Dear Ian.
On your article, I find it interesting on a number of
points. I think you are absolutely right to note that Russia is not the only
cause of instability in eastern Ukraine. Recently, some observers - notably Ben
Judah in the New York Times - called for military assistance, and troops, from
the West to Ukraine. Among others I was not
convinced how such a step would enhance Ukrainian or indeed regional
security. Similarly, I cannot help but see your point that NATO has been
anything but a passive bystander in relation to Ukraine. As with the EU this
problem began years ago. Ukraine was de facto refused entry to NATO while at
the same time the country was expected by NATO to come closer to
"our" side, leaving Ukraine in a dangerous limbo. In retrospect, it
is perhaps not surprising that some members of the Russian elite perceived a
battle - bloody or otherwise - was taking place with the West on the future of
Ukraine.
You suggest that NATO has an identity crisis. Few observers,
I believe, would fully disagree with you here. Following the end of the Cold
War during the 1990s NATO was, for most intents and purposes, simply another
Western "club" which former socialist states could join.
Subsequently, events in Kosovo and Central Asia have given NATO concrete jobs
to do, yet it probably remains most correct to say that these were American
projects with a NATO sheen - "coalitions of the willing," indeed,
which, certainly, was never the point of NATO where members of course are
expected to help each other when they otherwise might be most unwilling to do
so. Now, the fear might remain that Ukraine, and Central and Eastern Europe
more generally, is the latest American project into which the rest of NATO is
being dragged. Clearly, you have a good point in stressing that the Ukrainian
military has been responsible for civilian deaths in eastern Ukraine – and that
some of this responsibility might constitute war crimes. Arguably not the best
partner for NATO to arm.
With all this said, however, I still do take issue with some
points in your article. You mention that the fighting in Ukraine is NATO’s “proxy
war,” just as you suggest NATO is “beating the war drum.” Now, in order for
this to hold up, I think, one of two conditions would have to be fulfilled.
Either, NATO would have to have actively helped to start and expand the war in
Ukraine; or the mere existence of NATO would have provoked the war in the first
place. I am afraid I do not see either of these conditions in place here. That
NATO should actively have started and/or expanded the war in Ukraine does not
seem to be the message from your article. And, certainly, all signs during the
toppling of Viktor Ianukovych showed that NATO (and Russia) were taken aback. I
appreciate that some Western politicians, such as John McCain, actively and vociferously
campaigned in Kyiv for the removal of a democratically elected president. Yet
McCain, for all his follies, does not represent NATO. The organisation, in
fact, kept very much in the background until Crimea had been annexed by Russia.
The second explanation, that the existence of NATO has provoked this war does
ring true for me, but only in the limited sense, I hinted at above. The fact
that NATO for many years has been unwilling to state clearly whether Ukraine
belongs inside or outside the organisation (or even the “sphere of interests”
of NATO) is a contributing factor to the war. Yet, from this point, I cannot
conclude that Ukraine and Europe would be better off if NATO disappeared. On
the contrary, I believe that NATO now needs to assert itself and its mission in
a much clearer fashion than before.
Ian, I do not believe in a Europe, or a world, that is
divided into “spheres of interest,” belonging to a range of great powers. Now,
I do not claim that your article is advocating this – yet the elite of Russia
is, and so are many observers in the West for whom the actions of Russia today
are understandable and must be taken into account. Right now, this almost seems
to be the dominant tone of the debate in my Denmark. Still, if we are not to
have “spheres of interest” as the founding norm of international relations, of
what should such a norm consist? Well, I fear that the least bad option here
for me remains the norm of state sovereignty. This point comes with a number of
caveats, the largest one of which is that I remain a strong believer in
humanitarian intervention when required. Humanitarian intervention has been somewhat
discredited following the debacle in Iraq (and elsewhere), yet its necessity in
rare circumstances remains. Hence, it could be argued that the elites of
Russia, having witnessed the violent deposition of Ianukovych, honestly feared
that Ukrainian nationalists would assault Russians throughout Ukraine,
including in areas with an overwhelming Russian population, such as Crimea and
eastern Ukraine.
Reports from the UN soon pointed out, that Russians in
Ukraine were not threatened by Ukrainian nationalists. The interim government
did suggest a law to remove Russian as official language – a suggestion, which
a sensible interim president immediately discarded. Ukrainian nationalist candidates
had no chance in the subsequent presidential election. Thus, I cannot agree
with your assertion that Ukraine has done little to diffuse nationalist
tension. Certainly, though, the subsequent war has increased the presence of
intolerance in Ukraine, and there is no doubt that very worrying nationalist,
racist and other forces now fight as paramilitaries for the separatist and
government sides alike. Having said this, however, I fail to see that NATO
support for Ukraine equals Russian support for the separatists. All accounts I
have seen indicate that conditions in the separatist-held areas have remained
dangerously lawless, even when Ukrainian troops were not near. With the
deplorable exception of Odessa, this has not been the case in Ukrainian-held
territory. Certainly, Ukrainian shelling of civilian areas has been a
substantial part of the reason for the lawlessness in eastern Ukraine. Yet the
difference remains that Ukrainian military personnel can (and absolutely
should) be held responsible for all war crimes committed. The West must insist
on this; and while I am not overly optimistic about this happening, at least in
the state of Ukraine there is someone to hold to account. Whom do we hold
responsible on the nebulous side of the separatists?
But leaving all this to a side for the moment, let us assume
– for the sake of the argument – that Russia had somewhat humanitarian reasons
to enter Ukraine. Let us agree that the war has cost immense suffering for the
civilian population of eastern Ukraine. If, under these circumstances, Putin’s
Russian military now entered eastern Ukraine, and Crimea, just to stop the
fighting and to hold the Ukrainian regime to account, then the intervention
might be justified. Forget for the moment that Russian military assistance has
inflamed the fighting for months; forget, likewise, that Russian soldiers and
equipment have been part of the fighting for a long time, too. If the Russian
regime wants to ensure peace and tolerance for all in Ukraine then Russia, as a
neighbouring state, might do well in ending the fighting now – and NATO, by
extension, might do well to stay away. In fact, if Russia can begin to play the
role of guarantor of stability and civilian safety in the post-Soviet region –
if Russia can help to guarantee that the populations of Ukraine and other
post-Soviet states can enjoy the sovereignty of their increasingly
well-governed states – then NATO should perhaps be drawn back, slowly
dismantled, to be gradually replaced with negotiations for pan-European
security stretching this time really from the Atlantic to Vladivostok. Certainly,
the USA would probably be happy to turn his full attention to China and what
promises to be some tense years in East Asia.
And yet, Ian, this is not the Russia of which we today can
speak. Russia did not insert troops on Crimea in order to force Ukraine to
treat the inhabitants of the peninsula better. Instead, Russia promoted a
Crimean political party with 4% support from the previous local election to the
role of governing force capable of developing an unfree, unfair referendum that
justified the first land-grab in Europe since the Second World War. This is not
Kosovo – it is not even Abkhazia and South Ossetia for here, at least, the
contested areas are recognised as sovereign by Russia. A small difference you
may think, yet states whose sovereignty is recognised have a tendency to gain
more and more autonomy for themselves; something arguably visible with the two
republics in the Caucasus. Yet not with Crimea, which has now become the symbol
of the simple premise that “might makes right.” And a world built on such a
premise, the Soviet Union and Russia until quite recently clearly understood,
is a dangerous world in which states with justification can look anxiously for the
possibilities and dangers of conquest.
Now, you and I of course both know that many other factors
besides sovereignty guard international stability. Some international
institutions, for instance, have shown an ability to solve international
disputes with a minimum of tension. Arguably, NATO does not have a good record
here; not least due to the exclusive, militarised nature of this institution.
Thus, it might seem sensible to dismantle NATO and replace it instead with a
body of understandings and treaties that could foster a pan-European security
framework, including Russia. Yet, for me it is today difficult to see how such
a framework could be created. The elite of Russia today has substantial
resentment for the West. In Moscow, there is a clear feeling that the West has
treated Russia poorly since the end of the Cold War, and that the West seeks to
keep Russia down whenever possible. The merits or otherwise of this impression
are moot, yet there is little doubt for me that Russia’s elite saw the
deposition of Ianukovych in precisely this vein. Clearly, the activities of
NATO during the last decades have contributed to this Russian wish for
revanchism, yet removing NATO now would not convince elites in Russia of the
beneficence of the West. Unfortunately, for the time being, the resentment will
stay in place. It will also be accompanied by a search for justice for Russia;
a belief in Russia that there is a just place for Russia in the international
system and that Russia should seek this place with whatever means possible.
Now, unfortunately, beyond the idea that Russia should be a great power with a
regional sphere of interests what would constitute a just world in Russian
optics remains rather vague. Consequently, while Russian diplomatic and
military manoeuvres in and around Ukraine have often been tactically sound, on
a strategic level they have been haphazard. Yet even if a clear Russian
strategy for a just world order could be conjured, this does not imply that
neighbouring states and their populations should acquiesce. Populations of
regions such as Crimea and the Donbass might wish for independence – and this
might conceivably be accommodated through democratic means such as is happening
shortly in Scotland – yet Russia, just as other actors outside Ukraine, has no
right to force this through. And right does matter if we are not to start
doubting the entire post-World War II web of (admittedly very constructed)
borders – or perhaps have a look at the North Caucasus?
Even though the elite of Russia today is revanchist in
relation to the West, and seeks to create a just (as opposed to an ordered)
world – and even if we assume these are developments to be resisted by the West
– it does not automatically follow that NATO is the instrument with which to check
the Russian state. In many ways NATO is a poor instrument for the task. Being
blatantly unwilling to send troops and serious military equipment to Ukraine, NATO
is reduced to strengthen its presence in its existing member states such as the
Baltics and Poland. I am not quite convinced that an increased NATO-presence in
Central and Eastern Europe will sufficiently comfort local regimes, who may
still fear Russian attacks through non-traditional means, such as by the recent
kidnapping of the Estonian security official. Yet NATO remains the least bad
option here; at least for the time being. If NATO were disbanded now, a
belligerent yet floundering Russia would be opposed by a range of European
states, which in many ways are equally floundering and could quickly become
equally belligerent, squaring up to Russia. A pan-European security agreement
would be ideal, yet I for one see no reason why the current Russian state
should be trusted to adhere to such agreements or to respect for sovereignty,
for that matter. Unfortunately, in the foreseeable future this lack of trust
might well grow.
This is because, I believe, the nature of the Russian state
and its development. Russia today is increasingly becoming a fascist state.
Mind you – not a Nazi state, although these two terms are often confused,
especially in Russia. By a fascist Russia I mean a Russia that has the state (and
the leader) as the highest ideal, that favours corporatism and a modicum of
expansion in the surrounding region, that is increasingly militarised, and that
shows signs of chauvinism. Conversely, racialism and worldwide expansion are
irrelevant here. (My apologies for spelling out such basics to you, but I have
come into the habit of closely defining fascism, before people accuse me of
comparing Putin and Hitler; Putin and Franco might be a better bet). This is relevant
here, because such a Russia will increasingly be distanced from the European
community of values (and yes, I do believe such a community exists). Possibly,
Russia might drag Belarus away, too (although I doubt it), but an iron wall of incompatibility
and perhaps incomprehension is being constructed between Russia and the rest of
Europe. The existence of NATO certainly does not prevent this development, yet –
I believe – the absence of NATO would today not prevent it, either. Instead,
unfortunately, the West is forced to retain NATO for the simple reason that
lack of trust and mutual understanding between Putin’s Russia and the West will
remain for the foreseeable future and, at least, as long as Russian state
ideology remains fascist. This is not a shout for all the glories of “democracy,”
(however ill defined) but simply my conviction that some basics of Western
political ideology – including a respect for individuals and a non-militarised
solution to problems in the areas surrounding “us” – are going to, and should,
remain. And if I take this normative position I cannot possibly accept any
international imposition of a Russian fascist state ideology. This does not
mean that the West by force should seek to change Russian ideology – an
impossible and in many ways pointless task – but it does mean that we should
recognise our fundamental differences with the Russian state of today, and take
the necessary precautions against Russia, such as by ensuring the Baltics,
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania that their right to sovereignty will be ensured by
the EU and, yes, by NATO.
On a concluding note, however, this leads me to a final
concern. Leaving Ukraine to a side, it remains unlikely that Russia would
openly intervene in NATO member-states. Low-level provocations will remain yet,
frankly, Russia can ill afford a long-lasting dispute. Already, Western
sanctions are hurting a stuttering Russian economy much more than Russian sanctions
are able to hurt the West (a Russian halt to energy transfers to the rest of
Europe would be similarly catastrophic for the Russian economy in the medium
term). So some sort of modus vivendi will probably be found as the shooting
dies down in Ukraine (Donbass as the next Transnistria remains quite possible).
Nevertheless, in such a modus vivendi the Russians will remain “others.” Not
such a big problem for the many talented Russians living and working in the
West, who should easily be able to carve out a position for themselves, and not
such a problem for those people living in Russia who agree to support the glory
of the Russian state with their existence. Yet what to do for those people in
Russia who do not support the state above all else; who do not see Putin as the
ultimate leader; who seek to be politically, economically, culturally, gender-based
different? Well these Russians, on whose behalf the West for so many years has
been willing to shout, will now be left on their own. Lumped together, by the
West, with other people in Russia in the category of “others” / “outsiders” / “barbarians.”
These people in Russia may well be forgotten in the coming years. And that would
become yet another tragedy in this sad tale.
Hi Rasmus,
ReplyDeleteMany thanks for the detailed response. Let me just pick up on one or two points.
Territorial “sovereignty”: It is interesting to see in which cases NATO promotes the idea and which cases it does not. In this way, Ukraine needs to be kept together at all costs but Kosovo was allowed to split from Serbia. I’m not saying that either choice is the right one, just that there is a very interesting selectiveness here.
“I fail to see that NATO support for Ukraine equals Russian support for the separatists”. I didn’t say that the levels of involvement are equal or that this is all NATO’s fault (here Mearsheimer fails to convince). My point was just a) that we often overlook NATO’s long-term involvement in places like Ukraine and Georgia, that b) we can trace these back to the post-1991 identity crisis and c) that NATO’s proxy war is about as good of an idea for peace in Europe as is Russia’s. Just to add to this: we hear a lot about Russia’s atomic weapons programme and nuclear tests etc. – but the Americans are actually modernizing the tactical nukes in Europe, too. This is the kind of stuff that unfortunately rarely makes the headlines.
“The West should insist on an investigation of Ukrainian war crimes”. I wouldn’t expect too much from an alliance that used cluster bombs and depleted uranium in its 1999 bombing campaign. It is interesting to note that Croatian war criminals tend to get off quite lightly at the ICC, too.
“Russia as a fascist state”: these sorts of analogies are of course very popular in some parts of Eastern Europe but they miss the point that we can easily turn such comparisons back on the West – and there are few states as nationalist, militarist, pseudo-democratic, xenophobic and prone to inflict wars on others as the United States…so let’s not get into that debate.
Yes, it is very difficult to see what a post-NATO European security order would look like and particularly so in the light of Russia’s disrespect for Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty. The moment to disband NATO was obviously missed in the 1990s. My point was that the Cold War ended precisely at a time when the US had radically increased military spending, showed little respect for Latin American sovereignties and also happened to have supported the very same terrorists in Afghanistan that it fights today. The USSR, in other words, called it off at a time when the US was behaving much like (if not worse than) Russia today. Now, it is common knowledge in the West that the Soviet Union only did so because it could not afford the arms race anymore, but we only need to look to North Korea in the 1990s to see a state that continued to fund an arms race even though its population was starving. I conclude from this that Moscow made that choice in the 1980s and the effects were pretty spectacular. A shame the West never quite got it together to disband NATO. We are now seeing the consequences.