if any, cases of states or other actors acting against what they rationally perceived to be their best interest.<br />
<br />
Following from this, it is claimed that any state acting rationally will seek international stability, at least at a systemic level. Revanchist aggression, as per the 1930s, simply cannot happen in a world of nuclear weapons, where war can be so final, so destructive. While nuclear-armed great powers, such as Russia and the USA, can attack and dismember weaker states from time to time, confrontation between great powers is irrationally dangerous for all states and therefore highly unlikely, if not impossible.<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, both of the above assumptions are flawed.<br />
<br />
While all actors may act according to a rationale, this does not prevent misperception and miscalculation. This is especially the case for states, since states are neither unitary actors nor hold interests similar to each other. Russia, for instance, is not run as a one-man band by President Vladimir Putin, but is controlled in cautious, murky and sometimes faltering cooperation by a range of figures from the business and security services worlds, some of whom may mistakenly believe it would be easy for Russia to take and hold eastern Ukraine. Also, while all states want to increase their security it is difficult to see how annexing Crimea enhances Russian security. If the Russian regime really believes conquering Crimea makes the country safer in the long run from Ukraine and NATO, then we are witnessing a miscalculation of enormous dimensions. And if the West waits for Russia to finish conquering sufficient territory for the Kremlin to view the world as stable, then we may yet blunder into armed confrontation between two sides, which both think their counterpart is bluffing.<br />
<br />
Similarly, rationalities may be very different for different actors. While all states may view survival as their ultimate goal, war and conquest may be attempted for a range of "rational" reasons, if the attacking party believes the prize of conquest outweighs any risk to its own survival. What makes a "rational" prize for a given state can be difficult to guess for outsiders - certainly Crimea's historic importance for Russia is at least as important as any strategic value it may have.<br />
<br />
And as for the alleged pacifying role of nuclear weapons in the grander scheme of things, the nuclear-sated Cold War world was often unstable - particularly because of nuclear weapons. Only by 1962 was implemented the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction, which aimed to prevent major war through the understanding that such war would necessarily lead to widespread desolation throughout the world. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17026538">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17026538</a>). This MAD policy appeared as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As this Crisis did not result in war it is often overlooked today that the risk of war (and all-out destructive war, at that) was significant at the time - 50/50 by some estimates. (plenty of accounts document this, for instance Michael Dobbs, <em>One Minute to Midnight</em>, 2008; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, <em>One Hell of a Gamble</em>, 1997; and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, <em>Essence of Decision (2nd ed.)</em>, 1999).<br />
<br />
The point here is not that nuclear weapons may be used today - that is and will always remain extremely unlikely for a range of reasons - but that states may end in war through miscalculations and different rationalities, and despite knowing that fighting may have devastating consequences.<br />
<br />
<strong><u>2) Prosperity is the new peace</u></strong><br />
<br />
The second assumption is that the seach for prosperity has replaced the search for peace. Previously, the statesmen of the world were occupied by the thought of how national military and other power could be secured. The peace of your country could only be secured if you challenged the rest of the world constantly and thereby proved you and your community ready to prevail in an international struggle. This was the thought behind treaties and arms races before the First World War, in particular - and behind the phenomenon of mercantilism, which dominated international economy for centuries with its focus on busines serving the interests of the state. Well, today such posturing for power is no longer necessary - or so this assumption goes - for the world of inter-state competition has been replaced by a world of inter-business competition, where national borders are shown as an irrelevance both for companies, seeking to curb or take advantage of that nebulous phenomenon of globalisation, and for individuals seeking their next iPad. (Kenichi Ohmae, <em>The End of the Nation State</em>, 1995, is an example of this attitude; as is any work derived from Milton Friedman or Friedrich von Hayek).<br />
<br />
If this assumption were correct, we might assume that Russia, Ukraine and the West would tacitly or vocally agree to avoid an escalation of hostilities, as this would not be in the material interest either of these states or of their citizens. Following some discomfort, Russians, Ukrainians, and people in the EU and the USA would go back to looking at the economy. Ukraine would be enriched by much-publicized financial assistance from the IMF and from the USA, just as Russia and the international financial markets would continue to trade with and benefit each other.<br />
<br />
This might still happen, at least for a time, but it overlooks two problems. First, the above conditions were equally present before the current crisis escalated. Second, financial motives for individuals might not translate into international state policies. If the Russian regime were interested in simply gaining more prosperity for itself and for Russia, then an annexation of Crimea makes no sense. Financial uncertainty and possible rupture of trade agreements remain risks for a Russia involved in the annexation. Perhaps Russia and its leadership decided such an economic price was worth paying? But then we are left with the question of what is the prize that justifies such an economic sacrifice. No matter the answer here, clearly economic interests do not dominate international affairs.<br />
<br />
Similarly, although individual prosperity may be the focus for most people most of the time, clearly this does not always apply. Russian actions here had some support at home, despite the knowledge that Western sanctions and possible economic hardship might follow. More critically, it is clear that state actions in Russia, Ukraine, the West or elsewhere have not been significantly influenced by domestic opinion. If it remains true that the general populace mostly remains aloof to international affairs, then the focus on prosperity held by this populace is of little consequence to the current crisis.<br />
<br />
<strong><u>3) We are living in a post-historical world</u></strong><br />
<br />
This assumption really came into general debate with Francis Fukuyama's book from 1992, <em>The End of History and the Last Man</em>. Fukuyama's argument is more nuanced than is generally understood, but he was widely seen to prophesy that the end of the Cold War signalled the end of all wars. That the (neo-)liberal dogma now encompassed the Western world, at least - and that serious international conflict would be almost unthinkable in future.<br />
<br />
This assumption may appear to be somewhat similar to that advanced above. However, in the assumption derived from Fukuyama's argument is the idea that the world is not necessarily one entire, but that we must distinguish between "historical" and "post-historical" worlds. Or between "civilisation" and "barbarity," if you will. Thus, while the EU and the USA now allegedly exist in the conflict-less utopia of Fukuyama's making, other parts of the world - such as Russia - remain caught in unstable modernity, or even pre-modernity. "We" in the EU and the USA have reached the end-goal, while other parts of the world must continue to struggle for survival. And if "We" are threatened it is only by incursions from the outside world, which must therefore be tamed or subdued. (Robert Kagan, <em>Paradise and Power</em>, 2004, is a classic example of this, as are the writings by many so-called neo-conservatives). By such reasoning, what is happening between Russia and Ukraine now is simply to be expected from peoples and states, which have not reached the enlightened peace and stability held in the West. The West will therefore do well to stay out of trouble and let the "Others" in Eastern Europe sort themselves out. (inadvertently, Jonathan Steele's recent article in <em>The Guardian</em> is marked by such assumptions: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/02/not-too-late-for-ukraine-nato-should-back-off">http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/02/not-too-late-for-ukraine-nato-should-back-off</a>)<br />
<br />
The problem here is, however, that the world cannot be divided neatly into spheres of "Us" and "Them." And here we come back to my opening argument: that the flagrant Russian breach of a cornerstone of international law can fundamentally change everybody's world of tomorrow.<br />
<br />
All law is, to some extent, fiction. Law is a set of rules agreed upon by actors for a range of reasons. Nothing inherent in a legal system ensures that system actors will adhere to the laws. Such adherence is ensured by an actor holding a sovereign monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within the system, and dedicated to upholding the laws.<br />
<br />
International law has an even weaker basis. Apart from the fact that international law is far from a coherent body, but instead an amalgam of sometimes contradictory rules, there is no sovereign enforcer in international affairs. A hegemon might fulfil this role, but even when the USA was strong enough to credibly dominate a unipolar system in the 1990s it showed little interest in enforcing international law for the sake of it. A neutral arbiter Washington certainly was not, as Iraq, Iran and Kosovo testified. So, on the face of things, it seems fair to say that international law is an irrelevance in the face of relative power held by states.<br />
<br />
Yet as I have sought to demonstrate above, power relations among states are in no way a guarantor of international stability, let alone of international peace. Miscalculations and misunderstandings flourish, absolute economic progress for all is repeatedly sacrificed by individual states for their relative advantage, and from this struggle no part of the world can count itself free in perpetuity.<br />
<br />
And yet we are faced with the fact that the world has not suffered major war for seven decades. With the fact that Europe, in particular, has been spared inter-state violence (although civil war has tragically appeared). And I posit that a main reason for such peace has been the existence of a common framework as constituted by international law. When the United Nations was set up in 1945 member states could well fear that the organisation and its world would soon fall victim to another war. For anyone having experienced Hitlerian aggression, the UN Charter's prohibition of territorial annexation would have seemed limpid. Yet the years went by and no state seemed eager to change the borders of the world, especially not in Europe. The USSR could easily have annexed Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 - the West was never close to seriously oppose these quite brutal invasions. Yet it was the Soviet Union that, almost pleadingly, insisted at the 1975 Helsinki Conference that all post-WW2 borders in Europe must be kept. After 1991, post-Soviet Russia may long have been too weak to really undertake international revanchism, but even Putin's reinvigorated state repeatedly emphasised the international importance of avoiding "land grabs." Tellingly, in 2008 Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not become parts of Russia, but were instead recognised by Russia as independent states, knowing that such a step could be accommodated within the cognitive framework of international law, following Kosovo. <br />
<br />
Now, Putin appears to have forgotten this lesson. The lesson that, just like domestic societies need its actors to accept the basic agreed rules of the political game in order to function, international society - in order to be a society in which members can function together on a non-violent basis - needs to agree on some basic, common rules for what constitutes acceptable conduct. Refraining from territorial conquest against another sovereign state (as recognised by the UN) was the most basic of all such rules after 1945. And if Russia is now allowed to openly and unapologetically violate this rule, international society is left ruled by the precept of "might makes right." As I have tried to show in the piece, such a precept is no way to international stability in the years to come, for Russia, for Ukraine, or for the rest of Europe and the world.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-19525122855378772412014-03-17T16:22:00.003-07:002014-03-17T16:23:06.034-07:00The EU, Russia and the ambiguities of military arms exportsRussia won the Crimean referendum. No surprises there. Apparently, union with Russia was preferred by 96% of the Crimean population - or at least by that part of the Crimean population that was not scared away from the voting booths - or at least by that part of the Crimean population that filled out the voting ballots in advance... Free and fair voting did not decide the matter; Russian armed force did.<br />
<br />
And precisely the question of military arms form an awkward link between the EU and Russia. The EU Code of Conduct on arms exports outlines eight criteria, which supposedly governs this activity. The criteria include: "The respect of human rights in the country of final destination"; "Preservation of regional peace, security and stability"; and "The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to...respect for international law." (<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/codeofconduct.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/codeofconduct.pdf</a>)<br />
<br />
Now, it could be said that Russia is failing on these counts. Oh, wait, in fact EU member states have been saying just that for years - and are saying so even now: <br />
<ul>
<li>"We are concerned about a number of recent laws [in Russia] that don't, as far as I can see, advance the right of people to freely organize." (German Chancellor Angela Merkel in November 2012) (<a href="http://www.dw.de/merkel-putin-carry-on-bilateral-dialogue-in-moscow/a-16385897">http://www.dw.de/merkel-putin-carry-on-bilateral-dialogue-in-moscow/a-16385897</a>)</li>
<li>"There will be no more international stability if a region...because it's solicited by a neighbouring country, can decide to change its borders and attach itself to its neighbour." (French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in March 2014) (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-ukraine-crisis-france-idUSBREA260AO20140307">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-ukraine-crisis-france-idUSBREA260AO20140307</a>)</li>
<li>"The UK condemns in the strongest terms Russia's flagrant disregard of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. For the UK and her allies the Crimea remains part of Ukraine." (British Secretary of State William Hague in March 2014) (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-russias-recognition-of-crimea-as-a-sovereign-state">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-russias-recognition-of-crimea-as-a-sovereign-state</a>)</li>
</ul>
Straight talk - a clear message all around! And for our next trick - can anyone guess which three countries licensed the most arms exports to Russia in the last year? All together now: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom!!! (Council of the European Union, <em>The Fifteenth Annual Report</em>, 21.1.2014, pages 253-55, at <a href="http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/EU_reports">http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/EU_reports</a>)<br />
<br />
In fairness, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have three of the largest economies in the world, and they were all among the sixth largest arms exporters in the world during 2009-13. None of these countries had Russia as one of their main destinations for major weapons sales (the fact that, during this period, Germany sold 8% of its weapons to Israel, France sold 13% of its weapons to China, and the UK sold a whopping 42% of its weapons to Saudi Arabia is, perhaps, scant consolation...). (<a href="http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf">http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf</a>). Yet even if Russia has not been a main market for the arms manufacturers of the giants of the EU, significant activity has still taken place. <br />
<br />
Most discussed has probably been the decision by France in 2010 to sell two Mistral-class warships to Russia. These 23,000-tonnes vessels can carry troops and helicopters, and they can be used for amphibious assaults. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10740291">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10740291</a>). Where might Russia possibly seek to deploy these ships? Why, in the Black Sea, of course! Following the <em>Vladivostok</em>, which was launched in October 2013, by 2016 France is set to deliver the second warship to Russia, which will slot nicely into newly "liberated" Crimean harbours with its beautiful name of <em>Sevastopol</em>... (<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43279aba-a5f6-11e3-b9ed-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wGQDpNBD">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43279aba-a5f6-11e3-b9ed-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wGQDpNBD</a>)<br />
<br />
France has in recent days cast doubt on whether this and other weapons sales to Russia will go ahead given the current Russo-Ukrainian crisis. For instance, Fabius has threatened that Russian sailors might not now be allowed entry to France in order to train for use of the advanced ships. (<a href="http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2367013&language=en">http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2367013&language=en</a>) And today Fabius and the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves le Drian postponed indefinitely a planned visit to Moscow, also threatening that the warship contract might be suspended. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-france-idUKBREA2G1NQ20140317">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-france-idUKBREA2G1NQ20140317</a>)<br />
<br />
But it all seems a bit too little, too late. And, as indicated above, France is far from the only EU-state with significant arms exports to Russia in recent years. Germany, for instance, has agreed to sell to Russia a technically advanced brigade-level training facility. (<a href="http://euobserver.com/opinion/123411">http://euobserver.com/opinion/123411</a>). And the UK has been preparing an arms treaty with Russia, which would British defence companies working together with their Russian counterparts on projects. (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10598250/Comrades-in-arms-Britain-and-Russia-to-sign-defence-deal.html">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10598250/Comrades-in-arms-Britain-and-Russia-to-sign-defence-deal.html</a>). <br />
<br />
You do not have to submit to a Cold War mentality to feel a little queasy about such affairs...Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-77078745251171943902014-03-16T08:58:00.001-07:002014-03-16T14:44:38.640-07:00The Crimean Referendum - three points to considerThe referendum on the status of Crimea is now well underway. By tonight, the Crimean authorities plan to publish preliminary results with the final tally official in one or two days. The results seem certain to be clearly in favour of unifying Crimea with Russia. Yet despite the internationally high profile of the referendum, some analyses still fail to pick up some of the most noteworthy point in the matter.<br />
<br />
<strong><u>This is not a referendum on Crimean sovereignty</u></strong><br />
<br />
The referendum taking place in Crimea today does not concern the sovereignty of the peninsula. This has nothing to do with its legitimacy or lack thereof (more of which will be mentioned below). It has to do with the two options provided on Crimean ballot papers (my translation provided below; the text taken from <a href="http://referendum2014.ru/upload/iblock/13c/13cda4a81397f6fcc489566e4aa44cfc.pdf">http://referendum2014.ru/upload/iblock/13c/13cda4a81397f6fcc489566e4aa44cfc.pdf</a>):<br />
<ol>
<li>"Are you in favour of the reunion of Crimea with Russia with the rights of a subject of the Russian Federation?"</li>
<li>"Are you in favour of the reinstatement of the Crimean Constitution of 1992 and for the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?"</li>
</ol>
First, Crimea was never part of the Russian Federation, which was a legal entity that came into existence in 1992. Consequently, as a question of sovereignty Crimea cannot "reunite" with Russia in the context of the Russian Federation. Crimea was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), but for less than 9 years, between 1945 and 1954. Before that, Crimea had been the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic since 1921, and earlier Crimea existed within the Russian Empire from 1783. In effect, therefore, Crimean potential inclusion in the Russian Federation will be based on 9 years of Soviet rule and 138 years of Russian Imperial rule. The Crimean leadership would probably expect inclusion in Russia as an autonomous republic, along the lines of the 21 existing republics in Russia, such as most of the North Caucasus.<br />
<br />
Second, as has been pointed out by several observers, there is a clear discrepancy between the Ukrainian constitution of 1996 and the 1992 Crimean constitution, eventually confirmed in 1998. The Ukrainian constitution states - in section 1, article 2 - that "The territory of Ukraine within its present borders is indivisible and inviolable." (my translation, from <a href="http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80">http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80</a>). The Crimean constitution, on the other hand, is a mess. While this document does state that Crimea belongs within the framework of the Ukrainian constitution (article 1, paragraph 1), Crimea reserves the exclusive right to change its constitution based on a popular referendum on the peninsula (article 48, paragraph 2). (<a href="http://referendum2014.ru/legal-base/">http://referendum2014.ru/legal-base/</a>) Crimean parliamentarians have already indicated that they would use, if necessary, such powers to transfer the peninsula to Russia no matter the voting results today. (<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/crimea-vote-does-not-offer-choice-of-status-quo.html?_r=0">http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/crimea-vote-does-not-offer-choice-of-status-quo.html?_r=0</a>)<br />
<br />
<strong><u>Most Crimeans do not favour incorporation into Russia</u></strong><br />
<br />
The problem is that we now very little right now about public opinion on Crimea. <br />
<br />
Recently, monitors from the OSCE have been prevented from entering Crimea. Monitors' reports indicate that their lives might have been in danger from armed pro-Russian militias, who fired warning shots. (<a href="https://twitter.com/OSCE/status/442300671740870656">https://twitter.com/OSCE/status/442300671740870656</a>) UN special envoy to Crimea, Robert Serry, was forced to leave the region by similar militias. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/un-envoy-crimea-quits-anger-pro-moscow-yatsenyuk">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/un-envoy-crimea-quits-anger-pro-moscow-yatsenyuk</a>) Ukrainian journalists entering Crimea have been kidnapped and robbed at gunpoint (<a href="http://en.rsf.org/ukraine-two-ukrainian-journalists-missing-10-03-2014,45977.html">http://en.rsf.org/ukraine-two-ukrainian-journalists-missing-10-03-2014,45977.html</a>) (<a href="http://cpj.org/2014/03/more-journalists-obstructed-on-the-job-in-crimea.php">http://cpj.org/2014/03/more-journalists-obstructed-on-the-job-in-crimea.php</a>); a Bulgarian journalist had a gun pointed to his head by local "self-defence forces" as shown on CCTV footage (<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/07/world/europe/crimea-journalists-threatened/">http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/07/world/europe/crimea-journalists-threatened/</a>). And, last night, the hotel housing most Western journalists in Crimean capital Simferopol was stormed by dozens of armed, masked men, allegedly searching for an "armed criminal." (<a href="http://time.com/#26320/gunmen-storm-crimea-hotel-full-of-reporters-on-eve-of-referendum/">http://time.com/#26320/gunmen-storm-crimea-hotel-full-of-reporters-on-eve-of-referendum/</a>) At the same time, local opponents of Crimean secession from Ukraine are being threatened on the peninsula. A priest from the Greek Catholic Church, known for its pro-Ukraine stance, was kidnapped by armed men in Sevastopol (<a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iYALA4Ueu28Kxoc_Xi6Dn1SqKlwg?docId=78c5c539-ddf0-4f8c-8d38-c4186efe3d2e">http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iYALA4Ueu28Kxoc_Xi6Dn1SqKlwg?docId=78c5c539-ddf0-4f8c-8d38-c4186efe3d2e</a>) as has been the case for numerous other local activists. (<a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/silent-war-exposes-growing-divisions-in-crimea-20140315-34tld.html">http://www.smh.com.au/world/silent-war-exposes-growing-divisions-in-crimea-20140315-34tld.html</a>) <br />
<br />
On this background, the Crimean Tatars - one-eighth of the total population - are boycotting the referendum (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimeas-tatars-brace-for-russian-takeover/2014/03/12/8b8ce764-a9df-11e3-8a7b-c1c684e2671f_story.html">http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimeas-tatars-brace-for-russian-takeover/2014/03/12/8b8ce764-a9df-11e3-8a7b-c1c684e2671f_story.html</a>) while Ukrainians on Crimea - one-fourth of the population - have constitently supported the position of Ukraine. As for Russians on Crimea their opinion is difficult to gauge. It is telling, though, that - ever since Crimea voted to be part of Ukraine in 1991 with 54% in favour on a 60% turnout - local calls for independence from Ukraine have been few and far between. In the 2010 elections for the Crimean parliament 80% of seats went to the Party of Regions, the party of now-deposed President Viktor Yanukovych. (<a href="http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/52929.html">http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/52929.html</a>) The Party of Regions did not and does not have a policy of handing Crimea over to Russia. While Yanukovych has recently accused the acting government in Kiev of losing Crimea, neither he nor his party - which remains in the Ukrainian parliament - support today's referendum, although they do share some local Russians' concerns. (<a href="http://partyofregions.ua/en/news/5312f7fff620d2320c000025">http://partyofregions.ua/en/news/5312f7fff620d2320c000025</a>)<br />
<br />
Conversely, in the 2010 elections the party Russian Unity, the leader of which Sergey Aksyonov has now taken control of the Crimean parliament and referendum, received a staggering 4% of votes! And precisely 3 seats. Not a big public mandate for Mr Aksyonov. And, by extension, not a big public mandate from Crimeans for independence from Ukraine and accession to Russia. (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-aksyonov-insigh-idUSBREA2B13M20140312">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-aksyonov-insigh-idUSBREA2B13M20140312</a>)<br />
<br />
<strong><u>Russian actions in this crisis are not based in international law</u></strong><br />
<br />
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, has - time and time again - stated that Russian actions towards Ukraine and Crimea, and the Crimean referendum, exist in accordance with international law. (see e.g. <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/uk-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-kerry-idUKBREA2F05U20140316">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/uk-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-kerry-idUKBREA2F05U20140316</a>)<br />
<br />
Well, no - that is simply not the case.<br />
<br />
International law is a somewhat nebulous concept, but it has its modern foundation in the Charter of the United Nations from 1945. In the Charter, it states in article 2, paragraph 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state..." (<a href="https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml">https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml</a>). Supporters of the Russian position may claim, with some justification, that the US and its allies breached the Charter during the invasions of Iraq and Libya, which were both sovereign states ruled by regimes recognised by the UN. But that is not the point. Lavrov is not stating that it is OK to breach international law, because the Americans did it - he says Russia is not breaching international law, full stop. And, in the case of the Charter, Lavrov's claim is untrue.<br />
<br />
Lavrov can with more hope look to the "Responsibility to Protect" as outlined in 2005 by the UN World Summit Outcome Document. This document highlights that all states have a "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." (articles 138-40). Article 138 underlines the responsibility of states to protect their own populations, while article 139 notes that the UN member states "are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council...on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." (<a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf">http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf</a>) <br />
<br />
Nowhere in Ukraine - let alone in Crimea - have we witnessed genocide, war crimes or ethnic cleansing. Even so, should the Russian authorities believe such crimes to take place, the Kremlin is legally obliged to take up the matter in dialogue with Ukraine and with the UN Security Council. Russia has not done so, instead vetoing the draft Council resolution denouncing the Crimean referendum as illegitimate. China abstained from this vote; all thirteen other Council members, including democratic stalwart Chad, voted in favour. What Russia seeks to offer the UN instead of this draft resolution appears to be troops on the ground.<br />
<br />
Just three points to consider as the Crimean referendum moves towards its foregone conclusion.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-46828266353999896082014-03-13T16:23:00.003-07:002014-03-13T17:00:24.913-07:00Russian media"Members of the so-called [Ukrainian nationalist] 'Right Sector' now wield influence throughout Ukraine. Members of the Russian parliament say that they have received calls for help from a range of regions [in Ukraine]." (<a href="http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/254063">http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/254063</a>)<br />
<br />
"The [Russian] self-defence forces of Sevastopol have seized five homemade bombs stuffed with nuts and bolts...from a young man who tried to smuggle these into the city...Self-defence groups continue to operate under emergency law to prevent [Ukrainian] militants and provocateurs from entering Crimea." (<a href="http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/858538/">http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/858538/</a>)<br />
<br />
"The Western nations have spent a tremendous amount of time and efforts in influencing Ukrainian society and leading it to the present situation, believes Konstantin Kosachev, the head of Russia's federal agency for foreign cooperation." (<a href="http://rt.com/politics/ukraine-russia-us-ideology-510/">http://rt.com/politics/ukraine-russia-us-ideology-510/</a>)<br />
<br />
...and we say thank you to our commentators tonight from Russian television stations <em>Pervyi Kanal</em>, <em>NTV</em>, and - why of course - good ole <em>Russia Today</em>...<br />
<br />
Oh, and on a completely different topic the Russian Ministry of Truth - erm, no of course, the Russian Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecoms, Information Technologies and Mass Communications - has announced that access to the internet-sites <a href="http://www.grani.ru/">www.grani.ru</a>, <a href="http://www.kasparov.ru/">www.kasparov.ru</a>, <a href="http://www.ej.ru/">www.ej.ru</a>, and <a href="http://navalny.livejournal.com/">http://navalny.livejournal.com</a> will be curtailed as these websites are calling for unsanctioned mass protests in Russia. (<a href="http://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news24447.htm">http://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news24447.htm</a> and my always impressive friend and analyst Jesper Gormsen).<br />
<br />
For the love of...<br />
<br />
I appreciate some readers of this blog may sympathise with parts of the Russian position in relation to Ukraine and the West. I certainly agree that a solution must be found whereby Russians and Ukrainians can live peacefully side by side and the rights of people in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine are guaranteed. I am even willing to accept that a large part of the Russian populace may not love President Vladimir Putin, but would be opposed to the mass insecurity, which might well follow a real challenge to his rule. But what will appear next from the cauldron of the Kremlin? A more general "firewall" to restrict access to the internet in Russia, as we already know it in China? A general climate of uncertainty that, as a minimum, prevents proper investigation of attacks on and killings of media personnel? (Anna Politkovskaya and Anastasia Baburova spring to mind, as do dozens of other high-profile victims, <a href="https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/">https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/</a>) Even more restrictive press laws? In 2013, Russian media was still a little less unfree than that of Azerbaijan - will Putin try to beat his southern neighbour this year in a race to the dregs... (<a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/russia">http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/russia</a>; also <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press">http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press</a>)<br />
<br />
It seems to have become a reflex now for the Kremlin to crack down on things. The above-mentioned restricted websites are not widely read by Russians; and certainly not by the core voters that Putin still commands. The coverage of the crisis in Ukraine perhaps makes more sense, helping the President to keep his apparently high domestic approval ratings... (<a href="http://rt.com/politics/putin-rating-boost-crimea-122/">http://rt.com/politics/putin-rating-boost-crimea-122/</a>) Yet Russian internet use is exploding - the average Russian can still access unflattering information about their elites. And control of the major television channels might bolster the Kremlin's attacks on "Ukrainian nationalists" as such, but not on the ordinary Ukrainians, who are friends and family to so many Russians. So does the Russian state now simply use all crises to restrict civil society even more? Or are Russian actions abroad and at home just a sign that Putin and his people have little more to offer - no constructive ideas for taking their great country forward into prosperity and security, but simply some impetus to make Russia "powerful" (however ill defined...)? <br />
<br />
We shall know more in the coming days. Especially if all of us in the West, as well as Russians elites and Russians at large, remember with Tim Berners-Lee that it is our privilege and duty to seek information about our world from many sources - both from those approved by the authorities and from those, which might from time to time go against the official line. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/12/online-magna-carta-berners-lee-web">http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/12/online-magna-carta-berners-lee-web</a>)Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-34694754609279239902014-03-12T17:56:00.004-07:002014-03-12T17:56:56.276-07:00Meanwhile in Uzbekistan...These days, it is difficult to see beyond Ukraine and Russia in the post-Soviet world. With the Crimean referendum on independence looming, and with US and EU sanctions against Russian elites drawing near, there seems to be plenty of reason for focusing on these two most populous states in the region. However, the rest of the world is not standing still and, just now, from Switzerland comes the next chapter in the ongoing saga of who should be the next ruler of Uzbekistan.<br />
<br />
Uzbekistan is in many ways the crucial centrepiece of Central Asia. While Kazakhstan has the economic advantage, Uzbekistan with its 30 million people has by far the largest population in the region. Uzbekistan is geographically adjacent to Afghanistan, as well as to all other post-Soviet countries in Central Asia; countries which depend on Uzbekistan for any hope of regional cooperation. And while Uzbekistan has not always supported such cooperation its leadership has also been averse to close relations with Russia and the West. In addition, Uzbekistan does have large gas reserves of its own, as well as one of the largest gold desposits in the world. All these elements show that Uzbekistan cannot be ignored. (for summary information, see also <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html</a>)<br />
<br />
Throughout its post-Soviet existence as a sovereign country, Uzbekistan has been ruled by President Islam Karimov, who was credited with 88% of the vote during his latest election in 2007. Democratic challengers to Karimov appear unlikely - in the 2014 world survey of political and civil liberties by Freedom House, Uzbekistan appears as one of ten countries in the world to score the worst possible marks in both categories. (<a href="http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf">http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf</a>) Yet Karimov is now in his mid-seventies and potential successors within his elite are beginning to position themselves for his departure.<br />
<br />
It is in this context that the Swiss decision now to open money laundering investigations against Karimov's daughter, Gulnara Karimova, should be seen. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26543458">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26543458</a>) Ms Karimova was for long viewed as the heir apparent to her father. Yet as the presidential election approaches next year, the President's elder daughter has openly complained that Uzbek security and political elites, and even her own family, are against her. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/20/gulnara-karimova-uzbekistan-first-family">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/20/gulnara-karimova-uzbekistan-first-family</a>). Indeed, last September Lola Karimova-Tillyaeva publicly disowned her elder sister, who allegedly has also been the victim of attempted poisoning. And the Swiss charges come in the wake of criminal cases,k which were opened against Gulnara Karimova's close business associates in Uzbekistan. (<a href="http://www.fergananews.com/news/21841">http://www.fergananews.com/news/21841</a>)<br />
<br />
This is mentioned not to challenge the Swiss decision to investigate Ms Karimova for money laundering, but to highlight that her power and her business dominance in Uzbekistan seem to be quickly coming to an end. The benefitors of Gulnara Karimova's fall from grace remain quite opaque. Nonetheless, three names suggested as her direct competitors are Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev, Head of the National Security Services Rustam Inoyatov, and Finance Minister Rustam Azimov. (<a href="http://expert.ru/2013/12/5/peremenchivoe-schaste/">http://expert.ru/2013/12/5/peremenchivoe-schaste/</a>)<br />
<br />
These three are all in their late fifties or older, and they clearly all support central pillars of Islam Karimov's state. Thus, it is unlikely that any of them as president would promote political or civil liberties to a noteworthy degree, just as they would probably all seek to retain for Uzbekistan a wary position between Russia and the US; closer to the former but without being subservient to Moscow. Still, it has been suggested that Azimov has been rumoured to be a favourite choice of the US to succeed Karimov (<a href="http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/subcontinent-central-asia/45355-usa-selected-rustam-azimov-next-president-uzbekistan.html">http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/subcontinent-central-asia/45355-usa-selected-rustam-azimov-next-president-uzbekistan.html</a>); that Mirziyoev and Inoyatov are rumoured to be closely allied (<a href="http://www.compromat.ru/page_34228.htm">http://www.compromat.ru/page_34228.htm</a>), and that Inoyatov in particular has good connections with Russian political and security services elites (<a href="http://www.iarex.ru/articles/37167.html">http://www.iarex.ru/articles/37167.html</a>).<br />
<br />
This does not mean that Uzbekistan is likely to follow Ukraine in becoming a new battleground for Russian versus Western influence. Uzbek politics mostly make Vladimir Putin's Russia look like a democratic heaven and no one among the Uzbek elites has an interest in changing this, given the prevalent fear among them for civil unrest and demonstrations. Just such fear resulted in hundreds of casualties among protesters in the Uzbek city of Andijan almost a decade ago. (<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4550845.stm">http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4550845.stm</a>) But the relative closeness of some, but perhaps not all, Uzbek elites to their Russian counterparts can tell us something about the influence of Moscow here - and in Central Asia and Afghanistan more generally - in the coming years. <br />
<br />
Finally, it is worth noting that any hint of a messy Uzbek succession - possibly including casualties within the elites - could seriously worry rulers and their supporters in countries throughout much of the post-Soviet region. In Belarus and Tajikistan, for instance, it must have been noted by presidential offspring that their counterpart in Uzbekistan (and in Ukraine, where Viktor Yanukovych's son until February was gaining influence) is now weakening. And if struggle between economic and military security interests among post-Soviet elites is now on the rise it is even worth remembering that the vast majority of serious challengers to sitting regimes tend to come from inside these elites themselves.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-55718241072507705582014-03-11T17:50:00.000-07:002014-03-11T17:50:54.520-07:00Whatever happened to Volgograd?Time flies so very fast. These days, all news from the post-Soviet space seem to concern the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. And rightly so, you might say. Russian troops have now almost complete control over Crimea. The peninsula shall witness a referendum in a few days; an event that may well result in the most far-reaching challenge to sovereignty in the post-Soviet world, and beyond.<br />
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Yet noteworthy events have a tendency to take place in this region; and right now we are in danger of forgetting about one such event. Before the toppling of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, before the Sochi Winter Olympics even, all talk was of the terrifying bombings killing and maiming scores of people in the Russian city of Volgograd. This horror is worth remembering still, for several reasons.<br />
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To quickly recap, on October 21st, 2013, a suicide bomber on a Volgograd bus killed seven people and injured almost forty. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24608694">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24608694</a>) Just as the shock from this event had subsided, on December 29th and again the following day, further suicide bombs in the city killed thirty four people in total, injuring more than eighty. (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25959746">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25959746</a>) <br />
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<u><strong>Why did the bombings take place?</strong></u><br />
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For a while these acts of terror unsurprisingly dominated debate in Russia, and to some extent abroad. It was quickly stated that the suicide bombers were connected to the North Caucasus. More precisely, Dagestan and its militant Islamic groups appeared to have fostered the attacks - at least according to the Russian authorities, who later arrested and killed people suspected of involvement in the attacks. (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/us-russia-blasts-idUSBREA0T0LT20140130">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/us-russia-blasts-idUSBREA0T0LT20140130</a>)<br />
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While statements from the Russian authorities cannot always be taken at face value there seems little immediate reason to doubt the bombings were planned from the North Caucasus. Volgograd is the first larger city travelling north from the Caucasus and would consequently be the easiest for Caucasian militants to reach. The city has obvious connections to Russian rule, connected as it is to the Second World War that still forms much of Russian state identity. Going further back, of course, Volgograd was founded in the late 16th century (as Tsaritsyn) to protect the southern frontier of Russia. Such symbolics makes the city an obvious target for anyone seeking to terrorise the Russian state. (see also: <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/why-volgograd-bombing/25216682.html">http://www.rferl.org/content/why-volgograd-bombing/25216682.html</a>)<br />
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Yet, beyond the terrible human cost involved in these bombings it is worth remembering that terror attacks are nothing new for post-Soviet Russia. Following the third of the recent attacks, the British newspaper <em>The Guardian</em> provided a very helpful map of all registered terrorist attacks in Russia since 1991. (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2013/dec/30/every-terrorist-attack-in-russia-since-1991-mapped">http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2013/dec/30/every-terrorist-attack-in-russia-since-1991-mapped</a>) Looking at this map it is immediately visible that a vast majority of all attacks have taken place in the miniscule Caucasian republics, such as Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia. Not always names familiar abroad perhaps, but these are areas that still witness almost daily killings, by gun, bomb, or simply "disappearance." It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any certainty the background for most of these acts of violence - in this region, law enforcement agencies and militants alike are not known for their willingness or ability to inform. What remains certain, though, is the continued volatility of the Russian Caucasus and the sheer inability (or unwillingness?) by the Russian state to lessen the problem by non-violent means. It is certainly too simplistic to state that the Volgograd bombings were directly caused by the misery of the North Caucasus, yet it does remain clear that Russia cannot hope for freedom from terror as long as parts of its territory remain so unstable.<br />
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<strong><u>What has happened since the attacks?</u></strong><br />
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Given the scale of the problem suddenly so visible in the wake of Volgograd, it might have been expected that decisive action would be taken by the Russian authorities to prevent repetition. Clearly, Russian law enforcement must have done something right for the high-profile Sochi Winter Olympics passed without a glitch (outside the Caucasian republics that is). Sochi itself and the Olympic venues were so heavily guarded that the risk of a renewed Munich was always minimal. Nevertheless, it is pleasantly surprising that other areas of Russia were not subject to spectacular terror while the Games took place. The lack of violence might have to do with lack of resources amongst perpetrators; or it might have to do with the response of the authorities. President Vladimir Putin, in his practiced He-Man style, vowed the "total annihilation" of terrorists immediately after the bombings (well, immediately after the second round of bombings, anyway). (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10544617/Vladimir-Putin-vows-total-annihilation-of-terrorists-after-Volgograd-bombings.html">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10544617/Vladimir-Putin-vows-total-annihilation-of-terrorists-after-Volgograd-bombings.html</a>) Certainly, as mentioned above, before the beginning of the Olympics the Russian authorities did claim to arrest or kill several people connected to the bombings. Subsequently, stricter anti-terrorist laws have been adopted by parliament in order to stymie future attacks. (<a href="http://en.itar-tass.com/opinions/1687">http://en.itar-tass.com/opinions/1687</a>) Yet it remains to be seen how effective such laws are - given the tendency of terrorist suspects to die "following shootouts with Russian security services" wanna-be terrorists might expect to be killed during or after their crime without having time to consider whether to commit a ten-year or a twenty-year terrorist offence...<br />
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It would probably be more effective - in the shorter, medium, and longer term - if the Russian state helped to turn the spiral of violence in its Caucasian republics. The Kremlin can with some justification state that Chechnya, previously centre for vicious civil war and general lawlessness, has now been pacified under former rebel turned Kremlin strongman Ramzan Kadyrov. Yet Kadyrov is probably not the man to foster widespread dialogue and conciliation in his community (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8809241/Ramzan-Kadyrov-profile.html">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8809241/Ramzan-Kadyrov-profile.html</a>) despite his recent, generous offer to send peacekeepers to Crimea... (<a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/kadyrov-chechens-ready-to-keep-peace-in-crimea-337720.html">http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/kadyrov-chechens-ready-to-keep-peace-in-crimea-337720.html</a>). It may therefore be feared that violent tension remains close to the surface in Chechnya. As was mentioned previously, terror attacks and violent deaths show no sign of abating in the North Caucasus, which also suffers from widespread socio-economic deprivation and, <em>pace </em>Kadyrov, local regimes that are not as democratically accountable to the local populace, as one might wish. And the Russian state with President Putin seems quite unwilling, or unable, to address this issue.<br />
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<strong><u>What can we expect in future?</u></strong><br />
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The immediate answer to what might be expected in future is, unfortunately, further terrorist attacks. Not because unsavoury individuals in Ukraine suggest "armed rebellion" in Russia as nationalist leader Dmytro Yarosh may or may not have said in some unspecified context. Not because terrorist attacks are part of some cunning, evil plan by the Russian authorities to keep its population fearful by using the constant threat of terror. But because the Russian authorities have long since (ever since the outbreak of the first fighting in Chechnya in 1994, one might say) lost the plot over what to do with the Caucasus. Anti-Caucasian and anti-Muslim sentiments might appear in Russia with somewhat unpleasant frequency, but there is little reason to believe that Putin and his elites share such automatic antipathy. The Russian state instead adds to the problem by continuing to promote authoritarianism and support for individual strongmen in the area - a technique used to some stabilising effect elsewhere in Russia but not here where, among other things, memories from the Chechen Wars and other regional violence has now damaged entire generations to the point where original nationalism has been significantly challenged and partly upstaged by militant Islam, so-called.<br />
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Why does this matter? Well, apart from the obvious interest for Russia and all who care about it to prevent future attacks on civilians (whomever may be the perpetrators) the Caucasian Republics remains yet another problem questioning the stability of the Russian state. Unless Moscow lets these republics go - which is extremely unlikely to happen - the Caucasian unrest is a persistent example that the Russian state cannot, over a period of years, pacify troubled, ethnically heterogenous areas with its usual method of strong central control. It almost makes one wonder how Russia could ever contemplate taking over Crimea. The peninsula may not be fertile ground for terrorism, and its socio-economic situation may be a whole lot better than that of the North Caucasus - but might it not be sensible for the Russian state to solve its domestic problems before venturing abroad?Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-26735460826598742072014-03-10T16:55:00.001-07:002014-03-10T16:57:06.028-07:00The real danger in a Russo-Ukrainian crisisIn the last few days, the Russo-Ukrainian crisis has been tense, but stable. But incidents of shooting have grown. Russian soldiers have repeatedly used warning shots when invading Ukrainian military bases on Crimea. Allegedly, Ukrainian activists trying to enter Crimea from the north came under fire from pro-Russian militias, who shot one of the Ukrainians in the chest with rubber bullets.<br />
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So far, there appears to have been no casualties from these Russo-Ukrainian military confrontations. Yet unless such confrontation quickly subside, a real possibility exists that people might die - either soldiers deliberately killed by their opponents or, perhaps more likely, bystanders hit by stray bullets. And such deaths could lead to unforeseen calamity - but not for the reasons generally mentioned these days in media and academic debate. Any individual deaths could swiftly turn into widespread Russo-Ukrainian fighting. And this would not be fighting between states, or fighting between ethnicities, but fighting between groups the distinctions between which could be very difficult to understand for everyone concerned.<br />
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<strong><u>It's not about states</u></strong><br />
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The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine have only existed as sovereign entities for the last twenty-two years. The borders of the two states correspond almost precisely to two of the republics in the Soviet Union: the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR). However, the Soviet republics were wholly different creations. They existed within a Soviet framework in which all directions came from Moscow, and within a Communist framework in which politics were enmeshed in Marxist-Leninist dogma. Membership in the Soviet Union and in the Communist movement consolidated a joint identity for Russians and Ukrainians; an identity also supported by centuries of imperial heritage, as formulated in 1832 by Sergei Uvarov as the slogan of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality." Benefiting from such a joint identity, Russians had no reason for concern when the notorious transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the UkSSR took place in 1954. So what if the peninsula was formally part of another republic? Everything remained in the Union. Yet after 1991 such certainties had gone. Russia and Ukraine were now different states, but largely in name only. Gradually, a post-Soviet national identity was assembled, but it has yet to really challenge the much longer duration of the pre-Soviet and Soviet identities.<br />
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<strong><u>It's not about ethnicities</u></strong><br />
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Still, if Russian and Ukrainian statehood might be a relatively new phenomenon surely Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities are age-old? No doubt, writings about Russians and Ukrainians go back centuries. No doubt, people still easily identify themselves as Russians or Ukrainians. Yet when asked to define precisely what being Russian or Ukrainian means, things get much more tricky. Language is not necessarily a factor; while few Russians speak Ukrainian, almost every Ukrainian can speak Russian to a considerable extent. Religion is not necessarily a factor; apart from the considerable proportion of atheists among the two ethnicities, most religious Ukrainians are Orthodox, just as their Russian counterparts. History is not necessarily a factor; while some Ukrainians would highlight the importance of the Cossacks and Taras Shevchenko for their self-understanding, the joint Russo-Ukrainian origins in the millennium-old Kievan Rus is central to the identity of the clear majority of Russians and Ukrainians alike. Given the significant amount of intermarriage between Russians and Ukrainians it becomes quite difficult to distinguish the two peoples<br />
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<strong><u>It's about Russia</u></strong><br />
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What is Russia? I keep coming back to this question? If Russia is not the Russian Federation, a post-Soviet state within post-Soviet borders, what is it? If being Russian cannot be understood as an ethnicity separate from being Ukrainian, then what happens if Russians and Ukrainians start to fight? What happens if Russia and Russians have no identity on which to fall back? Being different from Central Asia and from the Caucasus - sure! Being different from the West - no problem! Russian self-understanding is used to these opposites from the times of the Empire and the Union. But how can you be different from yourself? How can a Russian military force, with a disproportionate number of Ukrainians in its officer corps, battle against Ukrainians? Around which ideological banner will Russians gather? Of course, they can fight against the so-called "fascists" from Galicia but against the many people in central, eastern and southern Ukraine, who want to be Ukrainian? <br />
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I genuinely have no answer for this - and, much worse, I do not think anyone else has an answer, either. And that makes for some very frightening times to come, if shots ring out on Crimea.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-15969128556683038412014-03-08T01:47:00.001-08:002014-03-08T02:41:46.275-08:00Turkey and the Crimean crisisHow and why can Turkey become involved in the current crisis on Crimea?<br />
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Undoubtedly, Turkey must be involved to some degree. The peninsula, contested by Russia and Ukraine, is separated from the Turkish coast by less than 300 kilometers. In addition, Turkey is a member of NATO and a a close ally of the USA, which is increasingly confronting Russia over the crisis. And Turks feel a close ethnic and religious kinship with the Crimean Tatars, the oft forgotten third party in the Crimean conflict.<br />
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The geographical proximity of Turkey to Crimea is straightforward to understand. Recent reports from Ukraine suggest that as many as 30,000 Russian soldiers are now present in Crimea, while more could arrive to the peninsula from Russia quickly across the narrow Kerch Strait. At the same time, while the Russian Black Sea Fleet may not be in an impressive state it still retains a few vessels capable of engaging in combat operations, as demonstrated during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. And as a reminder that a Russian military threat cannot be ignored right now, recently and repeatedly Turkish military jets have had to scramble in order to deter Russian jets from flying along the Turkish coastline. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-turkey-russia-idUKBREA2612720140307">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-turkey-russia-idUKBREA2612720140307</a>)<br />
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The Turkish forces are not pushovers. The Turkish military is twice the size of that of Ukraine (<a href="http://www.cia.gov/">www.cia.gov</a>) and has retained its combat readiness over many years in an oft unstable region. While most of the Turkish fleet is normally located in waters west and south of the country, the fact that Turkey controls the Bosphorus Strait, providing access to the Black Sea, would make it easy for Ankara to quickly project considerable power against the Ukrainian coastline.<br />
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Turkey, though, has several reasons for not doing so. First, any genuine military move to help Ukraine retake Crimea would provoke significant opposition from Russia and would almost certainly end in major bloodshed, a massive and highly unpredictable escalation of the current crisis. Also, Turkey has a number of trade and energy agreements with Russia. 58% of Turkish gas supply comes from Russia (<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/turkey-still-needs-russian-gas-via-ukraine.html">http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/turkey-still-needs-russian-gas-via-ukraine.html</a>). Similarly, Russian-Turkish trade allegedly stood at $34bn last year and leaders of the two states happily declared their intent to increase trade volume in future. (<a href="http://en.ria.ru/world/20131123/184874427/Russia-Turkey-Vow-to-Boost-Bilateral-Trade-Tourism.html">http://en.ria.ru/world/20131123/184874427/Russia-Turkey-Vow-to-Boost-Bilateral-Trade-Tourism.html</a>).<br />
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Turkey cannot ignore events in Crimea, though. Having acceeded to NATO in 1952 during the first enlargement of this organisation, Turkey had almost 40 years of experience being on the front line of the Western struggle against the Soviet Union. This, of course, does not mean that the Turkish leadership today views Russia as a continuation of that enemy, but it does mean that Turkey had the chance to build up an institutional culture around cooperation with the USA, in particular. And, as was also seen during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the USA is using such affiliation to send military vessels through the Bosporus Strait and thus closer to the Russian and Ukrainian coastlines. ( <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-usa-warship-idUKBREA260ZB20140307">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-usa-warship-idUKBREA260ZB20140307</a>) The American destroyer, which now entered the Black Sea, may officially prepare to conduct exercises with the Bulgarian and Romanian navies, but it also serves as a reminder to Russia that the USA is watching. <br />
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Now, Turkey cannot just let the entire US navy through Bosporus. Ankara is governed here by the 1936 Montreux Convetion, signed by a group of states including Turkey, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, and governing the size and number of military vessels permitted access from the outside to the Black Sea at any one time. (<a href="http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf">http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf</a>) As Moscow showed in 2008, when the arrival of American military vessels quickly brought threats of trade sanctions against Turkey, Russia is a stickler for international law here. Consequently, the Turkish fleet is currently preparing to depart not for the Black Sea but for Africa (<a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal_341371_turkish-navys-long-african-tour-at-a-time-of-crisis-in-black-sea.html">http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal_341371_turkish-navys-long-african-tour-at-a-time-of-crisis-in-black-sea.html</a>) while it is unlikely that the USA will send to the Black Sea forces anywhere near the size required to worry Russia.<br />
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Indeed, right now Turkey does not need a clash with Russia. In domestic politics, the Turkish President and Prime Minister, once again, disagree - now on the limits of freedom on the internet (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-turkey-erdogan-idUKBREA2609E20140307">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-turkey-erdogan-idUKBREA2609E20140307</a>). Of possibly greater worry to the Turkish regime, its former army chief has been released from prison after two years, as the life sentence he received for plotting a coup against the state was deemed unconstitutional by the Turkish constitutional court. (<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-turkey-general-idUKBREA2612Y20140307">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/uk-turkey-general-idUKBREA2612Y20140307</a>). So Ankara really does not need to get involved in a Crimean imbroglio right now.<br />
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Nevertheless, Turkey has unequivocally stated that Ukrainian territorial integrity is of central importance for Ankara. (<a href="http://en.trend.az/news/politics/2250492.html">http://en.trend.az/news/politics/2250492.html</a>) Partly, this is due to Turkish discomfort with separatist movements and secession, in general, <em>pace</em> the Kurds. Yet it is also due to the 13% of Crimeans who are Tatars and whom Turkey has long declared kinship. In the current situation, again the Turkish Foreign Minister has made clear that his country will do everything necessary to ensure the "peacefulness and composure" of this Crimean minority (<a href="http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/Turkey-will-continue-to-protect-Crimean-Tatars-rights-says-Davutoglu_5273-CHMTM3NTI3My8xMDA1">http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/Turkey-will-continue-to-protect-Crimean-Tatars-rights-says-Davutoglu_5273-CHMTM3NTI3My8xMDA1</a>). Now, the Tatars have not exactly benefitted from Ukrainian rule in the last twenty years, yet they have consistently taken the side of Ukrainians against the Russian majority on Crimea. For this reason, and because Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan has a history of bullish support for perceived kin abroad, it is certain that Turkey will continue to follow developments in Crimea closely, and possibly become more involved in the near future.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-85648806452606338542014-03-06T15:34:00.001-08:002014-03-06T15:34:48.223-08:00Crimea, sovereignty and international ethicsEarlier today, in Ukraine the Crimean parliament unanimously voted in favour of the secession of the peninsula from Ukraine and accession to Russia. Or, to be precise, they voted in favour of a peninsular referendum, which will shortly decide the matter. Should such a referendum take place under the current circumstances it is almost certain that Russia will win the day. The vote by the Crimean parliament has, predictably, been supported by Russia and condemned in the West. Yet in several ways the status of sovereignty on Crimea is a complicated issue. And it touches on all the central debates in international ethics, including the values of Peace, Order, Liberty, Welfare, and Difference.<br />
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<strong><u>Peace</u></strong><br />
Russia is de facto occupying Crimea. Russian soldiers and weapons dominate the peninsula. They have partly come from the resident Black Sea Fleet and partly from across the Kerch Strait, the 5 kilometre narrow strait separating Crimea from south-western Russia. Many more Russian soldiers can quickly be summoned to the area. In addition, groups of armed, paramilitary "self-defence" organisations patrol Crimean cities. Some locals, unwilling to join Russia or support Putin's invasion, are nonetheless grateful that disciplined Russian soldiers and preventing violence by disorganised hooligans. In addition, it is a happy surprise that fighting is yet to take place between Russian and Ukrainian forces. So, before such fighting breaks out Ukraine should quickly abandon Crimea to Russia and secure a peace treaty with amended borders. Or so it can be argued if preserving regional peace is the main value here.<br />
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<u><strong>Order</strong></u><br />
International law has a value in itself. It is partly because of a UN-sponsored system preserving the sanctity of international borders since 1945 that post-war Europe witnessed to little strife. In fact, with the partial (and contentious) exception of Kosovo, post-war Europe has not witnessed any lasting and recognised breach of territorial sovereignty by one state against another. Even the secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia and then Serbia has only been recognised by some states, the secessions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by almost no states, and that of Transnistria by no one but itself. The break-up of Yugoslavia was a civil war; the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia might have removed the last vestige of self-determination for these states, but their borders remained intact. So, if preserving international order is the main value here it can well be argued that Crimean secession from Ukraine must be resisted by Kiev and the West. Such resistance might cause some fighting now, but will prevent much worse fighting at a later date.<br />
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<strong><u>Liberty</u></strong><br />
Robert Serry, the special envoy of the UN to Crimea, was forced to leave the peninsula quickly under threat from local militias. At the same time, a mission of observers from OSCE was prevented by similarly shadowy militias from entering Crimea, according to Polish Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak. Assuming that the militias are controlled by Moscow, and we can safely assume that, this is a remarkable case of double standards. Russia is not only a member of both the UN and the OSCE, but a member that time and again exhorts the world on how everything would be better if only these two organisations, instead of the EU, the Council of Europe and the dastardly NATO, were dominant in Europe. Yet when push comes to shove, apparently the UN and the OSCE are not liked so much by Putin, after all. The absence of international observers from Crimea prevents us from understanding what Crimeans really want. Most likely, protection against Ukrainian "fascism" remains popular on Crimea and maybe, just maybe, a free and fair local referendum on the future status of the peninsula would result in Crimea becoming Russian. However, as things are now any Crimean wanting to vote against joining Russia must be very brave indeed. This is a clear breach of Crimeans' liberty, and if liberty is the most important value in international affairs any local referendum should be prevented from taking place until conditions for a genuinely free and fair election are present.<br />
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<strong><u>Welfare</u></strong><br />
On the other hand, it is possible to ignore the question of liberty and focus on that of welfare, instead. Most people in the world, most of the time, are concerned with securing and bettering their daily existence; fighting for political rights comes a distant second. Crimeans are no different. Assuming that Russia can offer the peninsula and its inhabitants improved living standards, it can be argued that Crimean secession would be a good thing. After all, the economic difficulties of Ukraine are well documented while the coffers of Russia are booming with wealth gained from years of high energy prices. Everything else equal, Moscow should be able to spend a lot more on Crimea than Kiev could, for a long time to come. It is telling that, in terms of GDP per capita according to IMF statistics from 2012, Russia is 58th among the countries of the world - while Ukraine is number 106. The GDP per capita in Russia is two and a half times that of Ukraine. However, such potential for largesse does not ensure that Russian money will benefit ordinary Crimeans. Already, the Black Sea Fleet and its personnel are pumping substantial amounts into the Crimean economy, but I know from recent, personal discussion with locals that such relative wealth among the Russian military personnel can create distance to and envy among Crimeans. Such difference in wealth can partly be explained by the fact that Crimea, at the beginning of 2014, officially has salaries below the Ukrainian average (<a href="http://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2014/gdn/reg_zp_p/reg_zpp14_e.htm">http://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2014/gdn/reg_zp_p/reg_zpp14_e.htm</a>). So, if the welfare of the Crimeans is the most important value here there is an argument, at least, that Russia should have a chance to improve locals' lot. Conversely, though, Russia has promised to do so throughout the last twenty years with little to show for the fine rhetoric apart from a rather clean Sevastopol.<br />
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<strong><u>Difference</u></strong><br />
Finally, there is the value of difference. It is important to distinguish this value from liberty. Under liberty, Crimeans should be allowed to decide the future of their peninsula through a free and fair referendum the results of which should then be respected by all parties. Yet given the highly polarised nature of the issue at hand, it can be argued that the eventual minority opinion would be harshly treated. It is all fine and well to keep talking about Crimea as part of Ukraine, and certainly most people in Ukraine supported the ouster of former President Viktor Yanukovych. However, this does not exactly help the Crimeans who can, with some justification, say that they did not topple Yanukovych, they would prefer no riots in their region, thank you very much, and while they may be a minority across the nation they are a majority at home (sort of a tautology there, but you get my drift...). On the other hand, though, the Crimean population does include (according to the 2001 census) 24% Ukrainians - most of whom would probably prefer to avoid joining Russia. If to this figure we add the 12% who are Tatars, and also generally opposed to Russian rule, we have a total of more than a third of people in Crimea who want to stay in Ukraine. Probably, quite a few of the local Russians would also prefer to stay in Ukraine. Nevertheless, if we assume, for the sake of the argument, that all Crimean Russians want the peninsula to be part of Russia, this still leaves 36% who are - bluntly - stuffed. "Tough luck," you might say - that is the will of the majority. But this is the problem running through much Russian public debate today (and, incidentally, through public debate across the world) - the problem of the "tyranny of the majority." Most Russians are not gay and, in fact, most Russians probably remain unaccustomed to, and uncomfortable with, homosexuality. This is no different from the situation in most of the world - including most of the West. Yet the fact that homosexuals and their sympathisers in Russia would likely not have been able to vote down the controversial law against "homosexual propaganda" does not make that law legitimate. Similarly, the Ukrainian government can claim to have a national minority supporting the removal of Russian as an official language in the few regions where it had been introduced. Yet Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov was still right in rejecting the law that would have damaged Russian language and identity significantly in Ukrainian public space. In both these cases, and many others, we are dealing with tyranny of the majority. (and, before any reader argues that I am attacking Russia and Ukraine overly here, the West has repeatedly witnessed such tyranny in its debates on religion and immigration). Now such a tyranny can be fully compatible with many definitions of democracy. Yet it cannot be compatible with the value of difference - the honing of difference in order to create a dynamic, healthy society. <br />
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And if the value of difference is the value to be promoted here, Crimean minorities should be respected by retaining the peninsula within Ukraine but with a substantial degree of autonomy from Kiev and a pledge from all sides to increase and ensure the integration of Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and other groups not just in Crimea but across Ukraine as a whole. If this were to happen, the current crisis might yet carry some benefits for the future.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3369607392650299311.post-88189364919320168472014-03-05T16:46:00.002-08:002014-03-05T16:49:27.225-08:00A settlement for the crisis, or a settlement in crisis?Ukraine, Russia and the West have now apparently all stated that a solution to the crisis in Ukraine should be built around the February 21st agreement, which was brokered in Ukraine by the European Union and accepted by deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and his domestic opponents alike. And which was, at the time, rejected by Russia.<br />
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Well, it is certainly good news that all sides now seem to have a formal basis on which to base further negotiations. Yet apart from the risk that the agreement might eventually be put to a side due to escalating tension in Crimea or in eastern Ukraine, even if retained the agreement would not be straightforward to implement, as demonstrated by a look at its six points (as documented in <em>The Guardian</em> on February 21st, at <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text</a>):<br />
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<ol>
<li>Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed, and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.</li>
<li>Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.</li>
<li>Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014. New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice Commission rules.</li>
<li>Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.</li>
<li>The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence. The parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February law. Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and village by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares. Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force. After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine. The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.</li>
<li>The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland, and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation.</li>
</ol>
<strong><u>Point 1</u></strong><br />
Under the constitution of 2004 Ukraine witnessed six years of deadlock between then-President Viktor Yushchenko, at times-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, and then-opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych. Clearly, this constitution was not, in itself, conducive to creating a political framework within which everyone agreed on the same rules of conduct. Granted, in 2010 Yanukovych did take power in what was generally seen to be free and fair elections, but they were polarised, too, thus partly creating the current crisis. Also, with Yanukovych having fled to Moscow and the current government being supported by the oligarchs, who formerly aided Yanukovych, it is difficult to see how a genuine "national unity government" can be created. While the legitimacy of the current administration in Kiev can at times be questioned, it is difficult to see how the groups occupying Donetsk town hall and forcing the UN out of Crimea can be judged representative even for their parts of Ukraine.<br />
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<strong><u>Point 2</u></strong><br />
Following the hapless Yanukovych it seems sensible to reduce the power of the presidency, bringing the parliament back as an organ of central legal importance. Yet presidential systems do have some advantages over parliamentary ones. The latter can come across as slow to react, even paralysed, as demonstrated during the Yushchenko presidency. Even the USA, the epitome of the tripartition of power, has in recent years suffered severely in both a political and an economic sense due to deadlock created by a consitution, which is designed in a number of ways to shackle the presidency. Given the currently dire state of the Ukrainian economy, and the requirement from Western donors that Ukraine must implement tough IMF demands in order to qualify for aid, legislative deadlock in a constitutionally balanced system may not be the best solution for the country right now.<br />
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<strong><u>Point 3</u></strong><br />
This point leaves nine months before presidential elections are to take place. Apart from the obvious problem of finding monitors for all of Ukraine on which Ukraine, Russia and the West all can agree, we return to the difficulties presented by Point 1. Who can the current opposition present as a viable presidential candidate? The leaders of pro-Russian groups in Donetsk and Simferopol? Even if these people would stand they would never stand a chance in a genuinely free and fair nationwide election. Not with their lack of political experience (Tymoshenko and Yushchenko had been Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister, respectively, prior to the Orange Revolution), their lack of funds (unless Moscow is ready to foot the bill, which could become very controversial), and their substantial lack of trust in the provisional government in Kiev. Come to think of it, who is the obvious presidential candidate for the provisional government? Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov was parliamentary speaker before appearing as a compromise candidate for now, Vitali Klitschko has no experience of government, and Yuliya Tymoshenko has far too much experience - among most Ukrainians she is not fondly remembered for her time as Prime Minister. She even managed to lose the last presidential election to Viktor Yanukovych, hardly a born politician.<br />
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<strong><u>Point 4</u></strong><br />
You can just see this one go wrong, can't you... Disagreement persists over who actually shot and killed demonstrators and police officers in Kiev during the February unrest. Some of the people conducting the investigation could well be people who were involved in the violence in the first place. And as for the Council of Europe - a very admirable institution, which has a history of talking candidly on difficult political subjects, and of being roundly ignored by its members, if required. How this point could be fulfilled given the current levels of mistrust in Ukraine is very difficult to see.<br />
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<strong><u>Point 5</u></strong><br />
What are "illegal weapons"? Weapons held by anyone not under the direct command of the Kiev administration? What, exactly, are the odds that pro-Russian groups in Donetsk and on Crimea will hand over their pen knives, let alone any automatic firearms, to Kiev-controlled police and military forces? Especially since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insists that the "self-defence militias" on Crimea have nothing to do with Russia? Of course, if the provisional government in Kiev could get the assistance of all those handy Russian troops already in Ukraine to disarm non-governmental militias... Yeah, right! And as for the provision that "forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture" - well that is not a method to achieve the aim of solving the crisis, but the aim itself! Finally, it is difficult to give the authorities a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence when there is no agreement on who the legitimate authorities actually are...<br />
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<strong><u>Point 6</u></strong><br />
This, again, is not a way to a solution but a statement of intent which, aprtly at least, seems hollow today. It is worth noting, though, that Poland is included and that the USA is not - clearly an attempt to localise the conflict, which might be necessary in the medium term.<br />
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All in all, however, the February 21st agreement will not help to solve the current crisis - which is probably why Lavrov is using it to stall. If Russia can further consolidate its position on Crimea it might secure long-lasting domination of the peninsula without bloodshed. And should Kiev and the West follow Lavrov in supporting the agreement this might be the clearest recognition yet that these parties, too, consider Crimea a lost cause. For now, at least, but probably not for an unstable future.Rasmus Nilssonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07166736607728735351noreply@blogger.com0