A settlement for the crisis, or a settlement in crisis?

Ukraine, Russia and the West have now apparently all stated that a solution to the crisis in Ukraine should be built around the February 21st agreement, which was brokered in Ukraine by the European Union and accepted by deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and his domestic opponents alike. And which was, at the time, rejected by Russia.

Well, it is certainly good news that all sides now seem to have a formal basis on which to base further negotiations. Yet apart from the risk that the agreement might eventually be put to a side due to escalating tension in Crimea or in eastern Ukraine, even if retained the agreement would not be straightforward to implement, as demonstrated by a look at its six points (as documented in The Guardian on February 21st, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text):

1. Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed, and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days thereafter.
2. Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014.
3. Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted but no later than December 2014. New electoral laws will be passed and a new Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice Commission rules.
4. Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.
5. The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence. The parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February law. Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and village by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares. Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force. After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine. The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings.
6. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland, and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation.

Point 1
Under the constitution of 2004 Ukraine witnessed six years of deadlock between then-President Viktor Yushchenko, at times-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, and then-opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych. Clearly, this constitution was not, in itself, conducive to creating a political framework within which everyone agreed on the same rules of conduct. Granted, in 2010 Yanukovych did take power in what was generally seen to be free and fair elections, but they were polarised, too, thus partly creating the current crisis. Also, with Yanukovych having fled to Moscow and the current government being supported by the oligarchs, who formerly aided Yanukovych, it is difficult to see how a genuine "national unity government" can be created. While the legitimacy of the current administration in Kiev can at times be questioned, it is difficult to see how the groups occupying Donetsk town hall and forcing the UN out of Crimea can be judged representative even for their parts of Ukraine.

Point 2
Following the hapless Yanukovych it seems sensible to reduce the power of the presidency, bringing the parliament back as an organ of central legal importance. Yet presidential systems do have some advantages over parliamentary ones. The latter can come across as slow to react, even paralysed, as demonstrated during the Yushchenko presidency. Even the USA, the epitome of the tripartition of power, has in recent years suffered severely in both a political and an economic sense due to deadlock created by a consitution, which is designed in a number of ways to shackle the presidency. Given the currently dire state of the Ukrainian economy, and the requirement from Western donors that Ukraine must implement tough IMF demands in order to qualify for aid, legislative deadlock in a constitutionally balanced system may not be the best solution for the country right now.

Point 3
 This point leaves nine months before presidential elections are to take place. Apart from the obvious problem of finding monitors for all of Ukraine on which Ukraine, Russia and the West all can agree, we return to the difficulties presented by Point 1. Who can the current opposition present as a viable presidential candidate? The leaders of pro-Russian groups in Donetsk and Simferopol? Even if these people would stand they would never stand a chance in a genuinely free and fair nationwide election. Not with their lack of political experience (Tymoshenko and Yushchenko had been Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister, respectively, prior to the Orange Revolution), their lack of funds (unless Moscow is ready to foot the bill, which could become very controversial), and their substantial lack of trust in the provisional government in Kiev. Come to think of it, who is the obvious presidential candidate for the provisional government? Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov was parliamentary speaker before appearing as a compromise candidate for now, Vitali Klitschko has no experience of government, and Yuliya Tymoshenko has far too much experience - among most Ukrainians she is not fondly remembered for her time as Prime Minister. She even managed to lose the last presidential election to Viktor Yanukovych, hardly a born politician.

Point 4
You can just see this one go wrong, can't you... Disagreement persists over who actually shot and killed demonstrators and police officers in Kiev during the February unrest. Some of the people conducting the investigation could well be people who were involved in the violence in the first place. And as for the Council of Europe - a very admirable institution, which has a history of talking candidly on difficult political subjects, and of being roundly ignored by its members, if required. How this point could be fulfilled given the current levels of mistrust in Ukraine is very difficult to see.

Point 5
What are "illegal weapons"? Weapons held by anyone not under the direct command of the Kiev administration? What, exactly, are the odds that pro-Russian groups in Donetsk and on Crimea will hand over their pen knives, let alone any automatic firearms, to Kiev-controlled police and military forces? Especially since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insists that the "self-defence militias" on Crimea have nothing to do with Russia? Of course, if the provisional government in Kiev could get the assistance of all those handy Russian troops already in Ukraine to disarm non-governmental militias... Yeah, right! And as for the provision that "forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture" - well that is not a method to achieve the aim of solving the crisis, but the aim itself! Finally, it is difficult to give the authorities a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence when there is no agreement on who the legitimate authorities actually are...

Point 6
This, again, is not a way to a solution but a statement of intent which, aprtly at least, seems hollow today. It is worth noting, though, that Poland is included and that the USA is not - clearly an attempt to localise the conflict, which might be necessary in the medium term.

All in all, however, the February 21st agreement will not help to solve the current crisis - which is probably why Lavrov is using it to stall. If Russia can further consolidate its position on Crimea it might secure long-lasting domination of the peninsula without bloodshed. And should Kiev and the West follow Lavrov in supporting the agreement this might be the clearest recognition yet that these parties, too, consider Crimea a lost cause. For now, at least, but probably not for an unstable future.

Oligarchs uniting

They managed to chase Viktor Yanukovych from power, and from Ukraine, but otherwise the list of successes has been short for the new government in Kiev. Crimea is out of their control, a general Russian invasion of Ukraine remains a possibility, and the Ukrainian economy is, as before, on life support. Nevertheless, in one important region the government might be optimistic - and that surprisingly is the region of eastern Ukraine, otherwise perceived as Yanukovych's bulwark.

Following the Russian takeover of Crimea much has been written about how eastern Ukraine might be next to fall under Muscovite sway. Not only would Ukraine then lose control of another substantial part of its territory, but it would lose its most heavily populated areas, which also remains the economic powerhouse of Ukraine together with Kiev. No matter that Russian troops have not entered eastern Ukraine as they have Crimea; no matter Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kharkiv have nowhere near the same symbolic resonance for Russians as Sevastopol does - the danger of another Russian incursion seemed obvious. Not least after recent unrest when the government building was seized by pro-Russian demonstrators on Monday, two days after fighting had broken out in Kharkiv.

Yet those seeking to preserve a united Ukraine under control from Kiev (albeit perhaps under a different government) have two advantages: An increasing number of people seem to be demonstrating in this region in favour of national unity. And three of the richest men in Ukraine, all based in the east, have openly joined the case for Ukrainian unity under Kievan command.

Rinat Akhmetov has been the richest man in Ukraine for a number of years, building his fortune in the mining business around the city of Donetsk. Akhmetov has managed to prosper under varying regimes in Ukraine yet he did previously count Yanukovych as an ally. Now, however, he has made clear that his company, the SCM Group, counting 300,000 employees and stretching across Ukraine, will peacefully maintain the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Akhmetov has denounced the use of force from the outside. And he has allegedly named current Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the right man for Ukraine, while rapidly distancing himself from any previous business connections with Yanukovych.

Donetsk now has a new governor, as well, installed cleverly by the new government in the shape of Serhiy Taruta. Taruta is another billionaire, again within heavy industries such as steel and coal and thus the employer of a sizeable local workforce. Like Akhmetov, Taruta could swiftly have created regional unrest by damaging the local economy through unpaid wages and industrial shutdowns - that is, if Taruta wanted to help create a cause for invasion by the Russian military. But Taruta has done nothing of the sort. Instead, he has also appealed for the preservation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, and for the prevention of a destructive conflict and its loss of lives.

Akhmetov and Taruta have not suddenly become Ukrainian patriots. They never showed particularly sympathy for the Orange Revolution in 2004; although it is perhaps fair to say that they would have resisted the use of violence against demonstrators then, as well. More importantly, they would have resisted increased subservience to Russia. Or, as another Ukrainian billionaire - Dmytro Firtash - has put it: business circles in Ukraine must all help to defuse the risk of further escalation of violence because nobody benefits from that - particularly not Ukrainian business.

Akhmetov, Taruta and Firtash may have worked well enough with Russian elites in the past, but they and their Ukrainian fellow oligarchs will increasingly have a much better chance of doing business in the EU. Particularly in the heavy industries Russia remains dominated by domestic companies, while the EU can seek cheaper Ukrainian materials. Conversely, while Akhmetov et al might have plenty of assets secured in Western Europe their fortunes will be hit by a collapse of the Ukrainian economy - a collapse increasingly likely if the Russo-Ukrainian-Western standoff continues. Ukrainian oligarchs may well accept a Russian takeover of Crimea. The economic gains from the peninsula is limited, particularly for anyone not already dominating the local tourist and related industries there. On the other hand, Eastern Ukraine is the core region for most Ukrainian oligarchs, who have little use for noisy and sometimes violent demonstrators, who may or may not be paid by the Kremlin, but who certainly seem to have little plan for Eastern Ukraine beyond creating instability.

On Tuesday it appears that demonstrators gathered in Donetsk to call for the removal of Taruta as governor. While Taruta should certainly be expected to stand for election in the not-to-far future, it is to be hoped that he, and other wealthy industrialists, stay strong in the region for now. Indeed, if peace could be secured here due to the effort of oligarchs we may even witness a rather welcome new experience for the post-Soviet region: oligarchs uniting their country instead of dividing it.

International society triumphant?

Germany is the new Norway.

Running between Russia and the West, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier have consistently advocated dialogue and mediation since Russian troops invaded Ukraine last week. Merkel has stressed that the Russian move is illegal under international law - and although her overall approach to Russia right now does seem rather moderate there is little reason to think that Merkel does not believe in international law.

Similarly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov - the old warhorse always present as Putin's diplomatic face - appeals to the West to consider the fate of ordinary people in Ukraine, and not just Cold War geopolitics. A cynical laughter may be forgiven here from anyone who remembers Lavrov's limited interest in the fate of ordinary Syrians, Libyans...Russians.

Yet, if Lavrov, and Putin, do not give a toss about the fate of ordinary people in Ukraine why do they keep bringing them up in their statements? Let us imagine for a moment that Putin and his administration defended Russian invasion of Ukraine by looking at the world, Western and otherwise, and saying: "Yeah, so what? Sod off - we're powerful and we're gonna trample Ukraine underfoot just because we can. And you can't stop us." Again, observers might be forgiven for saying that this is what the Russian government is doing in practice right now.

Nevertheless, words do matter. And it is obviously very important for Putin right now to say that Russia is fulfilling a humanitarian mission; that Russia is upholding Russian, Ukrainian and international law. Even though no one in the West believes him - and people in Russia, including his diminishing group of admirers, know him for being a tough guy - not a penpusher. So why this desire to be "legal"?

There are probably several reasons for this. Putin and his elites might genuinely fear for the safety of Russians in Ukraine. OK, that is perhaps a stretch, but Putin has long showed an unwavering belief in his own ability to fix any bit of the world of which he does not approve. And he certainly does not approve of the current administration in Kiev. Also, for sure, Putin wants to prevent succesful revolution in Kiev giving anyone similar ideas in Russia - even though such a revolution would be highly unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. In addition, of course, Putin and Lavrov have retained the old Soviet habit of "double-speak" - you must use the correct, legal and accepted words even if everyone, yourself included, can see facts are very different.

And still, and still...the West is doing the same. OK, it is never easy to own up to your own weakness and NATO right now does look about as scary as Elmer Fudd... The West cannot simply go out and say it does not have the stomach for a fight, military or otherwise, with Russia - and US mid-term elections are due this year - and "it's all the economy, stupid!" Yet this incessant need to present statements on conferences, fact-finding missions, dialogue - does that not remind us of something? Yes it does - the League of Nations.

Now, the parallel should not be taken too far. Russia is not interwar Germany, despite Putin refusing to be housetrained (can't he just go back to wrestling bears and posing semi-nude with walruses in Greek urns, or whatever he's been doing in recent years to combat his mid-life crisis...). And while the League of Nations really was good at making bad fighting worse, recent years of mediation have seen some successes (including, perhaps, Iran?). Certainly, let the Russians and the Ukrainians talk together, preferably over a lovely meal and unsullied by Russian boots on the ground. But no one is actually talking with people in Ukraine right now.

Perhaps what we are seeing is the triumphant rise of an international society? If that is correct, such a society will be dominated by great powers - but that does not mean that recent simplistic analyses predicting a new Cold War are correct. What we are witnessing is quite different.

We have great powers now - global, such as the USA, and regional, such as the EU and Russia. These powers are not, though, engaged in a naked power struggle for world domination (or whatever general debate wants us to believe). Instead, the great powers want to create and develop an international society under their tutelage. Look at it as a Concert of Powers, if you like, as in post-Napoleonic Europe. States should make the world go around in order to preserve as much peace as possible in an unstable world. Non-state groups quickly become terrible terrorists, and as for "market forces for good" the less said the better after 2008... The great powers create institutions in which they can participate on a more or less equal footing, such as the UN Security Council, and they make sure that each power has a veto on matters they consider of vital interest (however defined). All this may not create a better world, but it preserves the one we have (more or less, anyway). Crucially, it has little to do with aggression and fear; more with Russian, American and EU elites understanding each other very well and being ready together to create a framework of law within which they can all operate.

Well, this sounds rather nice, does it not? It might well help to avoid war today. Yet it, curiously, means less freedom and influence for medium and small powers than during the Cold War. Then, Ceaucescu (and no, he is not really a comforting example) could disobey the Soviet Union, as could Tito to a much larger degree - because they knew Moscow feared that these states would turn to the West. In South Vietnam, the USA faced a similar dilemma. Some more or less unsavoury regimes were thus preserved. But they may also be preserved today; as long as they have the protection of a great power. The problem is, no great power wants to upset the situation so if a state wants to free itself from one great power, no other great power is ready to listen. Nobody is listening to people in Ukraine right now - the West is not listening to Kiev and Putin is not listening to Yanukovych, let alone to the Crimeans... Instead, Ukraine is almost becoming a Mandate state. You know, the sort of state administered by the great powers as much of the Middle East once was. And that did go very well in the end, did it not...

Peace and its price

What are we to make of Jonathan Steele?

He is a formidable academic - a leading scholar in the study of Russia and other post-Soviet states. And he is a very brave man. Again and again he appears in public debate, such as in his writings for the British newspaper The Guardian. And in this newspaper he now calls for the USA and NATO to "calm down and back off." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/02/not-too-late-for-ukraine-nato-should-back-off

Well, why not? Steele is right in stating most people in Ukraine do not want to join NATO. In this, at least, deposed President Viktor Yanukovych carried public support. And, certainly, everyone in Ukraine - Russians as well as Ukrainians - deserve to feel secure in their country, protected from any sort of "extremism."

But, dear Jonathan, what sort of a world do you actually want?

In the West, the US, the UK, France, Italy and Canada have been among the prominent countries condemning the Russian military invasion of Ukraine (and yes, it is an invasion). Sanctions have been mentioned, particularly by the US with Britain and France also keen to distance themselves from an upcoming Russia-chaired G8-summit. Yet none of these states have suggested military options to counter Russian actions; in fact, quite the opposite. The US has said this most openly; other Western states have simply minimised discussion of the military question in public - and this goes for NATO, as well. So what we are talking about is targeted political and economic sanctions - unsurprinsingly a more popular option for a US less dependent than the EU on Russian energy. Talk of such sanctions is hardly inflammatory or over-the-top, as Steele suggests. The strict limits on armed intervention abroad is a cornerstone of international law as demonstrated through a plethora of UN treaties, to which Russia is a signatory. Clearly, the "responsibility to protect" is now another firm part of international law - and the balance between violation of humanitarian norms and outside intervention is often debatable. Some international interventions almost certainly were a boon for the country being invaded. Idi Amin's Uganda being invaded by Tanzania in 1978-79 is perhaps a case in point; Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and defeat of Khmer Rouge's mass murderers in 1975-77 absolutely is. Steele is right to point out the much more dubious legacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But even if the attack on Iraq was misguided (and that remains debatable) it does not detract from the fact that no modern-day intervention, supposedly motivated by "humanitarian concerns", has been carried out on pretexts as flimsy as those used now by Putin's regime.

There have been no mass-scale, protracted human rights violations against Russians in Ukraine. Certainly, recent violence in Kiev was frightening and, while most casualties were protesters against Yanukovych some wounded and dead were defending the regime. And, indeed, some groups supporting the protests can with some justification be described as "extremist" and anti-Russian. But these groups are a clear minority - and on both sides in Kiev the dead included Russians and Ukrainians alike. Crimea witnessed little fighting, at all - apart from one clash between rival sets of demonstrators in Simferopol, which did result in casualties. Yet this does not justify invasion. Invasion is not "fitting," as Putin claims. And it does not justify Russian Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev threatening the new regime in Kiev with "bloody revolution." (imagine the apoplexy in the Kremlin if the West had produced such a statement against Russia or an ally of Russia). Russia has, clearly and unequivocally, broken international law, as pointed out directly to Putin by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

This does not mean that the West should threaten war against Russia. Even though Russian troops could probably be pushed out of Ukraine the accompanying violence would benefit no one - least of all people living in Ukraine. Indeed, the relatively calm demeanour of military forces from Russia and Ukraine facing each other in Crimea was a happy vignette in an otherwise grim day. The ambassador of Ukraine to the US has indicated that Ukraine might ask the West for military assistance if Russia were to pursue a general invasion of Ukraine. And the standoff remains very tense with Ukraine having called up all its reserves and begun a case of treason against Denis Berezovsky, who as head of the Ukrainian navy has sworn allegiance to the pro-Russian leaders of Crimea. Hopefully, Ukraine will not need to use its armed forces against Russia - hopefully both sides can stay calm. And, yes, it is most likely that Putin's regime wants to avoid armed conflict, take over Crimea without bloodshed, and destabilise the regime in Kiev while riding out Western protests. Such an outcome would be very damaging to Ukrainian sovereignty - and to international law. But would it secure peace?

And so we are back at Jonathan Steele. Steele suggests that responsibility with "averting catastrophe" lies solely with Kiev, not with Moscow, Washington or Brussels. Kiev must rein in its "nationalist extremists" and restore to the country's Russians those linguistic and other rights that have apparently been taken away from them by the new regime.

But, Jonathan, you are a historian. And as a historian you know, very well, that this is not "a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." This is a quarrel between people in a country oh so near of whom we know a great deal - and with whom we daily interact in politics, in business, in leasure.

Peace has its price. It requires compromise; sometimes even pragmatism. Yet pragmatism is never an end in itself, but always for someone and for some purpose. We in the West should, as far as it is humanly possible, help our own Russians and Ukrainians with preserving peace in Europe. Putin is no Hitler - and he probably thinks he is doing the right thing now; as he always thinks. But Putin is not our concern. Our concern is Russia and Ukraine, Russians and Ukrainians. These are our neighbours, our friends and fellows. And Russians and Ukrainians must be treated with the utmost respect. Peace has its price - but sometimes that price is action, decisive action. A line must be drawn by the EU, by the US, now, that we will not permit the Russian regime to damage itself and the rest of us by riding roughshod over international law and over the responsibilities of peace. Targeted sanctions must be put in place against top figures in the Russian regime until such a time as Russian troops no longer prevent Ukrainian authorities from exerting their sovereign duties and rights in Ukraine. War will not help anyone - and even targeted sanctions might prove too difficult for Western leaders that already now seem prepared to shirk their responsibilities. But Russians are our friends and fellow Europeans. As such, we should demand great things of them and of their country. Invading Ukraine is not great - it is failure.

West, East and the Future of Ukraine

Ukraine is still burning. Just as things had begun to go back to normal in the capital Kiev, trouble brews on the southern Crimean peninsula. Russian militias have taken over the airport and the parliament of Crimea. Are the militias egged on by Russian President Vladimir Putin? It is too early to tell, but the militias certainly have his tacit permission.

The crisis has provoked a plethora of analyses in international media. There is talk of a dividing line between East and West - Russia versus Western Europe and the USA– with Ukraine coveted by both sides. It is claimed that Western Ukraine wants to be part of the West, that Eastern Ukraine wants to be part of Russia and that we are dealing with nothing less than the future of Ukraine; with a geopolitical tug-of-war. Should the country belong to Us or to Them? A popular question that, unfortunately, is misguided. If we should try to explain current developments in Ukraine – and the developments we may witness in the near future – we have to be aware of four points:

1) Ukraine is not divided between East and West

The notion that Ukraine is divided between East and West, that international allegiances change dramatically between Ukrainian regions, is a myth that was developed jointly during the modern era by the Soviet Union and by Ukrainian nationalists. Both parties had an interest in presenting Ukraine as a place to defend against virulent nationalism or Soviet imperialism, depending on your point of view. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union international media then found this myth very helpful in trying to make sense of the new state, particularly after Russia and the West again began to challenge each other. Russia still wanted to be a great power and – as was often repeated in Moscow and Washington alike – Russia cannot be a great power if it loses Ukraine. And when Ukrainians and Russians at the same time happily yelled at each other – in different languages, no less – well then Ukraine had to be split between the West and Russia – right? International affairs in a reductio ad absurdum… But as so often happens, the rest of the world paid attention to those who were shouting the loudest and forgot the silent majority in Ukraine.

Ukraine is divided into at least four parts: Western Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, the Middle, and Crimea. What does this mean? It means that Western and Eastern Ukraine, as such, and their alleged geopolitical allegiances to the West and to the Russian East, have little influence; that a Ukraine-centred Middle is increasing in importance; and that Crimea is a completely different issue, not least due to the Tatars. I will develop this point a bit later.

Western Ukraine, centred on L’viv and Galicia, was never particularly prominent in Ukrainian politics. Well, you say, what about the heroes of the Orange Revolution in 2004? What about Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, those vanguards of Ukrainian attempts to become part of the West? Tymoshenko, as it so happens, is from Dnipropetrovs’k, one of the largest cities in eastern Ukraine. And she was part of the business elites from eastern Ukraine, running the country at the end of the 1990s. Certainly, she did then fall foul of the authorities and, yes, she was prominent in the Orange Revolution and its aftermath, but she was never a Ukrainian nationalist. On the contrary, she has repeatedly shown herself very willing to cooperate with Russia. She does not care for the now deposed President Viktor Yanukovych, but, then again, no one does – not even in Russia. If Tymoshenko succeeds in regaining the power she craves, cooperation with Russia will certainly be on the table. And as for poor little Viktor Yushchenko, whose bid for a renewed presidential term was democratically crushed in 2010… Well, Yushchenko – who talked so much about Ukrainian entry in the European Union – was last seen accompanying Yanukovych in Kiev at the international football game between Ukraine and England in the autumn. It seems clear that neither Tymoshenko nor Yushchenko is prepared to do battle for Western Ukraine, or for the West, against “wicked Russia.”

Well, in that case everything is run from Eastern Ukraine, right? This is the homeland of Yanukovych, the bugbear of our tale, who has now departed to Moscow. In eastern Ukraine people still long for Russia, Moscow and the Soviet Union, right? Erm…no. When Yanukovych was elected Ukrainian president in 2010 his campaign was supported by business elites, who, indeed, mainly originate in the industrial heartland of eastern Ukraine. But these people do not love Russia; and neither does Yanukovych. Yanukovych is in many ways an incompetent politician, but since he had now succeeded in becoming president he certainly had no intention of just following Putin’s lead. And his wealthy supporters never had an interest in being swallowed by the big business beasts in the Russian pond. During Yanukovych’s presidency Ukraine has repeatedly sought further economic integration with the EU, which would benefit the economy of Ukraine and its elites alike. As a consequence, Russia has repeatedly attempted to force Yanukovych to split with the West – and this plan succeeded a few months ago. Yet Yanukovych and his supporters only cooperated with Russia for their own material benefit as rulers of Ukraine; not because they are fond of Russia (that bumbling Yanukovych has now lost a lot of his Ukrainian support through his tactical and strategic errors is a different matter).

This means that Ukrainian politics is neither Western nor Russian. Where does that leave us? Well, it leaves us with the Middle, the Ukrainian middle. And it leaves us with a situation where the vast majority of people in Ukraine have family and friends in Russia. Yet they still understand the economic advantages in cooperating with the EU as opposed to joining that palace of illusions which is Eurasian cooperation centred on Moscow. In November, when Yanukovych rejected cooperation with the EU and moved towards Russia he had precious little support anywhere in Ukraine, including in the east. Under pressure from Russia, perhaps looking to his personal interests and with no political nous whatsoever, Yanukovych managed to become unpopular with pretty much anybody in Ukraine. And, as indicated above, Putin never fancied Yanukovych, who is viewed in Russia as a weakling.

2) Russia and Putin have no strategic blueprint

During the last decade Western coverage of Russian foreign policy has been dominated by a clear theme: Russia is controlled by Putin – Putin is really clever and tough and ready to oppose the West and the USA – Putin time and again outsmarts the West. That logic is clearly present in coverage of the current Ukrainian conflict. Repeatedly, experts tell us that strategic-thinking Russia is ahead of the West in its influence on Ukrainian events. This is an understandable impression that unfortunately, is not supported by events. Indeed, it never was.

If Putin and his Russian elites were masterminds, planning everything in advance, why did the crisis escalate in Ukraine in the first place? Putin definitely did not have an interest in toppling Yanukovych’s regime. Just as Putin drew no benefits from the Orange Revolution. Or from the fact that the Olympic Games in Sochi were overshadowed by the fight on Russian gay rights in particular and human rights more generally. Since Putin came to power in 2000 he has always been reacting to events, not acting in advance. That is now again the case in Ukraine. Putin and his elites – remember that Putin is just one of many people controlling Russia – realised far too late that Ukraine had run away from Yanukovych. And this is just before and during Putin’s beloved Olympics in Sochi. And, whoops, fights have now broken out in Kiev. And Yanukovych has to run for it. And now there is a new government in Ukraine, without being legitimated by elections and pulling Ukraine to the West – the horror! We have to do something, Putin thinks – and all of a sudden militias in balaclavas appear on Crimea. Home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. OK – let us assume for the moment that Putin and Russia succeed in taking control over Crimea, in taking the peninsula away from Ukraine. Then what? How can this benefit Russia? Well it cannot – that is the point.

3) Crimean unrest is bad for Russia

Can Russia take over Crimea? Certainly! Can Crimea declare its independence under Russian protection, as happened in Georgia a few years back? Absolutely! Will such a step in any way benefit Russia, Ukraine or Crimea? Nope!

The peninsula of Crimea, reaching into the Black Sea from southern Ukraine, was conquered by the Russian Empire through battle with the local Muslim Tatars. Early in the twentieth century Crimea was then swiftly incorporated in the Russian Soviet republic, as part of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Crimea was presented as a gift by Nikita Khrushchev to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, but that was hardly an issue as long as Crimea remained part of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the fact that Stalin expelled the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia did not really pose a problem, given the general lack of interest the Soviet regime had in promoting public debate and human rights. And then the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Crimea was still populated mainly by Russians but now found itself in an independent Ukraine – and the Tatars were coming back to reclaim the property and the land the Russians had received from them under Stalin. Oh, and one of the largest Soviet naval bases, home of the Black Sea Fleet, was still situated on Crimea. So trouble was certainly brewing for the peninsula in independent Ukraine.

So far, things have gone better than might have been feared. Partly because various Ukrainian administrations have sensibly allowed Crimea a high degree of autonomy. Partly because the Russian Black Sea Fleet has, by and large, been allowed to potter along in the vicinity of Sevastopol. Developments have not been quite so good for the Tatars, who have not been able to effectively press their claims without substantial Ukrainian or Russian support. And now, masked militias – connected to (and partly supported by?) Russia has taken over Crimea. And that is bad news for Russia.

Russia and many Russians often speak loudly about the Black Sea Fleet – that symbol of Russian great power status. This is certainly right – but why has the Fleet been allowed to decay? It hosts a large number of Russian soldiers, who have reasonable conditions and pay, but the Fleet is not doing so well. During the war with Georgia in 2008, the Fleet did not exactly shine; and it is much smaller than the adjacent Turkish fleet – not to mention whatever the Americans might introduce in the Black Sea region. Oh, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet still contains a ship introduced by the emperor a century ago…

The point is that Russia needs the base, not the fleet. The base at Sevastopol is a deep-water base, providing Russia with the option to host and deploy large vessels to the Mediterranean, the Middle East and elsewhere. The base offers plenty of work for soldiers and other Russian personnel – and it thus does support Russian yearning to be a great power. But all those advantages disappear if Crimea becomes the object of a Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Unless Russia can take over Ukraine as a whole – and that is not a possibility – Kiev will forcibly resist losing Crimea to Russia. This would have been the case under Yanukovych, as well – no Ukrainian leader is prepared to hand over parts of the country to Russia. Crimea could be the centre of protracted strife, possibly armed strife, which would primarily harm those Russian civilians and military personnel, who constitute the majority of locals. That is not – and can never be – in the strategic interest of Russia or Putin. Of course, the Crimean dispute can easily escalate, nonetheless, as long as Russia, Ukraine and the West have no plan for solving the crisis. How might such a plan look?

4) Ukraine is part of Europe – and Russia is part of Europe

If the EU and the West is really going to help solving the Ukrainian crisis we have to – once and for all – view Ukraine as well as Russia as part of Europe. This does not mean that we should succumb to Putin’s great power-Russia, dominating Europe and equalling the USA and China. Russia will not be able to do that; and the sooner Putin gets that point, the better. Russia has plenty of oil and gas, but in the long run oil and gas can only be sold to customers, who trust in the reliability of Russian deliveries. Oil and gas cannot be used strategically to ensure Russian influence.

At the same time, the fact that Russia and Ukraine are part of Europe does not mean that we in the EU and the West should ignore the mainly problems still facing Russia. Persecution of homosexuals in Russia is not OK. Daily violence, bombings and general anarchy in the North Caucasus is not OK – especially not when Putin and his elites are partly responsible. And when elections are repeatedly falsified we cannot simply say: “Well, those Russians don’t know better.” Yeah, they do – and we must make sure that they – and the Ukrainians – remember it.

However, Russia and Ukraine have to be reminded of democratic norms and rule-of-law within a European community. I do not believe that Russia will ever join the EU or NATO (and Ukraine probably will not join for decades). But the EU and NATO are not Europe. Europe is, and remains, mutual frameworks of understanding, dialogue, and shared memory. Let us begin to credit Russia and Ukraine for the amount of progress, which is taking place. From both countries new generations have appeared who work very successfully in Moscow, in Kiev – and in London, in Berlin and in Copenhagen. You do not hear much about these people. The last decade, Russia in particular has enjoyed significant amounts of successful cultural cooperation with the West – yet such developments disappear under a deluge of bad news from Russia and Ukraine. There is probably little hope for Putin and Yanukovych. The situation in Crimea does currently look grim. But the crisis will eventually ease. And then we in the EU, in the West, have to start including Russia and Ukraine in our understanding of what it means to be part of our world – and not on the other side of a fictitious dividing line.

Vest, Øst og Ukraines Fremtid

Det brænder stadigt i Ukraine. Netop som hovedstaden Kiev var begyndt at stilne hen, blusser det nu op på Krim-halvøen i syd. Russiske tropper har taget kontrol med Krims lufthavn og parlament. Er tropperne tilskyndede af Ruslands præsident Vladimir Putin? Det kan endnu ikke vides, men tropperne har i hvert fald hans tilladelse.

Krisen har medført en strøm af analyser – i danske og udenlandske medier. I Politiken, for eksempel, skriver Michael Jarlner den 28. februar at Rusland hæver indsatsen. Jarlner lægger op til en skillelinje mellem Øst og Vest – med Ukraine trukket i fra begge sider. Hvad der er tale om er intet mindre end Ukraines fremtid. Skal landet være med Os eller med Dem? Jarlners analyse har såmænd mange rimelige punkter – og ideen om en skillelinje deler han med langt de fleste kommentatorer og politikere i øst og vest. Men, desværre, holder den ide ikke. Hvis vi skal prøve at forklare, hvad der lige nu sker i Ukraine – og hvad der kan komme til at ske – er der fire ting, vi må gøre os klart:

1) Ukraine er ikke delt i øst og vest

At Ukraine skulle være delt mellem Øst og Vest er en myte, der igennem det tyvende århundrede blev bygget op af Sovjetunionen og af ukrainske nationalister i uhellig forening. Begge sider havde interesse i at fremstille Ukraine som et land, der måtte forsvares mod voldelig nationalisme eller sovjetrussisk imperialisme, alt efter hvad side man var på. Efter Sovjetunionens sammenbrud blev det så dejligt let for verdens medier at tage den myte op, især da Rusland og Vesten begyndte at knurre af hinanden igen. Rusland ville stadigt være stormagt og – som man flittigt sagde i både Moskva og Washington – Rusland kan ikke være stormagt uden Ukraine. Og når man så tilmed i Ukraine havde ukrainere og russere til at råbe af hinanden – på forskellige sprog, intet mindre – jamen så måtte Ukraine da være delt mellem Vesten og Rusland! Verdenspolitik reduceret ad absurdum… Problemet er bare, som det så ofte sker, at man lyttede til dem, der råbte højest, og glemte det tavse flertal i Ukraine.

Ukraine er delt i mindst fire dele: Vest, Øst, Midten, og Krim. Hvad betyder det konkret? Det betyder, at Vest og Øst ikke har meget indflydelse, at Midten har haft stadigt mere at skulle have sagt, og at Krim er en helt særlig heksekedel, ikke mindst grundet tatarerne. Nå, men en ting ad gangen.

Vest-Ukraine, med centrum omkring Lviv og Galicien, har aldrig haft nævneværdig indflydelse på ukrainsk politik. Jamen hvad med heltene fra den Orange Revolution i 2004? Hvad med Julija Timoshenko og Viktor Jusjtjenko, der var bannerførere i Ukraines forsøg på at blive del af Vesten? Timoshenko – hun er såmænd fra Dnipropetrovsk, en af de største byer i øst-Ukraine. Og hun var en fastetableret del af forretningsgrupperne fra Øst-Ukraine, der styrede landet sidst i 1990erne. Jo, hun ragede uklar med eliten dengang og jo, hun var da fremtrædende i den Orange Revolution og bagefter, men hun har aldrig været ukrainsk nationalist. Faktisk har hun ved flere lejligheder vist sig glimrende i stand til at samarbejde med Rusland. Hun kan ikke lide Præsident Viktor Janukovitj, der nu er flygtet til Moskva – men ham er der ingen, der kan lide; heller ikke Rusland. Hvis Timoshenko igen får magt, som hun har agt, vil hun være helt klar til at samarbejde med Rusland. Og så er der stakkels lille Viktor Jusjtjenko, der var præsident indtil han tabte sit genvalg stort i 2010. Jusjtjenko, der talte så meget om at få Ukraine ind i EU, han blev sidst set i selskab med Janukovitj til Ukraines fodboldkamp mod England i Kiev sidste efterår. Nej, hverken Timoshenko eller Jusjtjenko er klar til at være bannerførere for Vest-Ukraine imod det “onde Rusland.”

Jamen så må Øst-Ukraine da styre tingene? Herfra kommer Janukovitj, bøhmanden der nu sidder i Moskva. Her kigger man stadigt mod Rusland og Moskva og længes efter Sovjetunionen, ikke? Øh…næh. Da Janukovitj blev valgt til ukrainsk præsident i 2010 blev han støttet af en række rigmænd. Og jo, de kommer for det meste fra det gamle industrielle kerneland i det østlige Ukraine. Men de elsker ikke Rusland, og det gør Janukovitj heller ikke. Janukovitj er en klovn på mange måder, men når han nu var blevet præsident – jamen så ville han da ikke bare makke ret efter Putin. Og hans rige støtter havde og har ingen interesse i at blive underlagt de rigtigt store forretnings-fisk i den russiske andedam. Under Janukovitj har Ukraine igen og igen forsøgt at blive mere økonomisk integrerede med EU. For at få penge til Ukraine og dets rigmænd. Derfor har Rusland gentagne gange forsøgt at presse Janukovitj til at tage afstand fra Vesten – hvilket så lykkedes for få måneder siden. Men Janukovitj og hans støtter har kun samarbejdet med Rusland for at hytte deres eget skind som Ukraines herskere; ikke fordi de kan lide Rusland (at Janukovitj så har mistet mange af sine ukrainske støtter gennem sin inkompetence er en anden sag).

Så ukrainsk politik er hverken vestlig eller russisk. Hvad er den så? Jamen, den er Midten, den er ukrainsk. Og det betyder, blandt andet, at langt de fleste i Ukraine har familie og venner i Rusland – men sagtens kan se de økonomiske fordele i at samarbejde med EU i forhold til Ruslands luftkasteller om eurasisk samarbejde styret fra Moskva. Sidste november, da Janukovitj forkastede samarbejde med EU og søgte mod Rusland, var der ikke mange ukrainere, som åbent støttede ham. Heller ikke i øst-Ukraine. Presset af Rusland, måske med et blik for egne interesser og med elendig politisk tæft lykkedes det Janukovitj at gøre sig upopulær blandt stort set alle ukrainere. Og, som sagt, Putin har aldrig haft fidus til Janukovitj, der ses som svag i Rusland.

2) Rusland og Putin har ingen langsigtet plan

De seneste ti år er der gået en rød tråd gennem vestlig dækning af russisk udenrigspolitik: Rusland styres af Putin – Putin er rigtigt smart og hård og klar til at yde Vesten / USA modstand – Putin formår gang på gang at snøre Vesten. Den logik ser vi også i dækningen af den nuværende konflikt i Ukraine.

For eksempel skriver Michael Jarlner i Politiken: “…er det tydeligt, at Rusland hele tiden er et skridt foran det Vesten, der…har opfordret Rusland til at blande sig udenom.” Jarlner er en fremragende journalist og en dygtig analytiker. Men, undskyld Michael, den her analyse er noget vrøvl!

Hvis Putin og Rusland var så meget på forkant med tingene, jamen hvorfor lod man så urolighederne eskalere i Kiev? Det er bestemt ikke i Putins interesse at regimet i Kiev blev væltet. Lige som det heller ikke var i Putins interesse, at den Orange Revolution fandt sted. Eller at de olympiske lege i Sotji blev overskygget at slagsmålet om homo-rettigheder og menneskeret i Rusland. Siden han kom til magten i 2000 har Putin gang på gang været reaktiv. Han har aldrig været på forkant med begivenhederne. Det samme skete nu i Ukraine. Putin og hans omgangskreds – og Putin er på ingen made enevældig i Rusland – fandt alt for sent ud af, at Janukovitj slet ikke havde styr på Ukraine. Og så lige oven i olympiaden, som Putin holdt så meget af. Og, hovsa, så er der kampe i Kiev. Og Janukovitj må stikke af. Og nu er der en ny, ikke-folkevalgt regering i Ukraine – og den vil Vestpå, nej fy da føj. Vi må gøre noget, tænker Putin – og så dukker maskerede soldater op på Krim. Hvor den russiske Sortehavsflåde ligger. OK – lad os sige at Putin og Rusland nu får held til at styre Krim, at tage Krim fra Ukraine. Og hvad så? Hvordan hjælper det Rusland? Jamen, det hjælper slet ikke Rusland – Rusland har ikke på nogen made gavn af at tage Krim fra Ukraine.

3) Uro på Krim er skidt for Rusland

Kan Rusland overtage kontrollen med Krim? Jada! Kan Krim erklære sig selvstændigt under russisk beskyttelse, som vi så det i Georgien for få år tilbage? Jada! Kan sådan en udvikling på nogen måde gavne Rusland, Ukraine eller Krim? Nope!

Halvøen Krim, der strækker ind i Sortehavet fra det sydlige Ukraine, blev erobret af det russiske imperium fra de lokale muslimske tatarer. I starten af det tyvende århundrede blev Krim så fluks inkorporeret i den Russiske Sovjetrepublik under Sovjetunionen. Senere blev Krim foraæret væk af Nikita Krusjtjov til den Ukrainske Sovjetrepublik men det var der ikke så mange, der tænkte over. Krim var jo stadigt del af Sovjetunionen. Det gjorde heller ikke så meget, at tatarerne på Krim blev tvangsflyttet til Centralasien under Stalin, for offentlig debat og menneskerettigheder var jo aldrig noget, Sovjetunionen gjorde så meget i. Men så faldt Sovjetunionen sammen i 1991, Krim var stadigt befolket af russere, men lå nu i et selvstændigt Ukraine – og tatarerne var forøvrigt på vej hjem til Krim for at få tilbage de huse og den jord, som de havde mistet til russerne under Stalin. Åh ja – og så lå en af de største sovjetiske flådebaser, Sortehavsbasen, stadigt på Krim. Så der var lagt op til en masse ballade omkring Krim i et uafhængigt Ukraine.

Hidtil er det nu gået OK. Til dels fordi skiftende ukrainske regeringer har været fornuftige nok til at give Krim vidtstrakt autonomi; til dels fordi den russiske Sortehavsflåde har fået lov til at blive liggende nogenlunde uforstyrret uden for Sevastopol. Tatarerne har ikke haft så meget at råbe hurra for, men har ikke kunnet gøre meget uden ukrainsk eller russisk støtte. Indtil nu, hvor maskerede soldater, med forbindelse til (og måske en vis støtte fra) Rusland har indtaget Krim. Og det er skidt nyt for Rusland.

Rusland og russerne råber meget op om Sortehavsflåden – et symbol på russisk stormagtsstatus. Jo, det er da rigtigt – men hvorfor er flåden så ikke i bedre stand? Der er masser af russiske soldater på basen, og de har da rimelige betingelser og god løn, men flåden er i delvis forfald. Den blev brugt uden meget held i krigen mod Georgien i 2008, den er langt mindre end den nærliggende tyrkiske flåde, for ikke at nævne hvad amerikanerne kan kigge forbi med – og den indeholder stadigt et skib, der blev søsat under tsaren…

Sagen er, at Rusland har brug for basen, ikke for flåden. Basen ved Sevastopol er en dybvandsbase, der altid giver Rusland mulighed for at sende store skibe til Middelhavet, Mellemøsten og andetsteds. Basen giver masser af arbejde til soldater og andre russiske arbejdere – og den hjælper Ruslands fortsatte stræben efter stormagtsstatus. Men alle de fordele forsvinder, hvis Krim bliver genstand for strid mellem Rusland og Ukraine. Medmindre Rusland kan fuldstændigt overtage kontrollen med Ukraine – og det kan Rusland ikke – så vil Kiev modsætte sig med magt, at Krim overgår til Rusland. Janukovitj ville også have holdt på Krim – ingen ukrainsk leder vil overgive dele af landets territorium til Rusland. Det betyder, at Krim vil blive genstand for langvarig strid, måske væbnet strid, hvilket først og fremmest vil gå ud over de civile og militære russere, der udgør langt størstedelen af den lokale befolkning. Det er ikke – og kan aldrig være – i Ruslands eller Putins langsigtede interesse. Men, naturligvis, situationen på Krim kan sagtens eskalere alligevel så længe hverken Rusland, Ukraine, eller Vesten har en plan for, hvordan krisen kan løses. Hvordan kunne en sådan plan se ud?

4) Ukraine er en del af Europa – og Rusland er en del af Europa

Hvis EU og Vesten skal bidrage for alvor til at løse krisen i Ukraine, er vi nødt til – en gang for alle – at se såvel Ukraine som Rusland som en del af Europa og en del af Vesten. Det betyder ikke, at vi skal give efter for Putins stormagts-Rusland, der dominerer Europa og kan spille lige op med USA og Kina. Det kan Rusland ikke; og des før Putin forstår det, des bedre. Rusland har masser af olie og gas, men olie og gas kan kun blive afsat på længere sigt til kunder, der kan stole på russiske leverancer. Olie og gas kan ikke bruges strategisk til at sikre russisk indflydelse. At Rusland og Ukraine er del af Europa betyder heller ikke, at vi i EU og Vesten skal se igennem fingre med de mange problemer, som Rusland stadigt slås med. Når homoseksuelle forfølges i Rusland er det ikke OK. Når det nordlige Kaukasus dagligt er vidne til drab, bombesprængninger og general lovløshed er det heller ikke OK – især ikke når Putin og hans folk til dels er årsagen til volden. Og når valg forfalskes igen og igen, kan vi ikke bare sige “Jamen, russerne ved jo heller ikke bedre.” Jo de gør – og det skal vi holde dem – og ukrainerne – fast på.

Men vi skal holde Rusland og Ukraine fast på demokratiske, retsstatslige normer inden for et europæisk fællesskab. Jeg tror ikke Rusland nogensinde kommer med i EU eller NATO (og for Ukraine tager det nok årtier). Men EU og NATO er ikke Europa. Europa er, og forbliver, fælles forståelsesrammer, fælles dialog, og fælles hukommelse. Lad os nu give Rusland og Ukraine kredit for de fremskridt, der trods alt sker. Begge lande har nye generationer, der arbejder med stor success i Moskva, i Kiev, og i London, i Berlin, i København. Men dem hører man ikke om. Rusland især har haft meget frugtbart kulturelt samarbejde med Vesten det seneste årti – men det drukner i alle de dårlige nyheder fra Rusland og Ukraine. Putin og Janukovitj er nok håbløse – og situationen i Ukraine ser slem ud lige nu – men krisen fortager sig igen på et tidspunkt. Derefter er det så op til os, i EU og Vesten, at holde Rusland og Ukraine fast i vores hukommelse af, hvad det vil sige at være del af vores verden – og ikke på den anden side af en fiktiv skillelinje.

Europe is burning

As I write these lines, flames rise over Kiev. Scores die; the land is ripped apart.

Kiev is a centre of Europe. Not that we remembered. Curtains came down - woven of purple from that other Rome, showing eagles with one and two heads, and reinforced with iron. Yet Kiev is a centre of Europe.

In Kiev, Christianity was, remains, reborn. In Kiev, north and south, east and west, were tied together by Norsemen, by Byzantines, by Tatars, by Rzeczpospolita. In Kiev, Vertov showed us modernity.

You may not care much for Christianity, for the four corners of the world, for modernity. But these are, now and forever, major elements of Europe. And Europe is burning.

We should forget, now, that Europe is peace, unquestioningly. Europe is nothing of the sort. It can be peace, yes, but it can be death, too. It does not do to isolate the turmoil, quieten the illness. We could keep Yugoslavia out of the EU until it learned to behave itself. And we can certainly do the same to Ukraine. But the EU is not Europe. Metternich was wrong - and Blok was very, very right. Landstrasse is just a road. And we, Europe, were not born in Athens. We were born as the Other - and as the Other we shall remain.

Sure, the big boy from Donetsk is not a very nice man. And from the Kremlin emerge the nefarious plans of SPECTRE. But this explains nothing - and it helps less. Certainly, protesters are being shot down (and policemen, too, by the way). Yep - Vova the Dread has sent his henchmen southwest to skulk (or whatever it is that henchmen do). But can we please, now, forget that infantile rubbish about a !Ukraine divided between East and West! As if we could save Ukraine from itself, or somesuch. If only we thwarted the Villain - that Eye in the East...

Dear EU and all your member states: By all means strike the Ukrainian government with every sanction in the book - and please get personal, too. Viktor Yanukovych and his administration bear a heavy responsibility for what is unfolding. At best, they have been headless chickens. At worst, this was premeditated provocation. These guys fear for their wallets - OK, then start seeing how you can hit the regime on its money. They won't run to Russia - that's a big pond with dangerous fish over there. And the savvy Ukrainian oligarchs know that (I wonder what Akhmetov is thinking right now...).

Still, don't forget that Yanukovych was, actually, democratically elected. A depressing fact, perhaps (and he may have been playing a bit fast and loose with l'esprit des lois ever since), but we cannot just put him in a box and make him say "Boo!" Let's say Yanukovych is toppled. OK, what then? What form should European democracy take? Klitschko? Tymoshenko? Some of the lovely right-wing groups (that's the nice word for them...), who always like a bit of the old ultraviolence. Maybe we should just put Ukraine as a Mandate under the EU? That used to work so well in the Middle East...

Nah, better isolate the place and let Ukrainians deal with it themselves. It is their country, after all. It is nothing to do with us, no sir, with EU, with Europe. Well, not in half a year, anyway (or however long it took before we forgot about the Orange Revolution). Or, perhaps, we in "the West" / the club / the EU could, now, start to think about what Europe really is, and what we want it to be. There is so much talk these years about a Brussels losing its purpose. About bureaucrats, inefficiency, the Euro and its doldrums. Well, the EU was not created to make Europe rich; it was created to make Europe peaceful. The money was a sideshow. And peace is still missing in a centre of Europe.

In half a year, Kiev will, probably, be quiet again. There will be time to mourn the dead. Yet unless we - in the EU, in Ukraine, in Russia, in Europe - stand by our Europe, constantly create it and recreate it (perhaps by being a bit more interested in it), this will happen again. In Ukraine or elsewhere.

Back in the Renaissance, Sebastian Münster - he of Ingelheim - created a map of Europe as a Queen. I urge you, dear reader, to look it up. Sure, the Queen's heart is in Germany, her head in Spain, her royal sceptre in Britannia. But her legs are in the Balkans, in Moscovia, in Scythia. Maybe we should put this Queen on the EU flag? Just a thought...