Has the world really changed with the crash of MH17? In fact, what does it take to change a world, a region, a conflict? The shooting down of a civilian airplane? Not at Moneron Island in 1983, it didn't; nor in the Persian Gulf five years later. Moscow delayed, then accused the plane of spying. Washington just stuck to the story of how the crisis was Iran's fault, anyway.
Does it matter that so many of the dead this time are European? No, it shouldn't, but does it? For how much the world / the West gets involved? OK, many Americans died in 1983, but that was the Soviet Union, for crying out loud, the "Empire of Evil" - the Soviets were supposed to do this sort of stuff! (how the deuce Rust ever made it...did he not watch Firefox?) Does the West have the same expectations of Russia now? Should it have? Oh, in what a difficult dilemma does Volodia find himself...
What to do, what to do, if you sit behind the walls of the Kremlin? The Russian leadership mostly seems intent on downplaying the crash. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that Russia and the US have agreed an independent inquiry and adherence to the Geneva Principles for peace in Ukraine. Like a great power Russia yearns to be important, to be indispensable in international affairs. But, see, this is what Volodia and his chums have a problem understanding: Being indispensable does not a great power make. It does not even a medium power make. A great power actually tries to solve something; to develop situations, to help somehow. And that, alas, seems very far from the capabilities of today's Russian regime.
Did Volodia and Dima sit at the controls, playing Space Invaders with holiday-goers? You know, I don't think they did. And I don't think many observers, apart perhaps from some members of the Ukrainian leadership, would suspect the Russian elite of having declared war on the world. Yet the crime of which many observers are accusing the Russian leadership is the crime of neglect; neglect in the Pandoran sense where the jack-in-the-box is replaced with warheads. To show that Russia is indispensable, yes. But perhaps irresponsible, too.
Russian political analyst Iulia Latynina very interestingly stated that Russia has now "been caught up with" Gaddafi and bin Laden. No, Latynina is not saying anything as simple as "Russia is a terror-state." Instead, I think, her point is that Volodia is well on his way to making his state (sorry, the state of all Russians over which Volodia has claimed ownership) improper - dare we say "uncivilised" - in international affairs. This is not because Volodia is a "bad man," but because he seems caught between several illusions of what actually makes a civilised state in/of international affairs.
There is an old story, told to me more than a decade ago, about the Soviet embassy in West Berlin. Now, this was of course one of the most important centres of espionage activity for the Soviet Union (and everyone else) during the Cold War. At the embassy was a spy-master, an analyst capable of putting together highly detailed analyses of Western affairs based on information from the myriad of Soviet agents in the field sending him any and all possible pieces of information of which they could get hold. Then, one day the spy-master had to go back to Moscow suddenly, family matters I believe, and his replacement was not quickly found. Yet while his post remained empty, all the little agents milling about kept sending the embassy all sorts of information, in a wonderful confusion of absolutely no order of priority at all, for these little agents could not themselves conduct analysis. It was not their job. Sometimes, it does matter that Volodia is a former field agent in the Soviet foreign intelligence service...
Yet I digress. A friend of mine, a very competent analyst, pointed out shortly after the crash that there was an outside risk Ukraine might have shot down the plane. While I agree with the possibility that Ukraine might have mistaken the plane for a Russian spy plane I would assume that the Ukrainian military would have the technology and training to recognise civilian versus military aircraft, especially considering the frequency with which civilian aircraft overflew the area of the crash. Similarly, all thoughts of the plane crashing "by itself," so to speak, seem to have been debunked. So the quite strong suspicion remains that the plane was shot down by separatists based in eastern Ukraine; separatists over which Russia admits to have influence; and over which Russia has control according to the West.
And here we are back at Volodia's illusions. Hands up, who remembers the Sochi Winter Olympics? Come on - they even had Sugarpova at the opening ceremony... I joke, but the tragedy - and for Volodia this is a tragedy - is that the Sochi Olympics actually went quite well. Good organisation, welcoming to spectators (well, not the Circassians, but you know...), great venues, and engaged spectators. Even quite a few Russian medals. So hunky-dory all! Yet (and now for the tragic part) Volodia meant for the Winter Olympics to change the image of Russia and his regime abroad. The guy really wants to be loved. And, in terms of international perceptions of Russia (or domestic perceptions, for that matter), the Winter Olympics did diddly-squat.
You see, Volodia, you've got to make up your mind now! If you really want to be a scary leader of a scary country, you can be that - well, you can try anyway. Yet you better make damn sure to get better at it real quickly, because - right now - you're not that scary, at all. And if you really want to be lovable, then you can be that, too - maybe, sort of - but you've clearly got some work to do there, too.
Don't get me wrong: the brutal incineration of almost 300 innocent souls, the subsequent mistreatment of their bodies and the (alleged) disappearance of some of their effects is horrifying and has left the world reeling in shock. But the overall picture, emerging more and more clearly, is one of idiotic incompetence - more Clouseau in a Dumb State than Cushing in a Death Star...
No, Volodia, you (probably) did not order that drunk militia-man to fire warning shots at the OSCE. No, Volodia, you (probably) did not order the separatist administrations to move pieces of the wreckage back and forth so many times that separatist leaders now seem uncertain of whether they have the black boxes or not. But, Volodia, nobody in the West gives a damn! You have made so certain to create and consolidate a "power vertikal" not just in Russia but in much of the other successor states, too, that you can now be blamed for pretty much anything bad happening there. You are, in Philip Hammond's slightly hyperbolic words, leading Russia towards the status of a "pariah state." And, in the Daily Mail's phrase, for such a state "THERE'LL BE HELL TO PAY!" (on a side note, could somebody please take the nice people at the Daily Mail into a warm, comfortable room, hold their hands and explain to them, with compassion, that it would be best for everyone if they could now be quiet and let the grown-ups do the talking. Maybe Daily Mail could concentrate on gardening and nature...or maybe not, they'll probably just get their badgers in a twist again...)
Yet if Volodia's Russia can be blamed for all things wicked, and at the same time look oh so befuddled, then it is "business as usual," and then Volodia is in the worst of all worlds. If he didn't care about the West, Volodia's problem would be less. As a state Russia remains easily strong enough to ward off direct threats to its sovereignty; threats to Volodia's sovereignty will come from inside his regime, if at all. Sanctions can hurt Russia, yet now China offers a way out (well, a redirection to a slightly slower-cooking soup, but anyway...). Yet Volodia's Russia is not a great power, and won't become a great power, for "with great power comes great responsibility." Right now, I'm afraid, Russia is showing neither.
There is a story that then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, in 1993 responded to public panicking over chaotic monetary reforms with the words:
"Хотели как лучше, а получилось как всегда."
No, Volodia is not a nice fellow, but neither is he a tough decisive leader (Nicholas I would find the comparison rather insulting) and the above sentence is very much in danger of becoming Volodia's epitaph.
Especially is he continues with his "business as usual."
Sunday, 20 July 2014
Thursday, 17 July 2014
Into the maelstrom
This is what we know so far:
- At 4.41 pm BST today Reuters.uk reported that a Malaysian airplane had crashed on the ground in eastern Ukraine.
- The flight was MH17 from Malaysian Airlines flying at 10 kilometre altitude from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.
- An official from the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior stated the plane had been shot down by a BUK surface-to-air missile, and that all 295 passengers and crew had died. The Ukrainian government stated it was not involved, and suggested the plane may have been shot down, comparing it to recent attacks by separatists on Ukrainian military planes.
- Aleksandr Borodai, prominent in the separatist forces, claimed the plane had been shot down by the Ukrainian Air Force.
- A range of commercial airlines have declared they now will not fly over eastern Ukraine.
It is now certain that the plane did crash, leading to the death of almost 300 people. Which are the possible explanations for this horrific event?
- Could the airplane have crashed by itself? This is highly unlikely. There are no reasons to suspect that the plane should have malfunctioned to the point of crashing; air traffic controllers claim all messages from the plane were normal until it disappeared from their screens.
- Could the airplane have been hit by a bomb; either in the hold or a suicide bomber? There is little reason to suspect that a bomb should have been slipped through the safety checks at Schiphol Airport; and it would be a remarkable coincidence if a bomb in the airplane would detonate precisely over an active combat zone where military planes were shot down just days ago.
- Could the airplane have been shot down by the Ukrainian military? These troops would have the ability to shoot down the airplane, but it is difficult to see why they should do so. There is little reason why the Ukrainian military should have mistaken the airplane for a separatist plane, consider the separatists have not flown any airplanes so far.
- Could the airplane have been shot down by the separatists in Ukraine? It is possible that the separatists have acquired the BUK missile systems that allegedly was used to shoot down the plane, but it is difficult to see why they should have done so, or why they should have mistaken the airplane for a military airplane, especially given the height at which it was flying. An analyst on BBC has speculated, however, that the separatists, unlike governments, might not be able to distinguish electronically civilian versus military aircraft.
If, and this remains a big if, the airplane was shot down deliberately there remains the question of motive.
- Why would the Ukrainian military shoot down the airplane? Ukraine is winning the military battle in the region and has little reason to escalate the conflict.
- Why would the separatists shoot down the airplane? They are losing the battle but shooting down a civilian airplane would not help their cause.
- Why would any Russian-led forces shoot down the airplane? Elements in the Russian state may have an interest in keeping the trouble in eastern Ukraine going to some extent, but scaring international airlines from using the airspace makes little political, military or commercial sense.
There remains one, very remote, possibility that some party wants to use this catastrophe to escalate the current crisis beyond the area to which it has so far been contained. If this is the case - and I have currently seen no strong indications that it is the case - then the reasonably calm reactions from all sides so far is a sign that such a plan might fail.
This does not mean that a possible shooting down of the aircraft should not have consequences for the parties responsible; even if this was a mistake. But the next days must be focused on fact-finding before such steps are taken.
Thursday, 8 May 2014
Democracy Blues in Ukraine
It's a funny thing; this business of democracy.
These days in Ukraine, everybody claims to be democratic. Everybody claims to represent the people. The acting government in Kiev can point to the fact that 77% of people in Ukraine have told pollsters from Pew Research that they want the borders of Ukraine to remain unchanged. Pro-Russian secessionists can point to the fact that 54% of Crimeans want regions to be able to secede from Ukraine; and that - in eastern Ukraine - the 27% of Russian-speakers who feel the same cannot simply be ignored. (http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-ukrainians-want-to-remain-one-country/) Pro-Russian secessionists can, of course, also point to the fact that Pew Research is based in Washington, DC (although, by that standard, what are we to think about Russia Today...)
...and a vast majority of people in Ukraine can point to the fact that they would like peace now, please, and could all those nice pollsters please go away.
Anyway, so much for the hoi polloi. All the statespeople want to be democratic, too, yes they do. That is why Petro Poroshenko and the West want that Ukrainian presidential election to take place on May 25 across the country - apart from in the nasty terrorist towns, of course (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKKBN0DL11J20140507) And that is why Vladimir Putin was for the east Ukrainian secessionist referendum - until he was against it, of course. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/ukraine-crisis-putin-referendum-autonomy-postponed) How fortunate for democracy that eastern Ukraine, as represented by those most illustriously non-elected militias, have decided to ignore Uncle Volodya and press ahead with their voting, nonetheless. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27320806).
Why is it, by the way, that Maria Lipman, Vladimir Solovyov and so many others seem to think Putin planned this snub of him from the start? (http://www.firstpost.com/world/putin-keeps-russians-west-guessing-with-ukraine-shift-1515085.html) OK - I get why Solovyov thinks so; as a Putinista he would have to do so. But hasn't it occurred to anybody that Putin has been a politician for a good fourteen years now. As all other politicians in the world, Putin has long since learned to make mistakes - and now he just looks like someone who can't control his troops.
Anyway, I digress from my digressions. Democracy, it's about DEMOCRACY (the word around which all statespeople of the world must unite!)!!! Democracy - C'est la lutte finale / Groupons-nous et demain...
Look, I get it that democracy is a lovely thing in many ways; least evil and all that... (http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill(090503).html) I'm all for the power of the demos. But can we please all start agreeing on a simple starting point:
Democracy is based on fiction!
This doesn't mean we should get rid of democracy, far from it. And it doesn't mean there is not qualitative difference between the lumpy porridge served in much of the West and the rancid meat of the Russian political system - because, my God, there is such a difference! (http://en.novayagazeta.ru/politics/8740.html) But it does mean that all this search after a "truly democratic" election that will "save" Ukraine, or "save" Russians in Ukraine, is futile.
If the referendum on secession in (parts of) eastern Ukraine takes place this Sunday it will in itself provide no legitimacy to a region uncontrollable from Kiev (and from Moscow?). Just as the referendum, so-called, in Crimea provided no legitimacy, either, carried out as it was under the barrels of automatic weapons. And without legitimacy, on Crimea and in the rest of Ukraine, the status of the peninsula will remain uncertain. Similarly in eastern Ukraine - how can people vote in a free and fair manner with all sorts of armed bugbears running around? (and yes, there are bugbears on both sides of the divide).
Now as for that Ukrainian presidential election of May 25... William Hague, who has otherwise been sensible recently, states that the failure to hold this election would be very serious, because "Once postponed, who knows when they would be held." (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-hague-idUKKBN0DN0XJ20140507). Very true - and once held, who knows when the new president will be accepted throughout Ukraine? Of course Poroshenko wants this election to take place - he's bloody in the lead! (outside Slavyansk, anyway) (http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/23/ukraine-polls-suggest-poroshenko-may-win-presidential-election/)
Neither the referendum, nor the presidential election will solve anything as such. Certainly, neither shall the "will of the people(s)." What will work? Well, to start with - there must be an agreed demos, a people on which all the goodies of democracy can centre (how the deuce do we do this? Well, might a "Truth and Reconciliation" committe be an idea - possibly supported by a Ukrainian government in which each minister represented a region in Ukraine?). That demos must be everyone resident within and holding the citizenship of Ukraine; a citizenship which should be straightforward to get. Yes - the demos includes people from Western Ukraine ("fascists" and all). It includes Crimeans. And yes - it includes, too, Mr Poroshenko's "terrorists" in Slavyansk. We can punish by law all wrongdoers, for sure, but until we know who "we" are, we can't do a thing - at least that must be the reality for everyone in Ukraine.
Yet, if we agree that crimes have been committed by those on both sides of the fighting in Ukraine (and I certainly agree - as much as I sympathise with the Ukrainian position, I watched the live, savage beating of a pro-Russian militaman in Odessa and almost vomited...) then why are the borders of Ukraine such a non-negotiable? Why can't regions of Ukraine become independent or join Russia if their populations so wish?
Well, because democracy and its purported legitimacy may be fictitious - but they are based in a more fundamental fiction, and that is called sovereignty and the international stability that this confers. If Crimea can secede based on the fact that a majority of Crimeans want to secede (assuming this referendum had been free and fair, which it most certainly wasn't) then why couldn't Chechnya become independent (Dzhokhar Dudayev arguably had a republican, if not nation-wide, majority for that)? Why can't the Basque Country and Catalonia become independent? And why does Kharkiv necessarily have to follow Slavyansk into Russia? What is "eastern Ukraine" anyway?
...oh, that's right, "eastern Ukraine" is a fiction, just like "western Ukraine," just like "Ukraine." But "Ukraine" is a fiction with twenty-two years history, at least, and that beats twenty-two days. History, in its crooked way, can slowly confer some sort of legitimacy and normality - that normality back to which all people in Ukraine must now seek. For their sake, for the sake of the Russian Federation (with its own twenty-two years of history), for the sake of us all.
These days in Ukraine, everybody claims to be democratic. Everybody claims to represent the people. The acting government in Kiev can point to the fact that 77% of people in Ukraine have told pollsters from Pew Research that they want the borders of Ukraine to remain unchanged. Pro-Russian secessionists can point to the fact that 54% of Crimeans want regions to be able to secede from Ukraine; and that - in eastern Ukraine - the 27% of Russian-speakers who feel the same cannot simply be ignored. (http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-ukrainians-want-to-remain-one-country/) Pro-Russian secessionists can, of course, also point to the fact that Pew Research is based in Washington, DC (although, by that standard, what are we to think about Russia Today...)
...and a vast majority of people in Ukraine can point to the fact that they would like peace now, please, and could all those nice pollsters please go away.
Anyway, so much for the hoi polloi. All the statespeople want to be democratic, too, yes they do. That is why Petro Poroshenko and the West want that Ukrainian presidential election to take place on May 25 across the country - apart from in the nasty terrorist towns, of course (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKKBN0DL11J20140507) And that is why Vladimir Putin was for the east Ukrainian secessionist referendum - until he was against it, of course. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/ukraine-crisis-putin-referendum-autonomy-postponed) How fortunate for democracy that eastern Ukraine, as represented by those most illustriously non-elected militias, have decided to ignore Uncle Volodya and press ahead with their voting, nonetheless. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27320806).
Why is it, by the way, that Maria Lipman, Vladimir Solovyov and so many others seem to think Putin planned this snub of him from the start? (http://www.firstpost.com/world/putin-keeps-russians-west-guessing-with-ukraine-shift-1515085.html) OK - I get why Solovyov thinks so; as a Putinista he would have to do so. But hasn't it occurred to anybody that Putin has been a politician for a good fourteen years now. As all other politicians in the world, Putin has long since learned to make mistakes - and now he just looks like someone who can't control his troops.
Anyway, I digress from my digressions. Democracy, it's about DEMOCRACY (the word around which all statespeople of the world must unite!)!!! Democracy - C'est la lutte finale / Groupons-nous et demain...
Look, I get it that democracy is a lovely thing in many ways; least evil and all that... (http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill(090503).html) I'm all for the power of the demos. But can we please all start agreeing on a simple starting point:
Democracy is based on fiction!
This doesn't mean we should get rid of democracy, far from it. And it doesn't mean there is not qualitative difference between the lumpy porridge served in much of the West and the rancid meat of the Russian political system - because, my God, there is such a difference! (http://en.novayagazeta.ru/politics/8740.html) But it does mean that all this search after a "truly democratic" election that will "save" Ukraine, or "save" Russians in Ukraine, is futile.
If the referendum on secession in (parts of) eastern Ukraine takes place this Sunday it will in itself provide no legitimacy to a region uncontrollable from Kiev (and from Moscow?). Just as the referendum, so-called, in Crimea provided no legitimacy, either, carried out as it was under the barrels of automatic weapons. And without legitimacy, on Crimea and in the rest of Ukraine, the status of the peninsula will remain uncertain. Similarly in eastern Ukraine - how can people vote in a free and fair manner with all sorts of armed bugbears running around? (and yes, there are bugbears on both sides of the divide).
Now as for that Ukrainian presidential election of May 25... William Hague, who has otherwise been sensible recently, states that the failure to hold this election would be very serious, because "Once postponed, who knows when they would be held." (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-hague-idUKKBN0DN0XJ20140507). Very true - and once held, who knows when the new president will be accepted throughout Ukraine? Of course Poroshenko wants this election to take place - he's bloody in the lead! (outside Slavyansk, anyway) (http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/23/ukraine-polls-suggest-poroshenko-may-win-presidential-election/)
Neither the referendum, nor the presidential election will solve anything as such. Certainly, neither shall the "will of the people(s)." What will work? Well, to start with - there must be an agreed demos, a people on which all the goodies of democracy can centre (how the deuce do we do this? Well, might a "Truth and Reconciliation" committe be an idea - possibly supported by a Ukrainian government in which each minister represented a region in Ukraine?). That demos must be everyone resident within and holding the citizenship of Ukraine; a citizenship which should be straightforward to get. Yes - the demos includes people from Western Ukraine ("fascists" and all). It includes Crimeans. And yes - it includes, too, Mr Poroshenko's "terrorists" in Slavyansk. We can punish by law all wrongdoers, for sure, but until we know who "we" are, we can't do a thing - at least that must be the reality for everyone in Ukraine.
Yet, if we agree that crimes have been committed by those on both sides of the fighting in Ukraine (and I certainly agree - as much as I sympathise with the Ukrainian position, I watched the live, savage beating of a pro-Russian militaman in Odessa and almost vomited...) then why are the borders of Ukraine such a non-negotiable? Why can't regions of Ukraine become independent or join Russia if their populations so wish?
Well, because democracy and its purported legitimacy may be fictitious - but they are based in a more fundamental fiction, and that is called sovereignty and the international stability that this confers. If Crimea can secede based on the fact that a majority of Crimeans want to secede (assuming this referendum had been free and fair, which it most certainly wasn't) then why couldn't Chechnya become independent (Dzhokhar Dudayev arguably had a republican, if not nation-wide, majority for that)? Why can't the Basque Country and Catalonia become independent? And why does Kharkiv necessarily have to follow Slavyansk into Russia? What is "eastern Ukraine" anyway?
...oh, that's right, "eastern Ukraine" is a fiction, just like "western Ukraine," just like "Ukraine." But "Ukraine" is a fiction with twenty-two years history, at least, and that beats twenty-two days. History, in its crooked way, can slowly confer some sort of legitimacy and normality - that normality back to which all people in Ukraine must now seek. For their sake, for the sake of the Russian Federation (with its own twenty-two years of history), for the sake of us all.
Tuesday, 6 May 2014
Why the Russian economy matters
In Ukraine, fighting spread from the east to Odessa. Each day witnesses new battles and deaths, most recently in southern Mariupol although the now familiar battleground of Slavyansk continues to burn. Now, in a callow (or callous?) move, pro-Russian militias let civilians man the barricades in the east. Certainly, this may slow down the advance of Ukrainian troops, but it does nothing to protect ordinary people, Russians or Ukrainians, of eastern Ukraine. The nationwide elections of May 25th do seem hopeless, now, but so does the referendum planned in eastern Ukraine for May 11th. Russian troops may yet officially invade Ukraine.
On this dark background it seems perhaps misguided to focus, for a moment, on the state of the Russian economy. Yet we cannot avoid looking at this economy if we are to properly guess at the longer-term involvement of the Russian state in Ukraine - and in Russia itself.
Three questions are particularly pertinent.
On the first question: Yes, the economy of Russia is in trouble, in the short term but, much more importantly, over the medium to long term, too. In Q1 for 2014, Russian GDP contracted by 0.5% according to the Russian Ministry for the Economy, which also states that growth may not exceed 0.5% for the year. Now, Maksim Oreshkin of the Russian Ministry of Finance has confirmed that Russian GDP is set to contract again in Q2, meaning that Russia is technically in a recession.
This is not, or not primarily, due to Western sanctions, however. Russian economic growth has been sluggish for a while. Last year, for instance, the IMF measured Russian GDP as 1.3%. Admittedly, this growth has now been downgraded to a projected 0.2% (the OECD project a 0.5% growth rate for 2014), but even if growth for 2014 were to equal that of 2013, it would hardly be impressive. Remember, this is a BRIC we are talking about - one of the four great developing economies (together with Brazil, India, and China - and South Africa for BRICS) immortalised for a decade by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs. You cannot really blame O'Neill for the comparison; it made fine sense in 2001 and the years thereafter.
But now... In 2013, admittedly, according to the IMF Russia remained the eighth-largest economy of the world, with China second, Brazil seventh, India ninth (and South Africa thirty-third...). The Russian economy still matters - but look at growth rates. According to the IMF DataMapper for April 2014 (which even has Russian growth rates at 2.5%), India is at 6.8%, China is at 6.5%, and even Brazil has a projected year-on-year growth of 3.5%. (http://www.imf.org/external/Datamapper/index.php). Also, tellingly, with the exception of Ukraine (for which no secure data can be obtained presently by the IMF), all other post-Soviet states have a higher economic growth than Russia. For sure, the Russian economy is so much larger than that of its neighbours that its relative sluggishness still conceals assets much larger than those of the neighbouring states. Yet, clearly, the Russian regime is in no position to promote their state as the powerhouse that shall drag surrounding states into a glorious economic future. So much for that Customs Union, perhaps? Much more importantly, so much for Russian aspirations to show their country as an economic powerhouse of the world.
Western sanctions against Russia do have an impact; as does the uncertainty fostered among Russian and international investors by the persistent unrest next to, and partly fomented by, Russia. Apart from sharply curtailed GDP growth, inflation in Russia is rising with the Central Bank recently rasing the base rate by 50 basis points to 7.5%. Yet if this was the Russian economy of the early noughties it could probably ride out the storm. Now, sanctions may not force the Russian regime to be constructive in Ukraine. Russian elites do (mostly) care about the state of their country and its economy, but the fight for Ukraine and the incendiary anger against the West is taking precedence. So far, so understandable.
But what comes next? As mentioned above, Russia can no longer show itself internationally as a quickly growing economy. For better or for worse, the Russian economy has "matured" - and this thanks mainly to great world market oil prices over the last decade. And how has Russia and Russians benefitted from this? Especially outside Moscow and St Petersburg? Not very much, it seems. For 2013, the Economist Intelligence Unit compared living standards in 80 countries (that is, "where is it best to be born?"). Russia was not last. Oh no, only number 72 - and it beat Syria! (while losing to Indonesia, but there we are...). (http://www.economist.com/news/21566430-where-be-born-2013-lottery-life). Surveys of political and civil freedoms, and on corruption levels, do not make for more cheerful reading for Russia.
Maybe these measurements are misguided, run by Western, subversive agencies? Well, if so - why, in June 2013, did almost half of all Russian students dream of emigrating? Why did 38% of businesspeople want to leave. This according to Russian pollsters, from the respected Levada Centre. (http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130606/181540254/Almost-Half-of-Russian-Students-Dream-of-Emigrating---Poll.html).
The real problem is not that the Russian economy is getting sluggish. The real problem is that Russians (and everyone else) are ever less convinced in the Russian economy, and in the ability of their regime to better ordinary people's living standards. Russians and Westerners alike know of the American Dream; it stayed alive and well even when the American economy was in the doldrums. There must be a Russian Dream, too. It should be brave and optimistic. Instead, it seems just unrest and death. And that, it seems, is all that President Vladimir Putin and his staff is able to leave behind.
On this dark background it seems perhaps misguided to focus, for a moment, on the state of the Russian economy. Yet we cannot avoid looking at this economy if we are to properly guess at the longer-term involvement of the Russian state in Ukraine - and in Russia itself.
Three questions are particularly pertinent.
- Is the economy of Russia in trouble?
- Is the state of the economy of Russia connected to Western sanctions?
- Do Russian elites care about the state of the Russian economy?
On the first question: Yes, the economy of Russia is in trouble, in the short term but, much more importantly, over the medium to long term, too. In Q1 for 2014, Russian GDP contracted by 0.5% according to the Russian Ministry for the Economy, which also states that growth may not exceed 0.5% for the year. Now, Maksim Oreshkin of the Russian Ministry of Finance has confirmed that Russian GDP is set to contract again in Q2, meaning that Russia is technically in a recession.
This is not, or not primarily, due to Western sanctions, however. Russian economic growth has been sluggish for a while. Last year, for instance, the IMF measured Russian GDP as 1.3%. Admittedly, this growth has now been downgraded to a projected 0.2% (the OECD project a 0.5% growth rate for 2014), but even if growth for 2014 were to equal that of 2013, it would hardly be impressive. Remember, this is a BRIC we are talking about - one of the four great developing economies (together with Brazil, India, and China - and South Africa for BRICS) immortalised for a decade by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs. You cannot really blame O'Neill for the comparison; it made fine sense in 2001 and the years thereafter.
But now... In 2013, admittedly, according to the IMF Russia remained the eighth-largest economy of the world, with China second, Brazil seventh, India ninth (and South Africa thirty-third...). The Russian economy still matters - but look at growth rates. According to the IMF DataMapper for April 2014 (which even has Russian growth rates at 2.5%), India is at 6.8%, China is at 6.5%, and even Brazil has a projected year-on-year growth of 3.5%. (http://www.imf.org/external/Datamapper/index.php). Also, tellingly, with the exception of Ukraine (for which no secure data can be obtained presently by the IMF), all other post-Soviet states have a higher economic growth than Russia. For sure, the Russian economy is so much larger than that of its neighbours that its relative sluggishness still conceals assets much larger than those of the neighbouring states. Yet, clearly, the Russian regime is in no position to promote their state as the powerhouse that shall drag surrounding states into a glorious economic future. So much for that Customs Union, perhaps? Much more importantly, so much for Russian aspirations to show their country as an economic powerhouse of the world.
Western sanctions against Russia do have an impact; as does the uncertainty fostered among Russian and international investors by the persistent unrest next to, and partly fomented by, Russia. Apart from sharply curtailed GDP growth, inflation in Russia is rising with the Central Bank recently rasing the base rate by 50 basis points to 7.5%. Yet if this was the Russian economy of the early noughties it could probably ride out the storm. Now, sanctions may not force the Russian regime to be constructive in Ukraine. Russian elites do (mostly) care about the state of their country and its economy, but the fight for Ukraine and the incendiary anger against the West is taking precedence. So far, so understandable.
But what comes next? As mentioned above, Russia can no longer show itself internationally as a quickly growing economy. For better or for worse, the Russian economy has "matured" - and this thanks mainly to great world market oil prices over the last decade. And how has Russia and Russians benefitted from this? Especially outside Moscow and St Petersburg? Not very much, it seems. For 2013, the Economist Intelligence Unit compared living standards in 80 countries (that is, "where is it best to be born?"). Russia was not last. Oh no, only number 72 - and it beat Syria! (while losing to Indonesia, but there we are...). (http://www.economist.com/news/21566430-where-be-born-2013-lottery-life). Surveys of political and civil freedoms, and on corruption levels, do not make for more cheerful reading for Russia.
Maybe these measurements are misguided, run by Western, subversive agencies? Well, if so - why, in June 2013, did almost half of all Russian students dream of emigrating? Why did 38% of businesspeople want to leave. This according to Russian pollsters, from the respected Levada Centre. (http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130606/181540254/Almost-Half-of-Russian-Students-Dream-of-Emigrating---Poll.html).
The real problem is not that the Russian economy is getting sluggish. The real problem is that Russians (and everyone else) are ever less convinced in the Russian economy, and in the ability of their regime to better ordinary people's living standards. Russians and Westerners alike know of the American Dream; it stayed alive and well even when the American economy was in the doldrums. There must be a Russian Dream, too. It should be brave and optimistic. Instead, it seems just unrest and death. And that, it seems, is all that President Vladimir Putin and his staff is able to leave behind.
Tuesday, 29 April 2014
Russia and the context of the hi-tech sanctions
Thus a new round of sanctions have appeared against Russia and Russians, on behalf of the USA and of the EU. Plus ça change, it is tempting to say. While it is inherently difficult to conduct counter-factual history, it seems reasonable to say that Western sanctions so far have had little impact on Russian policy in relation to Ukraine. And as Western military intervention in Ukraine would be both very difficult and probably counterproductive it may be feared that the USA and the EU are running out of options to keep Russia from threatening the integrity of the Ukrainian state.
Yet there is a fine balance to be trod here, between raising the cost for the Russian regime while ensuring that ordinary Russians are faced with a minimum of difficulties. This is why personalised sanctions have been directed against Russians and Ukrainians deeply involved in the Ukraine crisis, in Vladimir Putin's regime, or both. And it is why the EU, in particular, and to some extent the USA is careful imposing sanctions that may further disrupt the Russian economy. Certainly, the latest round of sanctions may have been inadequate: the Moscow stock market rose 1% on the news that more serious and wide-ranging sanctions were not imposed. Yet the Rouble continues to perform very poorly, and Russia is judged by some analysts to have witnessed $60bn capital flight already in 2014, equivalent to the total for all of 2013. Hence the amount of personalised sanctions can also be seen as a Western indication that no collective economic punishment of Russians or Russia is sought.
The personalised sanctions are only one side of the story, though. Although some American politicians, in particular, continue to clamour in vain for widespread sanctions on Russian financial institutions and energy companies, other industry sectors are being severely hit by the USA, in particular. Previously, the White House had banned NASA from having any contact with the Russian government, apart from issues concerning the International Space Station (which is currently only accessible with Russian rockets). Now, the USA is denying export licences to Russia for any high-technology items that may contribute to Russian military capabilities. Existing licences of this kind are being revoked. This is unlikely to hamper Russia's military ability in the short run. Russia remains a globally significant arms exporter in its own right, does currently have some sophisticated military hardware, and can probably buy more from China if required. What these sanctions will do, however, is to prevent Russians from learning from their cooperation with American colleagues in a range of spheres, including space technology where the two countries have previously cooperated extensively on the development and deployment of sattelites.
More fundamentally, by sanctioning high-tech cooperation with Russia the USA is putting Russian development on the spot. Under the previous Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev (currently Russian Prime Minister) technological development officially became a high priority for the state, most obviously exemplified in the Skolkovo innovation centre. The fetichising of technological development as a symbol of success, and perhaps even a symbol of civilisation, has deep roots in Russian and Soviet history. And always a Western connection appears. Peter the Great drags Russia definitively into the European system of states by copying techniques of shipbuilding and administration assessed during his extensive stay and even work in the Dutch Republic and in England. Emperors following in his wake were mostly only too keen to obtain and implement for their own uses Western technologies that could improve Russian infrastructure, industrial production and, indeed, arms. Even the Bolshevik leadership, so ready straightaway to announce its departure from everything to do with the "bourgeois" system of states, happily invited American engineers, architects and other technological developers to teach and develop the first generation of Soviet technical experts. And the Russian Federation has similarly taken advantage of technological cooperation with the West.
All this does not mean that Russia and Russians had no technological developments of their own. As the space race showed, when the Soviet state put its mind to something results did follow. Today, Russian technical experts, not least in the computer industry, remain sought for all over the world. What Russia does lack, however, is a sustainable infrastructure helping to support, maintain and develop its high-tech industries. It is all very well that President Vladimir Putin now obliquely threatens the West with possible future energy disruptions; or that Finance Minister Anton Siluanov foresees no immediate danger for Russian companies from the sanctions. If the repercussions from the current crisis drag into the far future, and they most likely will, then the Russian regime has to adjust its policies and mentality to technological autarky, as well as autarky in a number of other spheres. Russia may have the resources to do this, for a while anyway. Whether its regime has the will to do so is a different matter.
Yet there is a fine balance to be trod here, between raising the cost for the Russian regime while ensuring that ordinary Russians are faced with a minimum of difficulties. This is why personalised sanctions have been directed against Russians and Ukrainians deeply involved in the Ukraine crisis, in Vladimir Putin's regime, or both. And it is why the EU, in particular, and to some extent the USA is careful imposing sanctions that may further disrupt the Russian economy. Certainly, the latest round of sanctions may have been inadequate: the Moscow stock market rose 1% on the news that more serious and wide-ranging sanctions were not imposed. Yet the Rouble continues to perform very poorly, and Russia is judged by some analysts to have witnessed $60bn capital flight already in 2014, equivalent to the total for all of 2013. Hence the amount of personalised sanctions can also be seen as a Western indication that no collective economic punishment of Russians or Russia is sought.
The personalised sanctions are only one side of the story, though. Although some American politicians, in particular, continue to clamour in vain for widespread sanctions on Russian financial institutions and energy companies, other industry sectors are being severely hit by the USA, in particular. Previously, the White House had banned NASA from having any contact with the Russian government, apart from issues concerning the International Space Station (which is currently only accessible with Russian rockets). Now, the USA is denying export licences to Russia for any high-technology items that may contribute to Russian military capabilities. Existing licences of this kind are being revoked. This is unlikely to hamper Russia's military ability in the short run. Russia remains a globally significant arms exporter in its own right, does currently have some sophisticated military hardware, and can probably buy more from China if required. What these sanctions will do, however, is to prevent Russians from learning from their cooperation with American colleagues in a range of spheres, including space technology where the two countries have previously cooperated extensively on the development and deployment of sattelites.
More fundamentally, by sanctioning high-tech cooperation with Russia the USA is putting Russian development on the spot. Under the previous Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev (currently Russian Prime Minister) technological development officially became a high priority for the state, most obviously exemplified in the Skolkovo innovation centre. The fetichising of technological development as a symbol of success, and perhaps even a symbol of civilisation, has deep roots in Russian and Soviet history. And always a Western connection appears. Peter the Great drags Russia definitively into the European system of states by copying techniques of shipbuilding and administration assessed during his extensive stay and even work in the Dutch Republic and in England. Emperors following in his wake were mostly only too keen to obtain and implement for their own uses Western technologies that could improve Russian infrastructure, industrial production and, indeed, arms. Even the Bolshevik leadership, so ready straightaway to announce its departure from everything to do with the "bourgeois" system of states, happily invited American engineers, architects and other technological developers to teach and develop the first generation of Soviet technical experts. And the Russian Federation has similarly taken advantage of technological cooperation with the West.
All this does not mean that Russia and Russians had no technological developments of their own. As the space race showed, when the Soviet state put its mind to something results did follow. Today, Russian technical experts, not least in the computer industry, remain sought for all over the world. What Russia does lack, however, is a sustainable infrastructure helping to support, maintain and develop its high-tech industries. It is all very well that President Vladimir Putin now obliquely threatens the West with possible future energy disruptions; or that Finance Minister Anton Siluanov foresees no immediate danger for Russian companies from the sanctions. If the repercussions from the current crisis drag into the far future, and they most likely will, then the Russian regime has to adjust its policies and mentality to technological autarky, as well as autarky in a number of other spheres. Russia may have the resources to do this, for a while anyway. Whether its regime has the will to do so is a different matter.
Monday, 28 April 2014
What place for the OSCE in Ukraine?
And thus international organisations once more fall foul of Russia and of the pro-Russian militias in Ukraine. First, a UN observer was chased out of Crimea when Russian troops and their allied were busy securing Russian control of the peninsula. Then OSCE observers were kept away from Crimea with armed road blocks and warning shots to help ensure a minimum of international scrutiny of the referendum preceding Crimean accession to Russia. Russia was sanctioned by the Council of Europe, while the UN produced a report stating in clear terms that Crimea and eastern Ukraine have not witnessed any systematic attacks on Russians. And now OSCE observers have been captured by militias in Slavyansk in eastern Ukraine; the fate of all but one of them precarious.
We have repeatedly heard how unpopular NATO is in Russia (and with many people in Ukraine, too). The EU, as well, has received widespread censure in Russia for the public support shown to the Maidan rebellion and to the acting government in Kiev. Yet this is nothing new. In Moscow, NATO has been seen as the enemy ever since 1949. The EU has come under increasing criticism during the last decade following disputes over energy and trade policies, human rights, and the (somewhat haphazard) competition between Russia and the EU for influence in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. So far, so predictable. However, the UN and the OSCE have repeatedly been mentioned by the Russian regime as the two international organisations within which Russia and the West could do business; around which a new European security structure could be built. Well so much for that pipedream, it would seem.
The OSCE did have its main mission to Ukraine approved by Russia. The observers now prisoners in Slavyansk were part of a secondary mission by the OSCE, which did not require Russian approval. Still, it might have been expected that Russia would seek to protect OSCE staff in Ukraine, to highlight that this organisation (in which Russia would hold a veto and a commanding voice) should be the future institutional solution (or cul-de-sac) within which to manage Ukraine. Instead, after the observers were captured by militias accusing them of spying for the West the Russian regime has mostly kept quiet. Russian ambassador to the OSCE, Andrey Kelin, has assured the world that Russia is taking "some steps" to help secure the release of the observers. (http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0428/612131-ukraine/) It remains to be seen, however, what if anything Russia is actually doing to defuse the situation. Kelin also pointed out that the OSCE were highly irresponsible to send in the monitors in the first place. (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUKKBN0DE1MM20140428) The OSCE observers have been mentioned as prisoners of war and as spies by the pro-Russian militias in Slavyansk and, indeed, it is possible that these militias captured the observers by mistake in an increasingly tense situation. Yet if Russia did not want OSCE observers present, and since Russia has previously ruled out UN peacekeepers in eastern Ukraine, it appears that Russia does not want any international observers, at all, in the region. Ukrainians must be left to decide their own fate; just a rickety regime in Kiev, well-armed and seemingly violent militias in eastern Ukraine, and thousands of Russian troops waiting at the border...
While Russia continues to insist that it has nothing to do with the militias holding numerous towns in eastern Ukraine, the USA is not convinced. Maybe because the behaviour and look of the pro-Russian militias appears strikingly similar to that of Crimean militias, who eventually turned out to contain many members of the Russian armed forces. From the OSCE, Gary Robbins as US Deputy Head of Mission has deplored Russian unwillingness to condemn the capture of the observers, (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_28/OSCE-was-irresponsible-to-send-monitors-to-East-Ukraine-Russia-5043/) a capture including mistreatment of the observers and of Ukrainian prisoners in eastern Ukraine, according to the US State Department. (http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2374598&language=en)
From the EU such direct accusations take longer in appearing. Yet what is remarkable now is the willingness with which Germany not only appears as the semi-official interlocutor for the EU with Russia, but also as a vocal critic of Russian unwillingness (and inability) to implement the recent Geneva peace deal. On the OSCE observers, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been in contact with the OSCE as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Without much success so far, apart from the release of one observer on medical grounds, Mr Steinmeier's diplomacy has not shown much result. And he is clear that Germany holds Russia fully responsible for the release of the observers, and for ensuring that it is up to Russia to prevent humiliating treatment of the observers by the militias. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140427/russia-must-press-ukraine-separatists-free-osce-team-0) The office of Chancellor Angela Merkel is similarly putting the onus on Russia to solve the situation. (http://www.dw.de/ban-demands-that-separatists-in-ukraine-release-osce-observers/a-17599660)
Now, it is possible that the OSCE observers were captured without the knowledge of Moscow. Further, it is possible that the Russian regime is working clandestinely to pressurise the militias in Slavyansk into releasing the remaining observes. Apparently, the militias were not prepared to let an observers risk serious health problems, and thus let him go. Similarly, the leader of the captive observers has stated that they are being well treated by their captors, even though they have received no indication of release. Yet watching this leader mechanically read through this statement, it is clear that the observers have, at least, been subjected to substantial psychological pressure by their captors (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laBj3-QUizY) and, as mentioned above, their mistreatment is repeatedly mentioned by Western governments. Possibly, this is all against the wishes of Russian President Vladimir Putin; or, at least, against the wishes of some of his aides. Nevertheless, no one from the Russian regime seems keen now to point to the positive role the OSCE might have in defusing the Ukrainian crisis. And, until the opposite is demonstrated, Russia appears not to be prepared to help protect the staff of the OSCE in Ukraine. Thus, the Russian state appears, once and for all, to have abandoned the pretence that international organisations are the way forward to ensure Ukrainian, and European, security. What may ensure such security remains to be seen.
We have repeatedly heard how unpopular NATO is in Russia (and with many people in Ukraine, too). The EU, as well, has received widespread censure in Russia for the public support shown to the Maidan rebellion and to the acting government in Kiev. Yet this is nothing new. In Moscow, NATO has been seen as the enemy ever since 1949. The EU has come under increasing criticism during the last decade following disputes over energy and trade policies, human rights, and the (somewhat haphazard) competition between Russia and the EU for influence in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. So far, so predictable. However, the UN and the OSCE have repeatedly been mentioned by the Russian regime as the two international organisations within which Russia and the West could do business; around which a new European security structure could be built. Well so much for that pipedream, it would seem.
The OSCE did have its main mission to Ukraine approved by Russia. The observers now prisoners in Slavyansk were part of a secondary mission by the OSCE, which did not require Russian approval. Still, it might have been expected that Russia would seek to protect OSCE staff in Ukraine, to highlight that this organisation (in which Russia would hold a veto and a commanding voice) should be the future institutional solution (or cul-de-sac) within which to manage Ukraine. Instead, after the observers were captured by militias accusing them of spying for the West the Russian regime has mostly kept quiet. Russian ambassador to the OSCE, Andrey Kelin, has assured the world that Russia is taking "some steps" to help secure the release of the observers. (http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0428/612131-ukraine/) It remains to be seen, however, what if anything Russia is actually doing to defuse the situation. Kelin also pointed out that the OSCE were highly irresponsible to send in the monitors in the first place. (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUKKBN0DE1MM20140428) The OSCE observers have been mentioned as prisoners of war and as spies by the pro-Russian militias in Slavyansk and, indeed, it is possible that these militias captured the observers by mistake in an increasingly tense situation. Yet if Russia did not want OSCE observers present, and since Russia has previously ruled out UN peacekeepers in eastern Ukraine, it appears that Russia does not want any international observers, at all, in the region. Ukrainians must be left to decide their own fate; just a rickety regime in Kiev, well-armed and seemingly violent militias in eastern Ukraine, and thousands of Russian troops waiting at the border...
While Russia continues to insist that it has nothing to do with the militias holding numerous towns in eastern Ukraine, the USA is not convinced. Maybe because the behaviour and look of the pro-Russian militias appears strikingly similar to that of Crimean militias, who eventually turned out to contain many members of the Russian armed forces. From the OSCE, Gary Robbins as US Deputy Head of Mission has deplored Russian unwillingness to condemn the capture of the observers, (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_28/OSCE-was-irresponsible-to-send-monitors-to-East-Ukraine-Russia-5043/) a capture including mistreatment of the observers and of Ukrainian prisoners in eastern Ukraine, according to the US State Department. (http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2374598&language=en)
From the EU such direct accusations take longer in appearing. Yet what is remarkable now is the willingness with which Germany not only appears as the semi-official interlocutor for the EU with Russia, but also as a vocal critic of Russian unwillingness (and inability) to implement the recent Geneva peace deal. On the OSCE observers, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been in contact with the OSCE as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Without much success so far, apart from the release of one observer on medical grounds, Mr Steinmeier's diplomacy has not shown much result. And he is clear that Germany holds Russia fully responsible for the release of the observers, and for ensuring that it is up to Russia to prevent humiliating treatment of the observers by the militias. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140427/russia-must-press-ukraine-separatists-free-osce-team-0) The office of Chancellor Angela Merkel is similarly putting the onus on Russia to solve the situation. (http://www.dw.de/ban-demands-that-separatists-in-ukraine-release-osce-observers/a-17599660)
Now, it is possible that the OSCE observers were captured without the knowledge of Moscow. Further, it is possible that the Russian regime is working clandestinely to pressurise the militias in Slavyansk into releasing the remaining observes. Apparently, the militias were not prepared to let an observers risk serious health problems, and thus let him go. Similarly, the leader of the captive observers has stated that they are being well treated by their captors, even though they have received no indication of release. Yet watching this leader mechanically read through this statement, it is clear that the observers have, at least, been subjected to substantial psychological pressure by their captors (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laBj3-QUizY) and, as mentioned above, their mistreatment is repeatedly mentioned by Western governments. Possibly, this is all against the wishes of Russian President Vladimir Putin; or, at least, against the wishes of some of his aides. Nevertheless, no one from the Russian regime seems keen now to point to the positive role the OSCE might have in defusing the Ukrainian crisis. And, until the opposite is demonstrated, Russia appears not to be prepared to help protect the staff of the OSCE in Ukraine. Thus, the Russian state appears, once and for all, to have abandoned the pretence that international organisations are the way forward to ensure Ukrainian, and European, security. What may ensure such security remains to be seen.
Tuesday, 22 April 2014
Requiem for a peace?
Once more, fires flare in eastern Ukraine. Violent deaths are now becoming an everyday occurrence. The Geneva deal is fading. And across Europe governments call to defence against the Russian threat. Could all-out war ensue between Russian and Ukrainian troops? Or is there a way back to stability and peace in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere?
When Ukrainian tanks last week rolled into Slavyansk, only to be mobbed and stopped by civilians and (Russian?) militiamen it did not represent the finest hour for the Ukrainian army. However, in their seeming incompetence the Ukrainian armed forces did manage to hold their fire. Ukraine lost equipment, but no soldiers, or civilians, lost their lives. In its own muddled way, the "battle for Slavyansk" indicated that Russians and Ukrainians might be able to resolve the situation gradually, with threats but no deaths.
Now, blood is seeping through. Recently, pro-Russian militiamen were shot and killed in a murky firefight and now has been found the tortured body of what appears to be a pro-Ukrainian politician, from the Prime Minister's party, no less. It remains unclear precisely what happened to Volodymyr Rybak outside Slavyansk, but his fate may spur events on. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/22/ukraine-politician-found-dead_n_5192477.html)
It is possible that militias killed Mr Rybak to provoke open fighting with Ukrainian troops. It is also possible, if unproven, that the militias were spurred to the act by figures in the Russian regime. For now, Russia is not commenting on this murder and, indeed, is keeping fairly quiet in what could be anticipation or confusion. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has, once more, stressed that Russia can overcome any Western sanctions; that business and ordinary citizens should be kept free from political shenanigans. (http://rt.com/business/154012-sanctions-russia-stronger-medvedev/) UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, meanwhile, seems unsurprised that tensions will take a while to die down - and, following the recent UN report dismissing the claim of systematic threats to Russians in Ukraine, Churkin now wants UN far removed from eastern Ukraine. Apparently, the OSCE is now expected to stop any unrest that may appear, together with the Ukrainian conscience or some such. (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_22/Prospect-of-UN-peacekeeping-operation-in-Ukraine-unreal-Russian-diplomat-9486/)
On the bright side, this is hardly belligerent talk from Medvedev and Churkin. At worst, if the Russian administration is connected to the militias currently occupying parts of eastern Ukraine - and if recent casualties on both sides have been at least partly provoked by Russian intents to keep Ukraine unstable - at least the tens of thousands of Russian troops lined up along the border with Ukraine do not seem to be on their way in. Certainly, their continued presence is ominous - unless Moscow fears a Ukrainian spearhead attack towards the Ural mountains there is no credible domestic reason why Russian tanks in these numbers need to be facing the border. Undoubtedly, Russia would consider an attack if actions by the Ukrainian state resulted (even indirectly) in civilian casualties, but so far this has mostly been avoided.
Having said this, though, developments in eastern Ukraine have left the acting government in Kiev in a difficult dilemma. One month remains before the presidential election to decide the successor to the exiled Viktor Yanukovych. Such an election seems impossible under current circumstances, with the most populous (and richest, bar Kiev) part of the country subject to unelected, masked rule. Even if the militias (or some of them) in eastern Ukraine are genuinely concerned with locals' welfare (unlikely given the readiness with which militias let unarmed civilians face down armed Ukrainian soldiers and tanks) they have not been elected by any significant part of the local population in any of the cities they occupy. Everything you need to know about the official Russian view of democracy is encapsulated in its willingness to let politics be decided through the barrel of a gun - that was the case on Crimea and it is the case in eastern Ukraine. Let us say, for the sake of the argument, that a majority of Crimeans wanted to join Russia. Let us say that most people in eastern Ukraine feel the same way. Well, why could observers from the OSCE and the UN not be admitted to Crimea before or during the referendum? Why does Churkin want to keep the UN away now? And, if regions in Ukraine can vote to join Russia (an idea for which arguments may be found), why could Chechnya not vote to secede from Russia? Should Russia even be in the North Caucasus anymore? Maybe Russia is welcome there - but Moscow will never allow a local referendum to decide the matter. Thousands have died in the North Caucasus during recent decades - many Russians among them - but apparently Dagestan is lower priority than Donetsk. Or maybe it is simply easier for Russia to deal with unrest in Ukraine, where the Kiev government can still be blamed for any trouble? Or maybe Ukraine, like the North Caucasus, remains subject to Russian "off the cuff" politics, in Tor Bukkvoll's wonderful phrase; resulting in reactive Russian responses to whatever may be happening on a given day.
It seems increasingly clear to me, anyway, that the crime of Vladimir Putin's Russia right now is less the imperial gluttony suggested by The Economist (http://www.economist.com/printedition/2014-04-19) and more a bumbling necessity to prove Russia as the great power of which Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeatedly reminds us. (http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/us-releases-photos-of-russian-troops-russia-us-trade-jabs-over-troubled-ukraine-deal/story-fni0xs63-1226892038216)
Dear Mr Lavrov - your Russia still has one of the highest income inequalities in Europe, if not much of the world (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/); significant proportions of your male population suffers from substance abuse, losing years of their lives in the process (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/russian-men-losing-years-to-vodka); your country appears to be more corrupt than Mali, than Nicaragua, than Pakistan... (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/) It is all fine and well that your government wants to protect Russians living in Ukraine; please remember to protect Russians living in Russia, too!
Unfortunately, Lavrov and his colleagues may not have much time in the coming days and weeks to focus on domestic challenges. Following recent events, acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and acting President Oleksandr Turchynov both directly blame Russia for the violent surge. And, in worrying tones, the militias occupying cities in eastern Ukraine are now uniformly referred to as "terrorists," to be treated as criminals, one would suspect, and not military representatives of a foreign state. I cannot but agree with Turchynov's (and the West's) call for Russia to withdraw its troops from Crimea (leaving the Black Sea Fleet, one would assume) and to unequivocally condemn any violence in eastern Ukraine. Yet Turchynov does not stop here - he is also calling for Ukrainian security forces to re-launch in the east. (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3D0C420140422). Last time the Ukrainian offensive here ended in farce; let us hope we will not soon see farce turn into widespread tragedy.
When Ukrainian tanks last week rolled into Slavyansk, only to be mobbed and stopped by civilians and (Russian?) militiamen it did not represent the finest hour for the Ukrainian army. However, in their seeming incompetence the Ukrainian armed forces did manage to hold their fire. Ukraine lost equipment, but no soldiers, or civilians, lost their lives. In its own muddled way, the "battle for Slavyansk" indicated that Russians and Ukrainians might be able to resolve the situation gradually, with threats but no deaths.
Now, blood is seeping through. Recently, pro-Russian militiamen were shot and killed in a murky firefight and now has been found the tortured body of what appears to be a pro-Ukrainian politician, from the Prime Minister's party, no less. It remains unclear precisely what happened to Volodymyr Rybak outside Slavyansk, but his fate may spur events on. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/22/ukraine-politician-found-dead_n_5192477.html)
It is possible that militias killed Mr Rybak to provoke open fighting with Ukrainian troops. It is also possible, if unproven, that the militias were spurred to the act by figures in the Russian regime. For now, Russia is not commenting on this murder and, indeed, is keeping fairly quiet in what could be anticipation or confusion. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has, once more, stressed that Russia can overcome any Western sanctions; that business and ordinary citizens should be kept free from political shenanigans. (http://rt.com/business/154012-sanctions-russia-stronger-medvedev/) UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, meanwhile, seems unsurprised that tensions will take a while to die down - and, following the recent UN report dismissing the claim of systematic threats to Russians in Ukraine, Churkin now wants UN far removed from eastern Ukraine. Apparently, the OSCE is now expected to stop any unrest that may appear, together with the Ukrainian conscience or some such. (http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_22/Prospect-of-UN-peacekeeping-operation-in-Ukraine-unreal-Russian-diplomat-9486/)
On the bright side, this is hardly belligerent talk from Medvedev and Churkin. At worst, if the Russian administration is connected to the militias currently occupying parts of eastern Ukraine - and if recent casualties on both sides have been at least partly provoked by Russian intents to keep Ukraine unstable - at least the tens of thousands of Russian troops lined up along the border with Ukraine do not seem to be on their way in. Certainly, their continued presence is ominous - unless Moscow fears a Ukrainian spearhead attack towards the Ural mountains there is no credible domestic reason why Russian tanks in these numbers need to be facing the border. Undoubtedly, Russia would consider an attack if actions by the Ukrainian state resulted (even indirectly) in civilian casualties, but so far this has mostly been avoided.
Having said this, though, developments in eastern Ukraine have left the acting government in Kiev in a difficult dilemma. One month remains before the presidential election to decide the successor to the exiled Viktor Yanukovych. Such an election seems impossible under current circumstances, with the most populous (and richest, bar Kiev) part of the country subject to unelected, masked rule. Even if the militias (or some of them) in eastern Ukraine are genuinely concerned with locals' welfare (unlikely given the readiness with which militias let unarmed civilians face down armed Ukrainian soldiers and tanks) they have not been elected by any significant part of the local population in any of the cities they occupy. Everything you need to know about the official Russian view of democracy is encapsulated in its willingness to let politics be decided through the barrel of a gun - that was the case on Crimea and it is the case in eastern Ukraine. Let us say, for the sake of the argument, that a majority of Crimeans wanted to join Russia. Let us say that most people in eastern Ukraine feel the same way. Well, why could observers from the OSCE and the UN not be admitted to Crimea before or during the referendum? Why does Churkin want to keep the UN away now? And, if regions in Ukraine can vote to join Russia (an idea for which arguments may be found), why could Chechnya not vote to secede from Russia? Should Russia even be in the North Caucasus anymore? Maybe Russia is welcome there - but Moscow will never allow a local referendum to decide the matter. Thousands have died in the North Caucasus during recent decades - many Russians among them - but apparently Dagestan is lower priority than Donetsk. Or maybe it is simply easier for Russia to deal with unrest in Ukraine, where the Kiev government can still be blamed for any trouble? Or maybe Ukraine, like the North Caucasus, remains subject to Russian "off the cuff" politics, in Tor Bukkvoll's wonderful phrase; resulting in reactive Russian responses to whatever may be happening on a given day.
It seems increasingly clear to me, anyway, that the crime of Vladimir Putin's Russia right now is less the imperial gluttony suggested by The Economist (http://www.economist.com/printedition/2014-04-19) and more a bumbling necessity to prove Russia as the great power of which Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeatedly reminds us. (http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/us-releases-photos-of-russian-troops-russia-us-trade-jabs-over-troubled-ukraine-deal/story-fni0xs63-1226892038216)
Dear Mr Lavrov - your Russia still has one of the highest income inequalities in Europe, if not much of the world (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/); significant proportions of your male population suffers from substance abuse, losing years of their lives in the process (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/russian-men-losing-years-to-vodka); your country appears to be more corrupt than Mali, than Nicaragua, than Pakistan... (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/) It is all fine and well that your government wants to protect Russians living in Ukraine; please remember to protect Russians living in Russia, too!
Unfortunately, Lavrov and his colleagues may not have much time in the coming days and weeks to focus on domestic challenges. Following recent events, acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and acting President Oleksandr Turchynov both directly blame Russia for the violent surge. And, in worrying tones, the militias occupying cities in eastern Ukraine are now uniformly referred to as "terrorists," to be treated as criminals, one would suspect, and not military representatives of a foreign state. I cannot but agree with Turchynov's (and the West's) call for Russia to withdraw its troops from Crimea (leaving the Black Sea Fleet, one would assume) and to unequivocally condemn any violence in eastern Ukraine. Yet Turchynov does not stop here - he is also calling for Ukrainian security forces to re-launch in the east. (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/uk-ukraine-crisis-idUKBREA3D0C420140422). Last time the Ukrainian offensive here ended in farce; let us hope we will not soon see farce turn into widespread tragedy.
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